The Isaq Somali Diaspora And‎ Poll-Tax Agitation In Kenya,

Continued from last week

By E. R. Turton ‎
University of Zambia ‎
Source: WardheerNews ‎
Kenya has always regarded the Somali as either an infernal ‎nuisance or embarrassment’. ‎
Glenday to Beckett, 21 June 1941 ‎
November 05, 2005‎

The support for the Kenya Isaq in British Somaliland

The Kenya Isaq had persuaded their clansmen in Burao as early as 1926 to raise the question of their status with the Governor of British Somaliland, and four years later the Burao Isaq presented the Duke of Gloucester with a memorandum on the same issue when he visited the Protectorate. After 1936, however, the Nairobi Isaq began to organize support in British Somaliland for their agitation more systematically. First, they started to correspond regularly with the Nadi Atiya Rahmani Association, a sort of Somali welfare club, which had been founded by Isaq traders in 1935 and which had branches in Burao, Hargeisa and Erigavo. Secondly, in 1938 they appointed Haji Farah Omar as their representative in British Somaliland . Educated in India , where he had been greatly influenced by Gandhi, Haji Farah was an experienced political leader, and, according to Touval, was ‘one of the first modern politicians to emerge in the Protectorate’. Within a matter of months Haji Farah had found an issue the proposal to introduce written Somali into the school curriculum which not only aroused widespread local opposition but which could also be closely linked to the struggle of the Isaq in Kenya over Asiatic status.

At this time, the administration in British Somaliland was preparing to implement a programme of educational expansion that was long overdue. A Director of Education was appointed for the first time in 1938 and it was hoped to open a number of new schools, starting with one at Berbera. It was also planned to introduce written Somali into the curriculum. Mr. Ellison, the new Director, arrived in the Protectorate in April 1938 and almost immediately began a tour of the government assisted Koranic schools. At that stage the government’s plans seem to have been accepted without opposition, though from the start a number of reservations were expressed at Berbera by certain influential religious leaders.

These reservations, which were initially religious, quickly acquired a political significance when they were supported by appeals from Isaq Somali in East Africa for full scale opposition to the introduction of written Somali. The Isaq in Kenya claimed Asiatic status partly on the basis that Arabic was their written language and they feared that this claim would be undermined if an alphabet were invented for the Somali language which was at that time only spoken. They therefore wrote to British Somaliland expressing their keen apprehension that if Somali were to be written in Roman script, as were many Bantu languages, Somalis everywhere would be reduced to the same status of the Bantu they despised. Many of these letters described the plight of the Isaq in East Africa in highly emotive terms; an Isaq trader from Moshi for example wrote to the Nadi Atiya Rahmani Association in Burao:

‘We are in a very bad condition and treated very severely in respect of the tax as some new regulations have been issued against us. Because we agreed to pay yearly the same taxes as the Indians and Asiatics and now we are ordered to pay the same taxes as slaves as if we are the natives of this Africa . . . . You must not think that he (the new Governor Sir Vincent Glenday) came to Somaliland to administer justice —No! No! No!—but he came to make you slaves as those in this Africa . . . This information must be kept secret.’

An impression was created in British Somaliland that should written Somali be accepted there, other disabilities against which the Isaq were vigorously campaigning in East Africa , such as poll-tax and registration, would likewise be introduced into the Protectorate. The fear that poll-tax might be introduced was not entirely unreasonable since the British Somaliland Protectorate must have been virtually unique in 1939 in not having any system of direct taxation. Earlier attempts to introduce tax had been dropped after bloodshed and riots. However, there was in fact little chance of any tax being introduced until the Somali clans had been disarmed and that did not happen until 1942. But additional substance was given to these fears when it was learnt in January 1939 that the Governor, Sir Arthur Lawrence was to be succeeded by Sir Vincent Glenday, who had previously been a Provincial Commissioner in Kenya primarily concerned with the Somali there. Glenday was described by the Nairobi Isaq in a telegram to the Secretary of State as an administrative officer venomously opposed to the Community’s efforts at rising of its status’ (sic). The telegram ended: ‘Appointment viewed with apprehension, in Somaliland may cause unrest.’ The interests of the Kenya Isaq in their struggle to pay a higher poll-tax, and thus secure a higher status for themselves, seemed more than ever at this point to coincide with the interests of their brethren in British Somaliland who felt their own status threatened by the possibility that Somali would be rendered in a Roman script.

