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ISSUE 89
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Somalia's New Power-Brokers Survive Amid Chaos
By William Maclean
MOGADISHU, 02 Oct 2003 (Reuters) - In Mogadishu, motorists drive on the
right, left or centre: It's up to them. Bereft of police, victims pursue
community justice against rapists and murderers.
Offshore, foreign ships fish or dump toxic waste at will, their only concern
to dodge the guns of Somali pirates. The Somali capital's airport and sea
port have been shut since 1995.
Tax goes only to warlords, who buy weapons in defiance of an arms embargo
even as they talk peace and have their pick of 240 bush airstrips to trade
an array of contraband and hard drugs.
Mediators toiling to reverse Somalia's long collapse must confront a
12-year-old puzzle: the failure of the Horn of Africa country to cobble
together even a figment of central authority.
If warlords in Afghanistan or Democratic Republic of Congo can agree a
semblance of government -- and win rich pickings in donor funds in return --
why not their Somali counterparts?
The stakes are high, and not just for Somalis. The country is now cited by
U.S. officials as an ideal transit point for "terrorists" wishing to attack
Western targets in east Africa.
The reasons are many: divisive clan rivalries, the irresponsibility of
power-crazed faction leaders, fear of a revived predatory state,
destabilisation by neighbouring countries and ill-informed, incompetent
external diplomacy.
These realities, however, are common to many of the world's most troubled
countries.
QUARRELLING ELITE
"Somalia's inability to preserve even a minimum fig leaf of central
administration over 12 years puts it in a class by itself among the world's
failed states," wrote Ken Menkhaus, a U.S. scholar on Somalia.
"The fact that Somalia's quarrelling elite has
not been able to make such a cynical bargain among themselves is itself a
puzzle. Somalia is, in an odd way, a failure among failed states."
The country disintegrated into anarchy after former dictator Mohammed Siad
Barre was toppled in 1991 as clans pressured by famine and political turmoil
launched battles for territory.
The country now comprises two self-declared enclaves in the north and a
patchwork of quarrelling clan fiefdoms in the south.
These days Somalia watchers explore other reasons why the nation of up to 10
million remains in the grip of lawlessness.
Key businessmen and politicians, they say, have learned to thrive in such
conditions. And crucially, each has the ability by himself, or in alliance
with just one or two other "spoilers", to sabotage promising peace
initiatives.
"Unless you can make peace more profitable, and war more risky, chances are
things will continue the way they have been," said Somalia expert Andre Le
Sage.
In the early 1990s, warlords were the main players, making fortunes from the
diversion of foreign aid.
But as aid to the violent south has diminished, those opportunities have
vanished. Also, financial gains from the capture of land in inter-clan
conflict were mostly exhausted long ago.
In recent years a new breed of warlord-businessmen has emerged with the
acumen to run quasi-legitimate ventures.
These days, to earn money, it is usually not enough for the original
warlords to apply the skills they know -- piracy, kidnapping and extortion.
They must also pursue tie-ups with the new business elite, whose security
tend to include better gunmen and weaponry than the warlords' own private
armies.
A report by a U.N. panel of experts on Somalia said in March that several
warlords had acquired a new commercial sideline -- taking cash from Western
intelligence agencies in return for providing dubious information about
"terrorists" in Somalia.
Paradoxically, the businesses now run by the new entrepreneurs such as
transport and construction would benefit from the kind of "paper" state that
would be created by a cabal of politicians seeking international legitimacy,
experts say.
Up for grabs would be everything from development loans to rental on
property let out to diplomatic missions, not to mention a wide array of
reconstruction contracts.
TOO RISKY
"(Such a government) would dramatically increase the spoils over which
political predators could feast. But it would remain unable to enforce the
rule of law at a level that would threaten the illicit interests of this
elite," wrote Menkhaus.
While some might benefit from a more stable central power, they cannot be
certain it will be an arrangement to their benefit. So even a nominal
government is a step too far.
"For Mogadishu businessmen who made their fortunes in a setting of complete
state collapse, the transition to an environment of state governance -- even
a paper state -- proved too risky to accept," wrote Menkhaus.
"Embracing a state building agenda constitutes a leap of faith they are
currently not willing to accept."
An Arab-backed transitional national government (TNG) was set up in 2000 but
controlled only a few streets in Mogadishu.
The TNG's friendship with Arab states earned it the wrath of neighbouring
Ethiopia, which saw it as an unacceptable beachhead for Islamic radicalism
in the Horn. As the TNG's star waned, it was abandoned by most of its
businessmen friends.
The TNG mandate expired in August and factions at the talks in Kenya have
yet to agree a successor administration.
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