Arab-African Competition in the Horn of Africa

By Ahmed M.I. Egal

The collapse of the state in the erstwhile Somali Republic in 1991 ushered an era of anarchy, warlord hegemony, sporadic famines and a regression to a pre-modern socio-political structure in that unhappy country. Indeed, some journalists and aid workers which have visited the country comment upon its resemblance to the post-apocalyptic vision of life depicted in the Mad Max movies of the 1980s. That this situation has persisted for some 15 years is due in large part to factors indigenous to Somali political history, and the legacy of the Siyad Barre dictatorship which maintained itself in power through a carefully orchestrated policy of constantly shifting clan alliances.

However, a significant factor in maintaining this situation of statelessness and the ascendancy of warlord hegemony is the support (material and political) and succor given to the warlords by regional governments in the pursuit of their own political ends. It is the aim of this paper to expose the cynical machinations of these foreign governments in prolonging the Somali crisis for their own political aims, to the detriment of the interests and wishes of the Somali people. History and future generations of Somalis will judge these governments harshly for their actions today and yesterday, and it is important to bring their actions into the light of day, if for no other reason than to put them on record for the accounting that is to come.

The three principal foreign governments actively engaged in the internal politics of Somalia are Ethiopia, Egypt and Italy, each in pursuit of its own specific agenda, with Djibouti and Yemen playing smaller, supporting roles. It is worth examining each country’s specific goals with respect to its Somalia adventures in order to clearly understand how they interplay in the Somali political arena. Ethiopia, as Somalia’s principal neighbor to the West and traditional enemy with whom Somalia had fought two border wars in 1964 and 1987, has a clear agenda. Ethiopia seeks a government in Somalia that will not pose a security threat to its borders and which will not encourage and support either the guerrilla fighters of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) or the jihadists of Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (Al Ittihad). Since the EPRDF government came to power, it has instituted a federal system in Ethiopia with significant autonomy granted to the regional governments – indeed the federal constitution permits the secession of any region that votes to do so by a two thirds majority. It was under this formula that Eritrea won its independence in 1990.

When Somaliland (the erstwhile British Somaliland Protectorate) reasserted its independence and broke away from Somalia in 1991, Ethiopia welcomed its peaceful overtures and wish for cooperation, trade and good neighborliness. Somaliland, for its part, renounced any claims to the eastern, Somali-populated region of Ethiopia in recognition that under Ethiopia’s federal constitution, their brethren across the border had gained self determination, which after all was the basis of the original dispute with Ethiopia. The two countries signed agreements on security and trade to facilitate cross-border movement of people and goods and to deter attacks on one country mounted from the other’s territory.

Somaliland made good on its security pledges by arresting and handing over ONLF guerrillas that sought to attack Ethiopia from its territory. Ethiopia, for its part, included Hargeysa in the destinations of Ethiopian Airlines (the flag carrier), opened the border to free movement of goods and people and signed an agreement to use Berbera Port in Somaliland for imports and exports. Both countries opened offices in each others’ capital with full (if unofficial) diplomatic status. Thus, did Ethiopia become the first country to recognize Somaliland, albeit unofficially, and the first state sponsor of international recognition of this re-emergent country.

Ethiopia also welcomed the overtures of Col. Abdillahi Yusuf of the autonomous region of Puntland, particularly since it was his fellow Darod kinsmen of the Ogaden clan from which the ONLF drew its members and fighters. While Ethiopia hoped that its support of Yusuf would mitigate the ONLF insurgency, if for no other reason than removing Yusuf as a supporter and arms supplier of the ONLF, Yusuf wanted Ethiopian support in order to realize his long held dream to accede to the Presidency of Somalia. With no power base in Mogadishu, and no alliances with the Hawiyeh warlords which held sway throughout most of Somalia, Yusuf realized that he needed the support of a neighboring state with the capability to provide him with the funds and arms he needed to mount a credible campaign for the Presidency of Somalia.

Ethiopia, for its part, was threatened by the alliance of Djibouti and Egypt in establishing the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Abdul Salat Qassim in Arta in 1995. Djibouti carefully excluded Ethiopia from the organization and decision-making process of the Arta Conference and the creation of the TNG government while cultivating Egyptian and Arab League input and support. The TNG thus became an Arab construct hostile to Ethiopia precisely as Egypt had intended and it was no surprise that Qassim’s cabinet included Al Ittihad ministers which had sworn jihad against Ethiopia. Djibouti and Egypt also connived to cold shoulder Somaliland and ensure that the Arab League did not seriously entertain any of Somaliland repeated appeals for some form of de facto recognition, assistance and support. Indeed Egypt went so far as to persuade the Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states to stop imports of livestock from Somaliland, the country’s principal export, on the pretext of Rift Valley Fever (RVF). When FAO and WHO both definitively pronounced that Somaliland’s livestock was free of RVF and offered to issue health certificates for each shipment, but Saudi Arabia still refused to lift the ban, the real motivation of the ban became clear – namely to bring Somaliland to its knees economically so that it would accept the TNG government established in Arta by Djibouti and Egypt.