This combination of religious and political opposition proved to be extremely potent, and resistance to the introduction of written Somali spread remarkably quickly. From the start, the leaders of the Qadiriyya tariqa (brotherhood) played a prominent part in securing widespread opposition to the idea of written Somali. In June 1938, Sheikh Ibrahim Egal, a Habr Awal Isaq, brought a letter from the leaders of the Qadiriyya tariqa at Berbera to the elders of the Salihiyya tariqa at Burao, appealing against Somali being taught in the schools; this letter was read out in the mosque at Burao.

At the same time, the qadi (judge) in Hargeisa also expressed his opposition to written Somali stating: ‘We Somalis are Arabs by origin and we like to consider ourselves as still being of the Arabic race. We can never consent to our being considered as Africans.’ He claimed that the issue over the status of the Isaq in East Africa was only a minor consideration and had not influenced his stand, but other religious spokesmen openly connected the two issues. On 15 July, at the feast of’ Aw Barkadle, two wadads (people who claim to be religious experts) spoke out against teaching Somali in the schools and specifically referred to the Isaq campaign in East Africa where, they stated, the Isaq were already classed with the Asians and the Arabs, and paid the same taxes as the latter; and they added that if Somali became a written language, they would then all be classified as Africans.

Even more disquieting for the administration were the rumors that were started and the allegations that were being made and widely circulated about the Director of Education:

‘In the mosques and coffee shops, in all the larger centers, it was preached that the Director of Education was a disguised Christian priest and that he had been seen in Aden wearing a beard (a supposed characteristic of Roman Catholic missionaries).’

It was suggested that the attempt to introduce written Somali was motivated by a desire to spread Christianity, for as long as Somali could not be written, so the argument ran, the Bible could not be propagated. It became quite common for Somalis to address the Director of Education as ‘Padre’, and the whole education scheme was brought into disrepute.

Meanwhile, the campaign against written Somali was also being organized along political lines. When in 1938 Haji Farah Omar had been contacted by the Kenya Isaq and appointed as their representative, he had immediately sought their financial assistance and had begun organizing political support for the anti-Somali movement. In particular, he had tried to get himself appointed ‘spokesman’ for the Somali, thereby by passing the political structure of traditional and government appointed headmen. His first success occurred at Burao where at the beginning of August he was chosen to be the ‘spokesman’ of the local Somali. A document signed by 125 people declared:

‘We the undersigned Akils and elders of British Somaliland do hereby declare that we have come to the conclusion that we have nominated and appoint Haji Farah Omar to represent British Somaliland subjects grievance and we fully authorize him to represent in whole matters which injures and interests the tribe. ‘

However, the akils and elders of Burao did not give Haji Farah authority to act simply as he thought best. He undertook to consult them about events that concerned their welfare and this consultation was to take place in Burao itself. He also agreed not to interfere in tribal disputes and to be impartial in tribal affairs. He agreed that his position was to be elective annually, and reserved the right to resign after giving four months’ notice. At the same time, Haji Farah successfully reorganized the normal decision-making structure by creating a small council, and it was normally this council and not the larger body of elders that he consulted before making representations to the Colonial Office.

He certainly lost no time in making the most of his new position. Within three days of being elected he sent the following telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies: ‘British Government loyal subjects lost complete confidence with this Government. They suffer spy raids, unbearable fines, other intolerable torture. Appeal for immediate protection from Distractors (i.e. District Officers) . . . Haji Farah Omar spokesman.’

By the end of August he was gaining support in Hargeisa. Signatures were collected supporting his appointment as ‘spokesman’ there, though a certain amount of intimidation was used. Many signatures were obtained through pressure exerted at the local branch of the Qadiriyya tariqa. In the mosque a wadady Abdillahi Warsama, was alleged to have declared: ‘The man who does not follow (other) Muslims and appoint Haji Farah Omar as spokesman is finished with religion. The few government interpreters who spoke against Warsama and Haji Farah Omar were openly called kafirs in the streets and jostled or threatened. When, therefore, Haji Farah was elected spokesman in Hargeisa, the administration began to look on his movement in a rather different light. Previously, it had been assumed that he was simply trying to unite the Somali in their grievances. It was now felt that his aims were ‘purely anti- Government and that he definitely wants to cripple the whole administration.

