Issue 207

Nairobi/Brussels, December 12, 2005 (ICG) – Somalia ’s long civil conflict and lack of central governing institutions present an international security challenge. Terrorists have taken advantage of the state’s collapse to attack neighboring countries and transit agents and materiel. The country is a refuge for the al-Qaeda team that bombed a Kenyan resort in 2002 and tried to down an Israeli aircraft. Since 2003, Islamist extremists have been linked to murders of Somalis and foreigners. If governments are to counter the limited but real threat of terrorism in or from Somalia , they need to align closer with Somali priorities – the restoration of peace, legitimate and broad-based government, and essential services – and make clear that their counter-terrorism efforts are aimed at a small number of criminals, many of them foreigners, not the Somali population at large.

Somalis in general show little interest in jihadi Islamism; most are deeply opposed. Somali militant movements have failed to gain broad popular support, encountering instead widespread hostility. The most remarkable feature is that Islamist militancy has not become more firmly rooted in what should, by most conventional assessments, be fertile ground.

Nevertheless, since the collapse of the government in 1991, a variety of Islamist reformist movements have sprung up inside the country – some inspired or sponsored by foreign interests. The vast majority are non-violent and opposed to ideological extremism. The largest groups, notably Jama’at al-Tabligh and the Salafiyya Jadiida, practice missionary activism aimed at steering lax Muslims back towards the true path of their faith. A much smaller proportion, including Harakaat al-Islah and Majma’ ‘Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya, are politically active but not extremist, struggling rather to influence the future of the Somali state and its political system. By far the smallest reformist groups are those composed of jihadis, such as the now-defunct al-Itihaad al-Islaami and the new, nameless one fronted by Aden Hashi ‘Ayro.

Other, ostensibly Islamist entities have more complex origins and agendas. The Shari’a (Islamic law) courts that have sprung up across southern Somalia over the past decade began as essentially clan-based institutions intended to restore security and order in a stateless society. Attempts to unify and coordinate the court system, however, have been in large part politically motivated, and some courts have been hijacked by jihadi leaders. This kind of cooperation, combined with independent sources of funding, has allowed some courts to exercise greater independence from their clans, and since early 2005, the Shari’a court system in Mogadishu has been pursuing an aggressive political and social agenda.

The growth of courts, charities and businesses with an apparently Islamist character has sparked fears in some circles of a conspiracy to transform Somalia into an Islamic state. In reality, the Islamist activists are a diverse community, characterized more by competition and contradiction than cooperation, making a broad-based conspiracy implausible.

Islamist extremism has failed to take a broader hold in Somalia because of Somali resistance – not foreign counter-terrorism efforts. The vast majority of Somalis desire a government – democratic, broadly-based and responsive – that reflects the Islamic faith as they have practiced it for centuries: with tolerance, moderation and respect for variation in religious observance. Ultimately, there is no better way to confront jihadism than to assist Somalis in realizing such a government.

That is, of course, more easily said than done. Repeated attempts over the past fifteen years to rebuild the Somali state have ended in failure, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) formed in October 2004 seems determined to repeat past mistakes. Somalia ’s international partners must resist the temptation to back one faction of the divided TFG and struggle instead to breathe life into the transitional federal charter, revive the defunct parliament and establish a broadly inclusive government of national unity. Unless they are prepared to take up this complex challenge, they may continue to score victories in their battles against terrorism in the Horn while losing the wider war.

Media Release

Nairobi/Brussels, 12 December 2005 : Efforts to counter the threat of jihadi Islamism in Somalia will backfire unless international actors embrace Somali priorities – the restoration of peace, a legitimate government and essential services.

Somalia’s Islamists,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines the real but limited threat of terrorism in and from Somalia, and argues that the best way to confront jihadism in Somalia is to assist the vast majority of Somalis who desire a democratic, broad-based and responsive government that reflects the Islamic faith. Counter terrorism strategies must include the Somali perspective and concerns if they are to succeed. That Islamist extremism has failed to take broader hold in the country is due to Somali resistance, not foreign counter terrorism efforts, Crisis Group concludes.

“Unless the international community is prepared to confront the complex challenge of helping Somalis establish a broadly inclusive government of national unity, they may continue to score victories in their battles against terrorism in the Horn while losing the wider war”, says Matt Bryden, Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Project Director.

Since the collapse of the government in 1991, there has been a rise in Islamist reformist movements, the majority of which are non-violent and opposed to ideological extremism. The groups responsible for the murders of Somalis and foreigners, and linked to other terrorist attacks, are by far the smallest in number and do not have popular support. International actors should, therefore, make clear that their counter terrorism efforts are aimed at a handful of criminals – many of them foreigners – not the Somali population at large.

The international community should also resist the urge to back one faction of the Transitional Federal Government, which since its creation last year has seemed determined to repeat past mistakes. Partisan interventions will only backfire by uniting jihadi Islamists, moderates and rival political factions in a common cause, which would in turn amplify the jihadi threat rather than remove it.

“Western fears that the growth of Islamist courts, charities and businesses translates to a conspiracy to transform Somalia into an Islamic state are not well grounded”, says Suliman Baldo, Crisis Group’s Africa Program Director. “The reality is that Islamic activists are diverse and defined more by their differences than their similarities. They will only be driven to cooperate with each other if the international community fails to address Somalia ’s real needs”.

Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein ( Brussels ) +32 (0) 2 541 1635
Kimberly Abbott ( Washington ) +1 202 785 1601
To contact Crisis Group media please click here
*Read the full Crisis Group report on our website: http://www.crisisgroup.org

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