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ISSUE 95
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Somaliland’s Foreign Policy – An Assessment
By: Ahmed M.I. Egal
amiegal@hotmail.com
Since Somaliland’s secession from the Somali Republic in 1991, the
overriding strategic objective of our foreign policy has been the
achievement of international recognition. This paper aims to examine
Somaliland’s foreign policy in the light of that central objective.
The achievement of international recognition is
not a simple process for which there exists a clearly defined set of
requirements to be fulfilled, a blueprint that can be followed faithfully
from point A (non-recognition) to point B (recognition). In the past era of
competing geopolitical blocs, recognition could be achieved relatively
easily by playing one bloc against the other, as many dictators and coup
leaders (including Afweyne) discovered to their benefit. In the present uni-polar
world where one superpower holds sway over the entire world, this process is
more difficult. Nowadays, it is necessary to assemble groups of nations to
support the bid of the acceding territory to the community of nations. Thus,
East Timor, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Eritrea et al had their sponsors
(principally the EU and USA) who ensured their accession to the community of
nations as full members. The case of Somaliland is made more difficult by
the fact that the country from which we have seceded no longer exists as a
state, so there is no legal authority from which we can reclaim our
nationhood.
Nevertheless, it is possible to outline the make up of the coalition of
nations we need to assemble in support of our bid for recognition if it to
have a chance of success. Firstly, we need to secure the support of key
members of the African Union (AU) since we are, after all, located on the
African continent. Secondly, we need to secure the support of the EU, or key
members of that alliance, and finally we need the support of the US which is
the prevailing superpower.
Although it would be desirable to have the support of the Arab League, or of
some of its key members, I have purposely not included this bloc. Arab
governments have clearly demonstrated their hostility to the existence of
Somaliland not only by ignoring it in favour of the “factions” that are
responsible for the continued misery of the south, but by actively working
to destroy it through the embargo on its livestock exports. With respect to
Asia, it is likely, in view of the geographic distance and lack of historic
political & economic ties, that most Asian countries will be guided in their
response to Somaliland’s bid for recognition by the responses of countries
which have closer ties with us, as well as by the response of the Western
Powers.
Relations between Somaliland and the EU, and its individual members, as well
as with the US are proceeding slowly but adequately. It is now generally
accepted that Somaliland has demonstrated the will, determination, cohesion,
stability and political maturity required for international recognition. The
preoccupation of the major international players with international
terrorism and the war in Iraq, has relegated the issue of Somaliland’s
recognition far down the list of priorities on the international political
and diplomatic agenda. However, the safe haven and ready arms bazaar that
lawless Somalia affords Al Qaeda and its allies have placed the problems
presented by the disintegration of the erstwhile Somali Republic firmly in
the center of the war on terror. Any effort to address Somalia’s position in
the designs and calculus of international terror, must perforce address the
issue of Somaliland and its recognition, and there are indications that the
US and EU are beginning to focus more clearly on the resolution of the
Somali question. For this reason it is essential that we examine the thrust
of our foreign policy carefully with a view to ensuring that it is best
suited to achieve our central objective.
Since 1991 the principal focus of Somaliland’s diplomacy has been directed
at the establishment of close and cordial relations with Ethiopia and
securing its support for Somaliland’s recognition. Ethiopia was properly the
central focus of these efforts in view of several obvious reasons. Firstly,
Ethiopia was the base from which our liberation movement, the SNM, launched
its military campaign against the faqash regime of Afweyne, thus it was only
natural for Somaliland to redeem that debt with friendly relations.
Secondly, landlocked Ethiopia with its population of some 65 million people
is our largest neighbour and the economic future of Somaliland is
inextricably tied to trade and commerce with Ethiopia. Thirdly, the federal
constitution and system instituted by the EPRDF government in Ethiopia
provided autonomy and self government for the Somali inhabitants of eastern
Ethiopia, thereby removing the raison d’etre for the historic enmity between
the Somali people and Ethiopia. This new constitutional and institutional
arrangement also underpinned the independence of Eritrea and provides the
conceptual framework for Ethiopian support for the secession of Somaliland
from Somalia. Finally, Ethiopia is the host of the AU and it has
historically played a central role in continental African politics and
diplomacy. Ethiopia continues to play a pivotal role in African politics as
evidenced by its sponsorship and championing of the New Economic Program for
African Development (NEPAD). In short, Ethiopia is the ideal sponsor of
Somaliland’s recognition and we succeeded in securing their support to play
this crucial role on our behalf.
Over the last year and a half, however, it appears that the focus of
Somaliland’s diplomacy has shifted from Ethiopia to Djibouti and that our
relations with the former have cooled somewhat, while our relations with the
latter appear to have warmed. A thaw in Somaliland-Djibouti relations was
certainly needed since relations between the two countries were at a
historic nadir. In addition, the fact that it was Somaliland which initiated
the thaw is to its credit as evidence of its genuine desire for friendly
relations with its neighbours, as well as a demonstration of its political
maturity.
After all, it was Djibouti which initiated the animosity by so vehemently
opposing Somaliland’s independence and insisting that Somaliland accept the
sovereignty of the TNG, the stillborn child of the Arta Conference, for
which Djibouti acted as midwife. Somaliland has endeavoured to establish
cordial ties with Djibouti and President Rayalle has visited Djibouti twice,
while several Ministerial delegations have also been to Djibouti in search
of friendship and cooperation in a variety of fields. In return, we have
seen no formal announcements or practical steps taken by Djibouti to
evidence goodwill and fraternal relations with Somaliland.
The impression that the ascendancy of Somaliland-Djibouti relations is at
the expense of Somaliland-Ethiopia relations is further evidenced by the
lack of progress on various initiatives announced by the two countries some
two years ago, e.g. opening of branches of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia
in Somaliland and rehabilitation of Berbera Port to enable greater
utilization by Ethiopia. This perception, whether true or not, is extremely
damaging for Somaliland in its quest for international recognition. Djibouti
can in no way substitute for Ethiopia as the principal sponsor of
Somaliland’s bid for recognition, even if it should wish to do so (and the
recent interview given by President Gelle to IRIN would belie any such
desire on Djibouti’s part). Further, Djibouti does not have the diplomatic
weight and standing of Ethiopia in African politics, nor does it have
Ethiopia’s influence and standing in relation to the USA or the EU. In
addition, Djibouti cannot substitute for Ethiopia as a trading partner for
Somaliland for obvious reasons. Indeed Djibouti views the development of
Berbera Port with some considerable apprehension as a prospective competitor
for the import/export business of Ethiopia.
Accordingly, it is imperative that Somaliland renew the focus of its foreign
policy upon the relationship with Ethiopia and restore this track to its
rightful place as the core plank of its diplomacy. This is not to advocate
ignoring or belittling cordial and fraternal relations with Djibouti, but
the correction of a misdirection in our foreign policy that could have very
adverse consequences the achievement of our central objective. The coming
year is likely to be a watershed in Somaliland’s odyssey towards its
admission to the community of nations as full member, and it is absolutely
crucial that mistakes and missteps are avoided in charting this journey at
this late date. Toward that end, it is essential that the government of
Somaliland urgently review its foreign policy and restore our relations with
Ethiopia to its proper place in our diplomacy.
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