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Aniis Abdillahi Essa, Washington DC, USA
Siyad Barre made an unfamiliar and strange move in 1984. He caught the world by surprise when he turned to South Africa for help. His political and diplomatic isolation coupled with his opportunistic and unpredictable character forced him to turn to racist South Africa for help. Most likely he figured that the only country engaged in a Barre-like oppression was South Africa. The contacts were initiated by a well-connected Barre aide who flew several secret missions to South Africa. Those were later followed by a secret but official two days visit of the Somali Minister of Defense to Johannesburg in 1984.
Arrangements were made for an economic and military pact between Siad’s regime and the South African government. The foreign Minister of South Africa, Pik Botha, later paid an official visit to Mogadhishu without the knowledge of the Somali people. During the visit the arrangements were finalized and an agreement was signed. In the agreement the South African Airlines was granted over flight and landing rights on Somali airports. Similar privileges were given to the South African armed forces to use the ports at Kismayo and Mogdishu. In return, Siad Barre received 20 million dollars in economic aid and a huge chunk of military equipment that the South African forces captured from Angolan troops. Two dozens of MERCENARIES were also brought to Baidoa to train Barre’s troops.
The Barre-South Africa alliance did not stop the SNM. As a matter of fact, the SNM forces made a full-scale infiltration into Somalia in October 1984. They literally shook Siyad Barre's regime, particularly in the Northern regions. During that period the 26th Sector of the Barre army and their reinforcement units reported 983 casualties and many injuries. The results of that infiltration were phenomenal for the following reasons:
The SNM successfully tested its fighting capability.
Barre's regime encountered an unpleasant surprise and bitterly accepted the reality of the SNM.
SNM secured the attention of the diplomatic community in Somalia and, therefore, received great publicity of both national and international significance.
Hundreds of Barre's troops took advantage of the situation and deserted.
In a retaliatory move, Siyad Barre accelerated his reprisal attacks against innocent civilians and nomads. The following dated report will shed some light as to how indiscriminately Siyad Barre's regime Killed and executed innocent civilians without any charges or trial.
On October 16, 1984 six civilians were executed in Arabsiyo including an 80 and 60 years old men. On November 19, 198437 civilians were executed in an around Hargeisa. Four others were executed in Go'a, between Hargeisa and Burao, on November 20, 1984. On December 21, 1984 47 civilians were executed in Burao. Between October and December of the same year 76 more civilians were executed and more than 1350 were imprisoned in and around Hargeisa, Sheikh, and Burao. On October 2, 1984 the so-called National Security Court sentenced 7 high school students to death in Hargeisa. 21 others were given life sentences. The ages of those students ranged from 16-18 years. "We are concerned that they did not get a fair trail", said Helen Scoville, an area coordinator for Amnesty International in an article published by the Washington Post on October 24, 1984.
THE APPEASEMENT POLICY
Having recognized the military might of the SNM, Siyad Barre started a different kind of tribal politics. As this stage he realized that the South African connection did more harm than good. Therefore, he engaged himself in what could be termed as a policy of appeasement. He organized cohorts of people who were grouped along tribal lines whose purposes were to bring about conciliatory efforts between his regime and the supporters of the SNM. Tribal delegations laden with material goods and empty promises were dispatched to all areas where the movement's activities and influences were prevalent.
At times those delegations spent more than three months in towns like Hargeisa, Burao, and Berbera and villages on the border like ballidhiig, Dufukhsay, salahlay, balligubadle, Aidaroosh and Balli Abane. They were instructed to persuade their fellow clansmen to stop supporting the SNM by offering them cash and by making promises for reform. Those delegations found themselves between a rock and a hard place. Their conciliatory efforts ended in vain for the damage that Siyad Barre had already done was irreparable.
The appeasement Policy which was designed only to undermine the SNM did not work for several reasons. First the movement engaged itself in a counter campaign educating the villagers and the nomads about the intentions of Siyad Barre and his collaborators. Secondly, it fulfilled several successful military operations during the period that the appeasement policy was in effect. Having suffered a great deal of damage, Siyad Barre cracked down on the people that he was attempting to persuade. There were instances that members of these delegations were detained for failing to bring about results in their missions. Thirdly, people got used to his temporary conciliatory efforts, which have proven to be a series of fruitless missions.
