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ISSUE 133
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By Francis A. Kornegay
In this presentation, I am going to start from where I left off from a
previous presentation that was entitled: "Somalia/Somaliland Dynamics as a
Case Study in the International Politics of the Stalemated Reconstitution of
a Collapsed State: Tentative Thoughts on Stabilizing the Somali Coast."
The main point was that there might need to be a level politico-diplomatic
playing field between Somalia and Somaliland rather than another automatic
recognition for a new interim Mogadishu regime at the expense of continued
diplomatic limbo for Hargeisa.
This could also be viewed as a conflict prevention measure to forestall
possible [Somaliland –Somali] conflict.
I have decided to take this tact as a means of extrapolating from the crisis
of the state in the Somali coast sub-region of the Horn of Africa to try and
illuminate a wider set of considerations regarding peace and security in
this part of the continent which, in turn, may illuminate the overall
African governance challenge: the elusive quest for arriving at stabilizing
formulas for the political management of diversity on perhaps the most
diverse of continents.
Within the context of the Somali coast, this conundrum seems all the more
paradoxical given the deception, from the vantage-point of the uninitiated,
of a uni-ethnic monolith whereas in reality, beneath the surface of this
apparent ethnic uniformity, there exist complex fault-lines defined by clan,
region and colonial legacies compounded by various external influences that
have proved every much as polarizing as divisions anywhere else on the
continent. More than that, if a uni-ethno-linguistic territorial state is
not possible in the Somali region of the Horn of Africa, what does this say
about the fragile national identities of other colonially-derived African
states at a time when regional integration may offer the entire African
continent a greater chance of fulfilling its potential by overcoming the
legacies of colonial fragmentation?
The backdrop of all this, however, in 2004 is how to move forward in
conflict resolution in a manner that consolidates rather than promotes more
fragmentation on the continent; fragmentation being the key to Africa's
endemic instability, misgovernance and weakness. Furthermore, it is crucial
to recognize a paradigm shift as having occurred with the OAU's transition
to the African Union (AU), the AU constituting, in effect, a continental
proto-government that, according to AU Commission Chairman, Alpha Konare,
aims to evolve toward a confederated inter-African system. The question is:
how can conflict resolution along the Somali Coast contribute to this
evolution? How can this happen within a larger regional integration process
within Northeast Africa? This is
where I believe that the manner in which the fates of Somaliland and the new
attempt at an interim regime in southern Somalia are handled become central,
not just for stabilizing of the Somali coast, but for a wider sub-regional
accommodation.
My concluding point during the earlier presentation involved taking as my
reference point, recommendations that had been put forth by the
International Crisis Group (ICG) to the effect that there existed a need for
an international diplomatic intervention to overcome the regional divisions
reflected in IGAD as a precondition to breaking the negotiating stalemate
over Somalia. What I proposed was an additional caveat for consideration
regarding the issue of the statuses of Somaliland and the TNG and/or a TNG
successor coming out of the Nairobi peace-talks.
In Search of a Level Playing Field Between Mogadishu & Hargeisa
What was offered as an untried option was to consider constructing a
politico-diplomatic level playing field between Somaliland and the TNG or
TNG successor whereby the log-jam would be broken over the issue of
recognizing Somaliland: the African Union (AU) might be persuaded/encouraged
to grant Somaliland observer status within the AU while the TNG's status
would be adjusted from one of full diplomatic recognition to observer status
as well. Full diplomatic recognition and membership in the AU would be made
conditional on both Somalia and Somaliland implementing or buying into an
internationally-backed joint Somali coast stabilization process, the
elements of which might include the following:
The initiating of a follow-on or complementary track to the current Nairobi
process whereby there would be undertaken an open-ended Somalia-Somaliland
dialogue on the future of the Somali coast with all options being considered
as to how the Somali coast might evolve and which would be facilitated by an
out-of-area 'contact group' comprising Algeria, South Africa and Nigeria
–long-term members of the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) – as
adjuncts to the IGAD. This dialogue could be called the Somali Coast
Governance Forum.
In effect, there may be a need for AU/PSC oversight and facilitation as an
interactive complementary input emerging from the Nairobi process and a
follow-on, open-ended Somalia-Somaliland dialogue.
The outcome of such a dialogue would be feed back to the AU and would serve
as the determination on how the AU should proceed from the leveling point of
AU observer status for both Somaliland and the Somali successor TNG to
another level of diplomatic recognition for one or both parties.
In the meantime, the UN's "Monitoring Group" could be beefed up into a
Transactions Monitoring Commission (TMC) overseeing arms embargo violations
and financial transactions involving non-Somali state actors and one or
another Somali client actor.
An added role of a TMC, as a monitoring body, could be to monitor violence
and/or cease-fire arrangements between different Somali coast actors by
fielding peace monitors. This could/should reflect a joint collaboration
between the AU's PSC and a TMC and should be entrenched in a Somali Coast
Peace Accord that all Somali actors, including Somaliland as well as the
successor Somalia TNG and related groups should be party to. All IGAD member
states should sign on as well. The peace accord and associated monitoring
would complement and reinforce the prospective deployment of a UN
multinational force as contemplated by the current peace process.
Beyond what has been proposed here, my own sense is that it may, at some
point, be beneficial to consider a converging of the
peace/transition/conflict resolution processes of the Somali coast and the
Sudan into a wider sub-regional stabilization programme.