Egypt’s objectives in this sad saga are equally clear and arise out of one if it’s central national security concerns, perhaps its key national security concern – namely the sharing of the Nile waters. Ethiopia has made clear its intention to build dams in its northern mountains where the Nile rises, in order to generate hydro-electric power which it desperately needs. Egypt, meanwhile, has embarked upon an ambitious plan to build a man made river fed by Nile waters several thousand kilometers into its western desert in order to create arable farmland to feed its rapidly growing population, and views Ethiopia’s dam building plans with great trepidation. The agreement imposed at the end of the last century by imperial Britain upon Ethiopia for sharing the Nile waters with Sudan and Egypt, clearly needs to be revised and renegotiated by the three countries to take account of the new realities of the 21 st century. Egypt has decided that a united Somalia friendly to it, while hostile to Ethiopia, would be an important bargaining chip in its negotiations with Addis Ababa.

Thus, Egypt has connived to ensure that the Arab League spurns all efforts by Somaliland’s to secure its support for the remarkable and success it has achieved in establishing peace, security and democratic government. Further, Egypt has prevailed upon Somaliland’s traditional trading partners in the Arabian Gulf (principally Saudi Arabia) to ban its exports of livestock, thereby further impoverishing a country already ravaged by civil war and genocide. Egypt has also provided political and material support to the Mogadishu warlords opposed to Ethiopia, and through these intermediaries, to Al Ittihad. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks upon the USA, Egypt was unable to secure Western support for the TNG government formed in Arta, despite actively and avidly sponsoring it at Arab League meetings and forums. The prominent role played by Al Ittihad in the TNG government (Al Ittihad initially held six ministries), effectively negated any possible US and European support that may have been forthcoming for Egypt and Djibouti’s illegitimate offspring, while Ethiopian hostility to the TNG, and the TNG’s own pronounced preference for Arab backing over African support, ensured that African support for it was lukewarm at best.

When the tenure of the TNG ended in 2002, and in the light of the “War on Terror” wherein stateless countries such as Somalia are considered potential havens for terrorist organizations, the international community initiated a new process to establish a government in Somalia. Kenya was chosen as the host of this new effort and a conference was convened in Embagathi with the support of the US, EU and the AU to select a parliament which would, in turn, elect a President who would appoint a government. Having been excluded from the last government established for Somalia by an Egyptian/Djibouti alliance, Ethiopia was determined to play a major role in the establishment of this new government. Abdillahi Yusuf, the warlord ruler of the relatively peaceful, autonomous region of Puntland, saw a golden opportunity to realize his dream of becoming President of Somalia at the new conference with the disarray of his warlord competitors.

In the event, after two long years of unseemly haggling and maneuverings by the warlord participants, a parliament drawn from representatives of the Somali clans was established and sworn in. Abdillahi Yusuf, who had secured the backing of Ethiopia for his Presidential bid, started his campaign among the parliamentarians with cash inducements, appeals to kinship, promises of position and threats of force. His campaign, financed by Ethiopian largesse, succeeded and he was duly sworn in as the President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the latest government of Somalia hatched in a foreign country, after buying more parliamentarians than any other candidate. However, the Mogadishu warlords, realizing that they had been out maneuvered by Yusuf and his Ethiopian paymasters, and fearing for their survival should he succeed in establishing state authority with Ethiopian help, promptly sought to sabotage his ambitions by demanding that the TFG immediately locate to Mogadishu.

Transferring the TFG to Somalia and re-establishing state authority was a basic and essential requirement of the international community (represented by the AU, EU, UN and US), for the TFG to secure aid, financial support and full recognition. Upon accession as President, Yusuf immediately went to Addis Ababa and while there, requested a 20,000 strong African peacekeeping force funded by the international community in order to relocate the TFG to Mogadishu. The Mogadishu warlords responded by threatening to unite and wage war on any foreign troops that were sent to Somalia and objected, in particular, to any inclusion of Ethiopian troops in any AU peacekeeping forces that may be sent to Somalia. After a fruitless period shuttling between various capitals in east Africa, USA, Europe and Yemen, Yusuf realized that he had to transfer the TFG to Somalia to maintain any vestige of credibility. After much negotiation with various warlords, involving his Hawiyeh Premier, Mohammed Geedi, agreement was reached with the warlord in control of Jowhar, a provincial capital some 150 kilometers south of Mogadishu, and the TFG was relocated there.