The SNM movement inflicted considerable damage on Barre's regime politically, economically, morally, and militarily. It waged successive and frequent attacks against Barre's troops inside the country and at the border. Many of the combat and transport vehicles as well as the logistical supplies that the SNM used had been captured from Barre's troops in the battle field. It is a fact, however that the Somali public and the international communities are not fully aware of the victories achieved by the SNM within the short period of its existence.
Politically, SNM succeeded in pulling the carpet from under Siyad Barre's feet by convincing hundreds of Barre's armed forces and government personnel that they were in the wrong corner of the court. In 1985 only, 471 soldiers deserted Siyad Barr and joined the SNM. Still many others defected and mingled with their nomadic communities both inside Somalia and Ethiopia. SNM also gained new grounds by opening new bases and gaining the support of previously unreached communities. It also organized the sympathetic masses and prepared them for actual participation in the liberation struggle. Finally, the SNM reached out for the Somali communities abroad. Consequently, SNM had a total of 27 branches functioning in foreign countries.
Militarily, the SNM scored successive victories against Barre and his troops. As an illustration of the victories of the SNM forces, let us briefly recount some of these operations:
From June 13, 1985 to June 18, 1986 the SNM fulfilled 53 operations comprising ambushes, minor and major operations, an average of one operation per week. In those operations Barre's troops suffered 908 casualties and 444 wounded. Among the dead were 15 officers, the Las-Anod District Commissioner, Col. Adan Abdirahman, Luq District Commissioner, Adan Waranle, and his assistant, Hassan Dini. SNM captured 16 combat vehicles, a large number of small arms, ammunition and communication equipment. 49 more combat vehicles were destroyed by the SNM forces. During those operations SNM freed 17 political prisoners from the Las-Anod Jail. The prisoners were safely transferred to the SNM bases. The Somali National Movement lost a total of 62 Mujaahid in those operations including Mohamoud Haji Hassan (Hurre) and Ibrahim Adan Saeed. Two SNM trucks were also destroyed. The operations clearly indicated the tactical superiority of the SNM forces and their dedication to the liberation struggle.
Initiation of Conciliatory Talks with Ethiopia
When Siyad Barre failed in all his attempts to dislodge and discredit the SNM, he finally opted for initiation of conciliatory efforts and conflict resolution procedures with Ethiopia. History clearly indicates that Siyad Barre never had any real intentions to sit down with the Ethiopian government in an attempt to bring about lasting peace in the Horn. For over 16 years, Siyad labeled the Ethiopian government as imperialistic. He denigrated that nation many times by calling Ethiopia a black colonialist. He campaigned against his neighbor for so long to discredit it in the eyes of the international community. On the other hand, Siyad Barre, time and again, condemned the SNM for being traitorous simply because it established itself on Ethiopian soil. As a matter of fact, while Siyad Barre was busy pouring rhetoric and sowing enmity between the two neighboring peoples, the SNM in cooperation with the Ethiopian local authorities succeeded in bringing about understanding between the two people.
Why then Barre's peace initiative now? We think that there is no better way to answer this question than to quote the statement issued by the SNM Chairman, Mujaahid Ahmed Mohamed Sillanyo, on the Barre-Ethiopian talks in Djibouti in January 1986. The Statement read "It is clear that the successes of the Somali opposition and the intensity of the struggle of the people spearheaded by the SNM have driven Siyad Barre to what amount, on his part, to an act of desperation. For him this is purely a tactical move with the sole aim of weakening the SNM and the denial of vital support among the Somali people and their friends for the armed struggle against his corrupt and dictatorial regime. That is why he does not admit that he (Afweyne) has come around to the position of the opposition on the issue of peace between Somalia and Ethiopia."
SNM welcomes any genuine initiatives between Somalia and Ethiopia leading to lasting peace between the two countries and their peoples. It is important that we understand that SNM is not a product of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict.
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