Al Qaeda Gearing Up for Offensive in Saudi Arabia?

Two separate incidents connected to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and possibly involving radicals may suggest that militants in the kingdom are gearing up for an offensive aimed at the Saudi government as well as Americans and other Westerners. Expatriates living in the kingdom should take all security precautions prescribed by the U.S. State Department.

Analysis

Saudi Arabian Airlines said in a statement Oct. 15 that a hijack attempt aboard a flight from Sudan on its way to Jeddah was foiled after special forces disarmed and arrested a Saudi man carrying a gun. A few hours earlier, an allegedly drunk Saudi citizen rammed his car into the gates of the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, Agence France-Presse reported.

Taken together -- and following a string of terrorism-related incidents in Indonesia, Kuwait, the Philippines and Yemen -- the hijacking and the "accident" in Jeddah may indicate that militants associated with the al Qaeda network have been given the green light to conduct attacks in the kingdom and elsewhere.

Until the U.S. war in Afghanistan, local militants may have held back due to Riyadh's recognition of the Taliban government. Now however, al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman Zawahiri is warning of more attacks. If his claims are true, an outbreak of al Qaeda strikes in the kingdom against Westerners and the government could destabilize the government in Riyadh and irreparably damage U.S.-Saudi ties.

The spread of radicalism in Saudi Arabia, and its export abroad for operations such as the Sept. 11 strikes, has become a defining feature of the country's political situation and a key element straining U.S.-Saudi relations. The ruling House of Saud has moved cautiously to weed out dissent, desperately trying to contain growing internal dissatisfaction fueled by rising costs of living and high unemployment, while at the same time managing domestically unpopular ties with the United States.

The result of all this is an extensive but underground network of radical militants in the kingdom, which has made itself known through a spate of attacks against Westerners since the mid-1990s. In 1995, a car bomb outside the U.S.-run Saudi National Guard training center in Riyadh killed five Americans and two Indian nationals. In 1996, another car bomb destroyed the Khobar Towers, a U.S. Air Force housing complex in Dhahran, killing 19 Americans and wounding hundreds.

Since late 2000, at least 13 separate incidents involving car bombings and shooting attacks against Westerners have occurred throughout the country. The government has blamed these on turf battles between alcohol bootleg outfits. In May, the Saudi government also reported finding a spent launching tube for a SAM-7 missile near the Prince Sultan Air Base in Kharj, 50 miles south of Riyadh. The government reportedly busted up an al Qaeda cell following the discovery of the missile tube, but the attacks against Westerners have continued unabated.

The Saudi citizen who rammed into the gates of the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah on Oct. 14 may well have been under the influence of alcohol, which is banned in Saudi Arabia. But his "accidental" target was awfully coincidental.

There is no direct evidence to refute the Saudi government's explanation, but the possibility that it actually wasn't an accident -- or that the car even may have been filled with explosives -- cannot be dismissed, given the drawn-out campaign already under way in the kingdom against Westerners, the recent rash of terrorism-related attacks around the world and the attempted hijacking of the plane headed to Jeddah.

A war in the kingdom between the government and radicals has been in the offing for more than a decade, following the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the return of Osama bin Laden and his followers to Saudi Arabia. If al Qaeda now is signaling its local Saudi allies to launch an offensive, then the government's next move will need to be both brutal and bold, taking more direct steps to quell the radical militant activity in the kingdom.

However, once the government launches such a campaign it cannot draw back, and the backlash easily could entail a wide-scale offensive against Westerners in the country. Already under strict security alerts, expatriates living and working in the kingdom now may want to start thinking about relocating.

War Diary: Monday, Oct. 14, 2002

Monday, Oct. 14, was dominated by emerging counter-pressure from al Qaeda and forces that are probably linked to it. The attack on a tourist site on the Indonesian island of Bali, coupled with the recent attack on the French tanker off the coast of Yemen, indicates increasing al Qaeda activity. In addition, shots were fired at U.S. Marines in Kuwait from assailants in two civilian vehicles, although no one was injured. According to the U.S. Embassy, the Marines did not return fire and the attackers escaped.

