Somalia’s Peace Processes:‎
What Went Wrong And What Is To Be Done?‎

By Adam M. Jibril

In his recent visit to Hargeisa, Professor Ali Mazuri asked a group of intellectuals as to why there is a gap between South and North of the ex-Somali Republic, the same people who share one language, religion and culture. Somaliland has been able to build peace and stability, restore state institutions and achieve democratization, while the south particularly the capital Mogadishu is in a civil since 1991?

This question was examined by the audience from different angles but was not entirely addressed. However, Mr. M. Said Gees, the Executive director of Somaliland Academy for peace and Development has duly underlined the roles played or not played by foreign actors from the cold war era to the present in Somali affairs and how such roles were determental for either the prolongation of conflict or restoration of peace.

Others have pointed out that all endeavors invested by the international Community in the Somali peace processes had mostly been leading to intrusion and confusion. The post Mbagathi peace process is also lacking indispensable ingredients on the internal plane for self-sustaining.

However, an increasing number of Somalis do agree that in spite of significant net of negative outcome caused by foreign involvements and interventions the root cause of the plights experienced by the Somalis in the South since the state collapse in 1991 was self-inflicted and that the new was on internal actors who failed to discharge their responsibilities.

More over, it would be important to envisage the need to both internal and external factor’s interaction as necessarily complimenting each other, provided that the internal dynamics take the leading role in the process of making history of any nation. Otherwise there would not have been nations to emerge on our continent but continuation of the status quo of colonies and semi-colonies.

The moment the equilibrium tilts in favor of the external forces and their position is allowed to be decisive, the internal initiatives and contributions decline. This paves the way, as was the case in Somalia, for the proliferation of foreign initiatives that are often in complete contradiction with the realities on ground.

Lessons from the past

It is not possible to understand why events in Somaliland and Somalia took different tracks since 1991, unless we look back at how two political movements, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front and the Somali National Movement, conducted themselves while waging resistance in the 1980s against Siyad Barre’s government and thereafter.

The main organizations that led the opposition to Somalia’s former military regime were predominantly clan based, and although their organizational characteristics and political orientations had been comparable, yet their dissimilarities in many aspects were significantly central to shaping the directions of the subsequent events and developments in both Somaliland and Somalia.

A more comprehensive look into the different organizational characteristics and dissimilarities and the forms of struggle conducted by the SSDF and SNM from1981-1991, would help those who had not been following their history to identify the factors that produced different existing realities in Somalia and Somaliland today.

On that respect, the first political organization to oppose Siyad Barre regime was the SSDF, the initial contingent of whom were a group of military officers who fled to Ethiopia following the Ethio-Somali war in 1977 that led to the humiliating defeat of the Somali army. The SSDF was a coalition of three organizations: the Somali Salvation Front, the Somali Workers Party, and the Somali Communist Party. But the SSDF had soon become overwhelmed by military officers led by Col. Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed, the current president of the TFG, who had developed an intimate relations with Mangesto Haile Mariam, the then Ethiopian dictator.

Initially the SSDF had waged successful military operations in 1981-1983 from the Ethiopian-Somali border areas coupled with tough propaganda campaign over Ethiopian National radio.

The evolution of SSDF’s political and military campaign can be divided into two main phases. The first phase which extended from 1980 to 1983 was characterized by self-reliance, and self-motivation.

In that period the external support was on limited scale and confined to Ethiopia’s permission to allow SSDF fighters operate from inside its territory. All material needs for the military campaign were generated internally- contributions from the people themselves- and sources of military and political course of action (good or bad) had been Somali in nature.

As a result, foreign influence was kept to a reasonable level of cooperation with the Ethiopian government. Consequently the SSDF’s military and political activities reached their climax in 1983, after which the history of decline had begun.

The reasons behind this drastic decline of the organization’s military and political struggle and its own reputation and legitimacy were mostly due to a number of major factors. But chief among them was the Libyan-connection which despite netting the SSDF a massive armament and financial assistance, had been instrumental in disintegration and eventual downfall of the organization. This had led to a change in the extent of militancy as well as its political orientation. Instead of embodying liberal and democratic ideals as its point of reference Colonel Qadafi’s “Green Book” was chosen as the basic document to guide the political orientation of the organization.

As a result of the huge influx of Libyan funds, the flow of local contributions, which hither to formed the bulk of the organization’s resource, dwindled and finally dried up.

Instead of raising funds for the organization, the local financial contributors themselves- started asking for their share of the money coming from Libya, and fighters who had previously been voluntaries and ready for sacrifice, turned to become mercenaries working for money. As a result the combat readiness of the fighters deteriorated the SSDF’s fighting force and its reputation was finally reduced from a popular movement to a military regiments with no links to the masses of the people, a matter which eventually led to its total disintegration.

