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International Crisis Group Report On Somaliland, Democratization And Its Discontents, Part V
ISSUE 87
Front Page
Index

Headlines

- Somaliland Ministers Hold Discussions With Donors In Addis-Ababa

- Rayale Heading For Confrontation With Parliament Over Appointees
- International Crisis Group Report On Somaliland: Democratization And Its Discontents
Part VIII

Health

- Drug: The Double Edged Knife (Part 23)

- The Deadlier Legacy Of Aids

International News

- US Military Base A Boon For Djibouti's Economy

- Peace On The Football Field

- Sixth Man Charged Over Kenya Blasts

- Business Thrives In Sea Of Poverty

- U.S. Terror Fears Ensnare Ottawa Man

- Court Upholds Blocking Deportation Of Somalis

Peace Talks

- Ministry Yet To Pay Hoteliers In Eldoret

- Moi Blames Somali Conflict On Neighbors

Arts & Entertainment

 

Editorial & Opinions

- Rayale’s Worst Enemy Is Rayale

- The Rape Of Somali Territory And It’s Consequences To-Day


Part VIII

Continued from the previous issue

C. THE POLL

On 14 April 2003, nearly half a million Somalilanders turned out to vote for a new president. The conduct of the poll was peaceful, orderly and transparent, and when the sun set, domestic and foreign observers alike expressed their approval at the free and transparent nature of the exercise.

For a state as impoverished as Somaliland, the logistics of the exercise were formidable: the 902 polling stations planned for by the NEC required 5,600 civilian employees and nearly 3000 security personnel. The total cost, estimated at U.S.$1 million, represented approximately 5 per cent of the government’s annual budget. Fortunately for the NEC, whose finances were stretched to the limit by government foot-dragging in releasing the total budget, a small group of donors (the UK, Denmark, and Switzerland) came forward with an eleventh hour contribution of nearly U.S.$300,000.

There were several important differences between the organization of the presidential and local elections. Long queues and late closings during the local elections had persuaded the Electoral Commission to increase the number of polling stations by more than 100. Presiding officers, who had previously been appointed from the communities in which they worked, were crossassigned.

Perhaps most importantly, political parties had learned the significance of having responsible party agents present at all polling stations, and the NEC made provisions for a higher level of training for its staff and party agents just prior to the poll.

In addition to party agents, domestic and international observers were out in strength – 32 international observers representing various organizations and governments managed to visit roughly 300 of the 785 polling stations. Observer reports were uniformly positive, and no major irregularities were noted, although there were credible reports in some areas of multiple voting. Several polling stations returned somewhat dubious counts unanimously in favor of one party or the other. But since party agents were present in all locations and signed off on the vote counts as accurate, allegations of cheating were difficult, if not impossible, to substantiate.

In the absence of voter registration, the ‘indelible’ ink used to mark voters was key to preventing multiple voting. Dissatisfied with the French ink used during the local elections, the NEC had arranged to procure British ink manufactured in Kenya for the presidential round. Unfortunately, the new ink turned out to be soluble in kerosene, mild bleach, and lemon juice – a deficiency that party agents were quick to exploit. In major towns, credible reports circulated of party offices equipped with buckets of bleach or kerosene relieving voters of their ink stains and sending them out to vote again. Although no party resisted the temptation to exploit the NEC’s lapse, observers tended to agree that Kulmiye benefited the most. “They were simply better organized and more determined when it came to double voting”, an NEC commissioner opined to ICG.

On balance, the poll was tolerably fair, with all parties profiting more or less equally from procedural loopholes. Election observers unanimously reported their satisfaction with the exercise, and although all parties subsequently raised specific grievances, none complained of systematic rigging. The election also seemed to have surpassed popular expectations and the local press was full of glowing reports. “There was a huge sense of pride after 14 April”, Rakiya Omaar, director of the respected human rights organization African Rights, told ICG. “There was a sense of achievement. By definition we had entered a new era”. The glow of Somaliland’s “new era” was almost extinguished by what followed.

D. THE RESULTS

Long before polling day, it was clear that the outcome of the presidential election would be a close call. But when, on the afternoon of 19 April, the NEC finally declared the preliminary results, the margin of victory was uncomfortably thin: UDUB had won by only 80 votes.

Prior to the elections, party leaders on all sides had committed themselves to abide by the electoral outcome. But the NEC’s wobbly calculations, which involved errors, omissions and the disqualification of over a dozen ballot boxes, invited controversy.

Both Kulmiye and UDUB cried foul and began to prepare complaints for submission to the Supreme Court, which was scheduled to announce the definitive results on 8 May.

Kulmiye’s initial challenge, which it presented at a Hargeysa press conference on 23 April, was deceptively simple: the NEC had simply botched its math and erroneously dropped 156 Kulmiye votes.
Using the NEC’s own figures, Kulmiye reckoned it had actually won the election by 76 votes. But the commission stuck by its figures, and argued that, even if mistakes had been made, only the Supreme Court could now revise the preliminary election results. Its final report on the process asserts: The preliminary results were just that…. preliminary results. The final authority of [sic] declaring the winner of the election is the Supreme Court. The framers of the electoral law, the Parliament, recognized this need and had accordingly established this system which provides the parties with a legal forum to present their grievances in the event they decide to contest the preliminary results.

Procedurally speaking, the Commission’s position was solid, but its refusal to review its own figures in light of Kulmiye’s allegations drew angry charges that the commissioners had just “passed the buck” and awakened suspicion of their motives.

UDUB also contested the election results, aiming to enlarge its margin of victory and to ensure that it was not overturned by the court. The party argued that the NEC had improperly annulled a number of ballot boxes from pro-UDUB constituencies, representing over 10,000 votes. But the NEC’s disqualification of certain boxes on procedural grounds had been decided in close consultation with local party representatives – including UDUB. And since both UCID and Kulmiye were in a position to lodge similar complaints, it was unlikely that the court would agree to reverse the NEC’s decision, which would essentially require a complete recount.

When Kulmiye took its case to the Supreme Court during the first week of May, it took a different tack.

Instead of contesting the NEC tallies, the party’s main argument focused on the NEC’s omission of a ballot box from the village of Balle’Alanle, a pro-Kulmiye constituency. Kulmiye never explained why it chose to downplay its previous claims of NEC tabulation errors, leaving others to draw their own conclusions. “They realized they were wrong,” one of the electoral commissioners subsequently told ICG. “It’s true that there had been some typographical errors in transcription, but the totals were correct […] The votes Kulmiye claimed it had lost were in fact included in the Commission’s totals”.

Whatever the reason, the Supreme Court was unmoved by the complaints brought by either side, and refused to open additional ballot boxes. But the final decision announced by Chief Justice Sa’id Farah on 11 May served to further mystify the outcome: according to the court, UDUB had won not by 80 votes but by 217. “[The Supreme Court’s] judgment has confused the picture further for many in Somaliland, by presenting a whole new set of figures and failing to provide any convincing legal argument to justify its decision”, charged a highly critical report of the process.

On 16 May 2003, Rayale was sworn in as Somaliland’s president in a low-key ceremony at State House from which opposition leaders were absent. UCID, satisfied with its unexpectedly robust third place finish, quickly announced its acceptance of the results. But when Kulmiye rejected the outcome and declared the court’s decision illegitimate, Somalilanders at home and abroad held their breath, fearful of the worst. “There is a real danger of conflict,” a close observer of the process told ICG just days after Rayale’s swearing in. “People don’t want to go back to [war], but there are also those who see no alternative”.

To be continued next week.

 

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