The Mogadishu warlords continued to insist that the government come to Mogadishu which is, after all, the capital of the country. They controlled Mogadishu and they knew that if Yusuf and the TFG came there, Yusuf and his government would come under their control. Of course, Yusuf knew this as well and there was no love lost between him and his Mogadishu counterparts – indeed Yusuf feared for his very life if he went to Mogadishu with very good reason. Thus, a situation developed in which the TFG and the parliament were split into two opposing factions – the Jowhar faction lead by Yusuf and Geedi, and the Mogadishu faction lead by the Speaker of the Parliament Sharif Hasan Sheikh Adan and Hussein Aideed, Deputy Premier & Minister of Defence. Ethiopia provided arms and military training to a “national” army established by Yusuf in Jowhar with several thousand of his Puntland militia, while Geedi tried to broker a settlement with his Hawiyeh kinsmen in Mogadishu. Geedi’s efforts ceased abruptly when he narrowly escaped an assassination attempt on a trip to Mogadishu, and the stand-off and acrimonious rhetoric between the factions continued.

Egypt, sensing an opportunity to counter Ethiopian influence in the TFG, promptly began providing political support and weapons to the Mogadishu faction. Italy joined Egypt in strengthening the position of the Mogadishu faction because of its historic links with southern Somalia, specifically the majority Hawiyeh community therein. In addition to this colonial affinity and linkage, Italy was also anxious to retain some influence on developments in Somalia and was not willing to surrender its position to regional players like Egypt, Ethiopia and Yemen. Yemen supported Egypt’s position in the TFG dispute, despite its friendly relations with Yusuf to whom it had supplied arms while he was the ruler of Puntland – clearly Arab solidarity trumped its previously warm relations with Yusuf.

Thus did regional, African-Arab rivalry arm competing warlords against each other in their doomed pursuit of power, while sidelining the unprecedented, grass roots achievements of Somaliland, and so prolong the misery of the Somali people. The only country that emerges from this saga with a modicum of integrity and relatively minimal malevolence to the Somali people is Ethiopia. It is true that Yusuf is tyrant-warlord of the worst kind with the blood of untold innocent Somali civilians on his hands, and Ethiopia was remiss in choosing him as its champion. This choice reflects the ignorance of the EPRDF government of internal Somali politics and Somali political history – something they will have to correct if they are to achieve the peaceful co-existence with their eastern and south eastern neighbors that they want so much. However, Ethiopia’s machinations have been principally defensive to counter the mischief concocted by Djibouti and Egypt at Arta with the establishment of the TNG. In addition, Ethiopia has supported and promoted the stability, democracy and accountability achieved by Somaliland and prevailed upon Yusuf and the TFG to focus upon establishing a similar situation in Somalia instead of seeking to drag Somaliland into their sphere of anarchy.

The same cannot be said of Egypt and Italy however. Their myopic and single minded pursuit of their own selfish interests at the direct expense and misery of the Somali people is breathtaking in its malevolence. It is an evil that the Somali people will never forget and something for which both Egypt and Italy will be called to account by future generations of Somalis. Equally, the Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia as the major player in the GCC as well as Somaliland’s historic trading partner, have squandered the fraternity and goodwill of centuries of friendship, commerce and Muslim solidarity on altar of Egyptian paranoia over the Nile waters and Egyptian dreams of regional hegemony in the Horn of Africa. Italy, for its part, is caught in a false time warp of past imperial grandeur. It seems to have forgotten that even at the height of European imperial conquest, it was a second-rate imperial power and that its imperial history is characterized not by grandeur, but by marginality and fascist failure.

The international community has to accept the simple and obvious fact that the solution to the collapse of the Somali state lies with the Somali people and nowhere, and with no one, else. After much brow beating and threats of withdrawal of aid, not to mention shaming their respective foreign supporters, the opposing factions of the TFG have agreed to convene a meeting of the Parliament in Baidoa in February 2006. It is very unlikely that anything of substance will emerge from this meeting since the interests of the opposing factions are so divergent, as are the aims of their foreign supporters and sponsors. The simple, undeniable truth is that the warlords do not want a government in Somalia to succeed unless they can use such government to establish their dominance over the other warlords. Thus, a government of warlords is doomed to failure by the very nature of its being.

We have addressed the crucial question of how to institute a credible government in Somalia that will win the support of the people of that troubled country elsewhere (see “Reintegrating Somaliland & Somalia into the Community of Nations”). The aim of this paper is to highlight the malignant and evil role of the foreign, regional state players in Somalia’s tragedy, and to serve them notice that their actions are on record and that they will be called to account for them. The responsibility for every unnecessary death of each Somali child, the continued destitution of Somali people and the complete destruction of an entire nation lies, in the first instance, at the feet of the warlords who prey on their own people for their personal aggrandizement. Equally, however, a significant measure of this responsibility also lies at the feet of their cynical and callous foreign paymasters and sponsors, and a day of reckoning will come.

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