From The Economist print edition
How the march to war affects Africa
Johannesburg, Lagos, Nairobi (3/13/03) - "SEE that man?" said an excited Somali militiaman, pointing at a yawning, middle-ranking American diplomat. "He has the power to crush Somalia with one hand." The scene was a hotel in Kenya, where Somalia's interminable peace talks drag on. Many of the warlords are there largely because they are terrified that America will invade their country if they do not at least pretend to be seeking an end to their decade-old civil war. An absurd delusion, perhaps, but a surprisingly common one. As America prepares to swat Saddam Hussein, the breeze from its flywhisk is blowing Africans in all sorts of unexpected directions.
Most obviously, the three African members of the UN Security Council have had to spend recent weeks agonizing over how to vote. The Angolan government, a nasty, oil-rich regime that the Americans tried to topple during the cold war, is not wildly enthusiastic about their current plan to topple a nasty, oil-rich regime in Iraq. Cameroon's government is less nasty, and has less oil, but is more dependent on France. Guinea has no moral qualms about the use of force to overthrow dictators, at least judging by the way it backs rebels trying to overthrow Charles Taylor, the despot in neighboring Liberia.
Africans in countries that America suspects of abetting terrorists are more worried. Sudan, which used to harbor Osama bin Laden, was trying to mend relations with America even before September 11th 2001. After the twin towers crumpled, the country's Islamist government handed over terrorist suspects and (though it denies it) offered America the use of some air bases. It also made extra efforts to be seen to be negotiating a peace deal with rebels from the country's mainly pagan and Christian south.
Somalia has also felt America's hot breath, though to little effect. Because it fits the stereotype of a terrorist haven-a failed state with a Muslim population-America looked for al-Qaeda there. Local warlords assured them that the country's transitional government was riddled with bin Ladenites, not necessarily because it was, but because they wanted the Americans to bomb it. When the Americans realized they were being gulled, they lost interest, although some Somalis, as mentioned, have been slow to catch on.
The most strident criticism of America's new assertiveness has come from South Africa. The president, Thabo Mbeki, speaks more passionately about the need to stop war in Iraq than about issues over which he has actual influence, such as AIDS and Zimbabwe. Last month, he sent a team to Baghdad to share South Africa's expertise in disposing of weapons of mass destruction. (The apartheid regime had nuclear arms, but got rid of them.) Kgalema Motlanthe, the ruling party's secretary-general, predicted that because South Africa has minerals, "if we don't stop this unilateral action against Iraq today, tomorrow [America] will come after us."
More plausible is Mr. Mbeki's warning that war in Iraq could damage African economies. He says that donor money is likely to be diverted from Africa to aid post-war Iraq, and that high oil prices may push oil-importers into debt. He has a point. If war or the fear of it causes a global slowdown, this would hurt African commodity exports. Shares in Johannesburg touched a 17-month low on March 11th. But African tourism is sizzling, at least in places that seem far from Iraq: arrivals in South Africa rose 20% last year. African oil-exporters too should be in clover.
But they are not, on the whole, dealing wisely with the windfall. Oil prices may be high now, but after the war, when Iraq's huge oil fields come on stream again, they will probably subside. Countries that depend heavily on oil-and most African oil producers sell little else-should be carefully saving their earnings to see them through the lean times to come, or at least finding ways to hedge against future price volatility. But most are not.
History, alas, is repeating itself. After the oil shocks in the 1970s, African oil producers blew the windfall, borrowed against future oil revenues, and blew that money too. Nigeria's external debt is now 25 times larger than in 1973, but Nigerians are no richer. During the last Gulf war, a high oil price failed to yield significantly higher government revenues, as much of the extra cash was apparently stolen.
This year, higher oil prices have led to fuel shortages in Nigeria. By government decree, petrol is sold at a fixed, below-market price. When the world price rises, so do the profits from smuggling fuel out of the country. The dilapidated state oil refinery cannot keep pace, so the pumps in Lagos have run dry, and motorists have to queue for hours to refuel. The information minister, Jerry Gana, blames "saboteurs" who want to discredit the government in the run-up to elections in April.
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