Whether coordinated or not, whether formally linked to al Qaeda or not, Islamic operatives are intensifying their operations. Thus far, most major operations have taken place in or near the Islamic world but have focused on non-Islamic personnel or assets. It is reasonable to assume that these operations -- which were promised in al Qaeda communiqués issued last July -- are developing organically from al Qaeda planning and also are meshing with U.S. plans to attack Iraq. It is obviously in al Qaeda's interest to position itself within the Islamic world as genuinely and effectively resisting U.S. operations. Attacks against France, which is cooperating in intelligence-sharing; against Australia, which is deeply involved in U.S. war fighting; and against U.S. Marines in Kuwait appear to fit into a pattern of pressing the war against the United States and allies.

Not coincidentally, we think, a statement purportedly by Osama bin Laden appeared on an Islamic Web site, praising the attack against the Marines in Kuwait as well as the attack on the French tanker in Yemen. It is not clear whether bin Laden made the statement or whether it was made in his name. Indeed, it is not clear whether he is dead or alive. What is clear, however, is that the al Qaeda organization is intensifying operations. The network obviously is trying to signal to both its supporters and its enemies that it remains viable and effective.

The group also is trying to place heavy pressure on Islamic governments that might be inclined to cooperate with the United States. The attack in Bali had a sharp effect on the Indonesian economy, sending its currency and markets down. The attack in Yemen also was a signal to the government there, which has moved close to Washington. The attacks are intended to have multiplier effects, psychologically and/or materially affecting multiple audiences.

In the midst of this, the Saudi government appeared to tweak its position once again. In comments published in the London-based al-Hayat newspaper, Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz said, "Saudi Arabia will provide no assistance in any strikes against Iraq. The kingdom has a special status in the Arab and Muslim worlds, as it is home to the two holy mosques, and will not sacrifice this status for the sake of anyone." At the same time, Sultan urged Baghdad not to give anyone justification for launching a military offensive against Iraq. He also said he did not regard a U.S. attack as inevitable. This seems to take the use of Saudi territory for a U.S. attack against Baghdad off the table. However, it leaves open the question of whether Iraqi refusal to cooperate might shift the Saudi position again.

Interestingly, a Saudi delegation was due to visit Moscow on Oct. 14 and 15. The delegation was to be led by Saudi Finance Minister Abdul Azis al-Assaf. The Saudi oil minister was not expected to be present, indicating that the talks will not concern oil. Since these are the two largest exporters in the world, a discussion that does not involve oil but does involve finance is fascinating. Russia has been under heavy U.S. pressure to support an attack on Iraq, but one of Moscow's concerns has been the fate of debts Iraq has owed to Russia for years. British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited Moscow to try to come up with a formula, but did not seem to make much headway. Officials in Riyadh also might have some creative solutions in mind, although most likely to get the Russians to work with them in preventing an attack.

Finances played a significant role in this day of reflecting on attacks. Apart from the Saudi mission to Moscow, Kuwait announced that it would peg its dinar to the U.S. dollar in 2003 as part of a plan to create an integrated Gulf currency. The practical implications of the move are minimal, but the symbolic and psychological dimensions can be substantial. In a country where a very small guerrilla war against the United States is already under way, this is bound to generate interest.

Of more substantial significance, Qatar reportedly has made arrangements to invest $2.8 billion in Venezuela. This is of more than passing interest to the war. Qatar houses the main U.S. Air Force base for operations against Iraq and is one of Washington's closest allies in the region. Venezuela is a major source of oil for the United States and has been a major headache for Washington as well. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has been under intense domestic pressure since April, when a coup (or what certainly looked like a coup) failed. Last week was a period of intense speculation that another coup was likely. Venezuela has been urgently shopping for cash, seeking investment or loans against assets. STRATFOR reported that Venezuelan officials had approached Libya and other Arab, Islamic and non-Islamic countries, looking for about the amount Qatar plans to invest.

Qatar's move actually solves a U.S. headache. The last thing Washington wanted during the run-up to an Iraq confrontation was either a disruption of Venezuelan oil flows to the United States or a military coup against a democratically elected government (no matter how irritating) that might be construed as supported by the United States. Washington has no love whatsoever for Chavez, but it did not want a massive problem in Venezuela at this time. Thus, getting Chavez the money he needed solves a temporary U.S. headache; getting it from Qatar, if it all works out, is an interesting solution.

Oct. 14 was, therefore a day in which the United States was relatively quiet. The day was spent assessing the events in Bali, in more political maneuvering and in some interesting financial planning.