Peace & Security and Regional Cooperation/Integration in Northeast Africa
A Somaliland-Somalia Governance Forum might constitute one pillar of
dialogue and stabilization within an overarching Conference on Security,
Stability, Development and cooperation for Northeast Africa; in other words,
a regionalization of the AU's CSSDCA to specifically address long-term
peace-building and regional integration in this part of the continent within
a structured dialogue framework.
Given the dynamics of conflict and possible accommodation in both Sudan and
the Somali regions, what might the future architecture of the sub-region
look like? In the past rear or two, scholars from this sub-region have
actually deliberated on the distant prospect of a federation in the Horn of
Africa. In fact, attempts at federalism in the sub- region are not new.
Besides the failed federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea, Alex de Waal, in an
article on "The African state and global governance" cites an attempted
federation between Ethiopia and Djibouti which was vetoed by what he called
"the rents that Djibouti's rulers can extract from the international
system." There is also the possibility that the revived East African
Community, whose leaders have openly voiced support for political federation
could trigger a federalizing process in the Horn of Africa as well though
the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation advocates that the East African Community –
which, next year, launches it customs union – be extended to eventually
include Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC. On the other hand, within the NEPAD
sub-regional framework, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia are grouped within the
"Eastern Africa Countries & Indian Ocean Island States" with its secretariat
in Kenya.
In spite of the failure at federalism in the Horn of Africa, the lessons of
both the break-up of Somalia and the regionally-based conflicts in Sudan, is
that self-governing regional autonomy will have to be accommodated as the
centre piece of any effort at politically stabilizing this sub-region; and I
emphasize self-governing regional autonomy rather than sovereignty since,
without popular sovereignty, 'sovereignty' is a meaningless concept for a
greedy, power-hungry elite with a vested interest in centralizing all power
and resources under their control in a zero-sum game of cut-throat
competition with rival elites – all the while protecting elite enrichment by
evoking national or state sovereignty.
Sovereignty in Africa tends to be "elite sovereignty" and, therefore
inimical to the interests of a more effective level of sovereignty at the
pan-African level on the one hand, and the more localized interests of grass
roots communities on the other.
Autonomous self-government within a wider sub-regional and continental
sovereignty allowing room for sub-national political expression, in my view,
is closer to the reality of what Africa's peoples are essentially striving
for in the new era of AU and NEPAD. The lessons of conflict history in
Northeast Africa, including the experiences in the Somali region, I think,
proves this point. Does anyone, for example, think that the Sudan can remain
one territorially integrated country in the absence of a democratizing
federalism that allows for substantial autonomy, not just for the south, but
for other sub-national regions like Darfur? In the absence of a larger
federal solution, would it not be expected that south Sudan will opt for
independence and possible accession to an expanding East African Community
which, itself may evolve into a federation?
And, of course, your own history and self-determination aspirations rule out
a renewed attempt at a centralizing unitary governing formula for the Somali
coast at the risk of continuing conflict. At an inter-state level,
federalism can be complemented and reinforced by enhanced regional
cooperation which, in turn, given Ethiopia's federal or quasi-federal
framework, could provide the basis for wider inter-state political
integration in the sub-region. In this regard, revisiting a federal link
between Ethiopia and Djibouti could be reconsidered. It is quite possible,
that the five-star unity of the Somali nation could be a viable option
within a wider Northeast African federation or confederacy.
In the meantime, ongoing negotiations over the Nile Basin, which defines the
greater Northeast African ecosystem inclusive of the Horn and the East
African Community, holds out the promise of eventually reconciling
contradictions between up-stream and down-stream countries in arriving at an
economically sustainable accommodation to the benefit of all Nile Basin
countries.
Further reinforcing sub-regional accommodation might be a Red Sea
cooperative security regime involving Yemen that might transform current
tensions isolating Eritrea into a greater Northeast African, trans-Red Sea
security community. This could be crucial to building regional stability
given the current Ethiopia-Sudan-Yemen alliance against Eritrea and the
latter's support for opponents of these countries' regimes, including,
reportedly, the Ogaden National Liberation Front – once again, underlining
the need for an approach to stabilizing the Somaliland-Somalia relationship
within the context of a wider regional integration focused peace and
security strategy. This gets us back to the idea of a Somali coast
governance forum serving as a focal point pillar for a larger peace-
building framework for the Horn of Africa.
Conclusion: A United Nations Point of Departure?
From a practical standpoint of implementation, the collaboration between the
UNDP and the UN Economic Commission for Africa in
convening their African Governance
Forum (AGF) and ECA's own African Development Forum, could be critically
explored as models that might be adapted for an inter-Somali and/or a
broader inter-Northeast African dialogue on political and economic
governance and regional cooperation. The calabashes of the AU's CSSDCA could
be adapted for the purpose of hammering out issue agendas for individual
member states in the Horn of Africa and the sub-region as a whole.
Such a peace-building process would be a natural complement to any
peacekeeping deployments contemplated for the post-conflict situations. In
fact, conventional peacekeeping in the absence of peace-building and
post-conflict recovery initiatives is probably not sustainable. This is the
thinking currently being articulated by some South African proponents of
what's termed "Developmental Peacekeeping."
An open-ended inter-Somali dialogue aimed at stabilizing conflict tendencies
contained in the Somaliland-Somalia stalemate would appear to be a natural
starting point for such a process with the support of all African and
international stakeholders in bringing peace and security to the Somali
region. In the process, the unique experience that Somalis have acquired in
which all social partners have participated in discussions about the future
of the region and its constituent entities can benefit the quest for peace
and security among all Somali-speaking communities and the wider Horn of
Africa sub- region.
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