Self-support policy of the SNM made the difference

The second Somali politico-military opposition group that came into view in the early 1980s was the Somali National Movement (SNM). A predominantly northern and mainly backed by the Isaaqs who took the brunt of Barre’s atrocities, the SNM was first launched in the UK and later relocated to Ethiopia to begin armed resistance.

Somalilanders say that the SNM had risen where the SSDF ended. If this was true, then it was largely because of the fact that SNM was dependent on its own people’s resources while the SSDF was entirely reliant on foreign funds. Perhaps this short and simple opinion explains a lot about the two different realities that exist in Somalia and Somaliland today.

However, the success story of the SNM’s struggle against the Siyad Barre regime, reflected in the liberation of Somaliland, transfer of the political power to the people after remaining two years in power in line with the organization’s pledge to the people during the struggle. All these achievements were an outcome of two main factors; democratic character of the organization and its independence from foreign control and manipulations

From its inception in 1981 the SNM had been a truly democratic oriented organization. This had originated from two sources of existing realities; traditional pastoralist culture or “Natural Democracy” regulated by customary law (Xeer). With strong roots of conflict management, the Council of elders stands for this system, while the Central and Executive Committees of the organization were expressions of the modern system. Through democracy and transparency, the SNM was able to sustain its struggle. For instance the SNM had six party Congresses which in five of them the top leadership was changed peacefully and democratically, while in the SSDF case they had not been able to organize a single genuine party congress.

One of the most significant aspects of the struggle led by the SNM was materialized in the form of the independent politico-military orientation which gave its leadership the legitimacy and thus access to enormous potentialities of the people’s material and intellectual resources, provoking their motivations both at home and in Diaspora. Thanks to harmonization of these two factors the struggle against the Siyad Barre regime was escorted with success.

Somaliland’s unique experience of nation building and democratization is mainly due to the wisdom which says “One can only satisfactorily drink water with the direct support of his own hands” (Nin waliba gacmahiisa ayuu biyo kaga dhergaa). As a result, the Somaliland’s path to reconciliation was entirely based on the people’s own initiative resources.

The Somalia’s opposite track

The realities prevailing in Somalia were largely a result of foreign projects, initiated and dictated from outside. This was happening since 1983 when the SSDF had abandoned its decision-making rights to other countries leaders like the Libyan and the Ethiopian dictatorial regimes at the time. The leading role of the foreign alliance’s ideological and political interests prevailed and eventually shaped the subsequent developments, through which the fate of future Somalia was decided.

What has been happening in Somalia since the collapse of the central government in Mogadishu in 1991 went as continuation of the same occurrence of events in which the contribution of internal dynamics was only on the negative side in their makings. The failure of 14 peace conferences induced from outside can conceivably be seen, inter alia, as a result of the above mentioned external factors.

Unlike Somaliland, the South was deeply engulfed into a swamp of civil wars, foreign interventions, and theatrical series of “reconciliation conferences”. None of these conferences was a Somali initiative nor ever administered by Somalis themselves. The Somalis were only guests who had been invited to Nairobi, Cairo and Arta of Djibouti, and who had been given a secondary role. The only tangible Somali input in these conferences was, therefore, their agreement to disagree’.

In spite of this fact, the regional and international communities should not be blamed. As a matter of fact they had been trying their best to help Somalis, according to the way they have seen it right. But certainly with different approaches and seemingly with different agendas. The missing chain in this evolution is thus a Somali initiative that enjoys real commitment and political will to succeed. Without such a perquisite in place, any external assistance would only be counter productive and waste of time, energy and money.

What is to be done

The past experiences drawn from the 14 peace conferences loudly speak that the following conclusions ought to be considered:-

Since all previous Somalia peace conferences had experienced catastrophic closing stages and breakdowns;

1-The role of the international community must henceforth be obtained as supportive only in view of the fact that No foreign oriented peace initiative or military intervention would no more be workable;

2-New initiative but genuinely Somali peace process is now the only alternative to the past experience, towards changing the standstill;

3-A grass-root reconciliation peace processes should be put in place, on regional level, for instance (Hawiye-Hawiye reconciliation Conference), Degil & Mirfle reconciliation conference and so on. Such regional reconciliation endeavors would pave the way to resolving the Hawiye-Darood conflict with the aim to address the century old Darood domination sensitivity among Hawiye population. Only through these gradually but steady peace processes an all Somalia communities peace conference can be visible for achieving and building a central authority be possible in Somalia.

4-This reconciliation process should be based on vision, for instance the kind of state they want to build in Somalia is perceivably essential for at least the leaders to have clarity such a vision must realistically be achievable. Since no conventional thinking of Greater Somalia or radical Islamic state are today achievable, both versions will provoke new forces and thus create new devastating strategic mistakes.

Note: The author of this article had been a member of the executive committee of SSDF and one secretary for policy planning of the organization.

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