Nevertheless, the movement continued to grow and was beginning to make an impact on Protectorate affairs. The Governor came to the conclusion that the Protectorate’s educational policy would have to be held in abeyance for the time being, stating that ‘the opposition to written Somali is still almost universal.’ Meanwhile, Haji Farah got himself elected ‘spokesman’ in Berbera and persuaded the local akils to sign an obsequiously worded petition supporting Isaq agitation in East Africa which was sent to the Colonial Office:

‘In East Africa the Somali community is sometimes considered on the same level as the Negroes of East Africa. Since they pay non-native poll tax cannot the British Government assure them that they will get the same privileges as the non-Europeans residing there. We Somalis have always tried our utmost to show our loyalty to the Union Jack . . . Thousand and thousands of lives have been laid down for the British flag in East Africa not to mention Mesopotamia . During the struggle with the Mad Mullah we were fighting against our own countrymen but we realized that we were fighting for an ideal Government . . . This may not compare well to the sacrifices of other parts of the Empire but it surely proved our loyalty. . . (ends) long live the King.’

A few weeks later, in the middle of October, he sent another telegram to the Colonial Office, asking for a Royal Commission to be appointed immediately in order to investigate the unrest in the Protectorate. He claimed to be writing on behalf of the so-called Burao National Council, a characteristic hyperbole which referred to nothing more than the small consultative council Haji Farah normally created in those towns where he had been elected ‘spokesman’. The Colonial Office, however, was suitably impressed by the terminology and even the Governor was momentarily caught off balance by the hyperbole. He cabled that a most urgent reply was required but added that he had never heard of any National Council.

Haji Farah Omar, however, had over-reached himself. Nemesis followed swiftly, not as the result of any action by the British administration but through the rapid desertion of his followers. Both in Burao and in Berbera this was due to his high-handed manner and his failure to consult with the elders there. Twice he had sent telegrams to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the name of committees that had never functioned. In practice, he interpreted his role as ‘spokesman’ in a very different way from that of the people who had elected him.

By the end of the year, the ‘spokesman’ movement had died down and in December the school at Berbera was opened, though without written Somali being part of the curriculum. Religious opposition was also weakening, and, while the Qadiriyya tariqa remained steadfastly hostile, both the Salihiyya and the Andarawiyya turuq agreed to appoint Koran teachers at the school. More­over, the appeal of the religiously motivated claim that the Somali were essentially Arabs who accepted Arab culture declined until it was ultimately restricted to a tiny educated elite, who had for the most part visited Arabia . The ordinary coastal Somali, on the other hand, became increasingly conscious of a potential rivalry between themselves and the Arabs for jobs. This rivalry became so acute that in December 1938 it gave rise to the Nadi al-Shabiba el-Arabiya, an Arab Youth Club, established to protect Arab rights along the coast. It was so effective that in Jibuti jobs were divided equally between Somali and Arabs on the steamers of the Messageries Maritimes and the two no longer formed one body within the Syndical des gens de Mer.

At the beginning of 1939, the Governor visited the Atiya Rahmani Association and specifically criticized the use of the club for political discussion. Haji Farah Omar dropped out of the Isaq movement and the club does not seem to have played any further part in supporting the Isaq of Kenya. However, the situation was still potentially explosive in the Protectorate, and on 18 May 1939 the Director of Education was stoned by a hostile crowd when he was visiting the Koranic school at Burao.

Nevertheless, the ‘spokesman’ movement did not entirely disappear. At the same time that Haji Farah seemed to be losing popularity a new candidate appeared on the scene, Jama Siyad (also known as Jama Telephone), a Dolbahanta Herti. The Protectorate administration was never quite sure whether he was a potential rival to Haji Farah or working in league with him, but later events and oral testimony suggest that the two were co-operating closely. Haji Farah had achieved no success in British Somaliland . It was clearly time to start campaigning elsewhere and Jama Siyad was in an excellent position to do this, for he had lived almost 33 years in England and was obviously going to return there. In November 1938 he started visiting Erigavo, Burao and Las Anod in connection with the ‘spokesman’ movement, collecting money and signatures. The following year he undertook an extensive trip to the out­ lying areas of the Protectorate, always trying and sometimes succeeding to get himself appointed as delegate to represent the Somali in England where he returned in March 1940.

The attempt by the Kenya Isaq to gain effective support from their clansmen in British Somaliland had not proved to be very productive, whilst at the same time being a costly undertaking. Far from contributing to the financial resources of the Kenya Somali, their clansmen in British Somaliland demanded payment for their assistance. Moreover, the orchestration of Isaq grievances from Burao and Berbera probably only intensified and widened the opposition of the British Government to their demands. Strongly worded dispatches from the Somaliland Protectorate, warning of the dangers and pointing out the broader implications of granting them Asiatic status, were often referred to by Colonial Officials as one reason for not acceding to Isaq requests. As their allies in British Somaliland proved less effective than anticipated, so the Isaq increasingly pinned their hopes on their supporters in Britain .

.........................to be continued

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