25 May 2006

The multitude of forces that make up the tangled and knotted web of politics in the stateless country of Somalia were pulled taut in mid-May as violent clashes broke out in the constitutional capital Mogadishu between militias associated with the Islamic Court Union (I.C.U.) and the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-terrorism (A.R.P.C.T.), an umbrella group of warlords and businessmen who have dominated the city since Somalia lost an effective central government in 1991.

During the week of May 7, intense street fighting between the militias resulted in an estimated 150 dead and more than 300 wounded -- mostly civilians caught in the cross-fire. The outbreak of violence marked an escalation of the chaotic conflicts that have racked Somalia since its descent into statelessness, threatening tentative movements toward stabilization and national reconciliation.

Located at the eastern end of the Horn of Africa, with a long coastline on the Indian Ocean and proximate to the Arabian Peninsula across the Red Sea, Somalia is geopolitically significant as a gateway between Africa and the Middle East. Its collapse into a patchwork of regions with varying degrees of political integration has invited external powers to intervene in its conflicts in the service of their particular interests.

A Muslim country with a population estimated at ten million people, a pastoral economy and no strategic resources, Somalia has attracted Washington's attention as a potential breeding ground for Islamic revolution. Several al-Qaeda operatives are thought to be in hiding there, the country has been used as a transit point for jihadis, and there are suspicions that al-Qaeda training camps are functioning. Washington is intent on preventing Somalia from becoming a base for Islamic revolution.

Regional states -- Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti -- are organized in the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.), which has attempted to broker the formation of a central government in Somalia with some minor success. Nonetheless, despite a common interest in regional stability, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia have reportedly flouted a United Nations arms embargo, funneling weapons and materiel to various Somali factions in efforts to gain influence. Yemen, which lies across the Red Sea from Somalia, and Italy, the former colonial power with an interest in reconstruction contracts, have reportedly done the same. A U.N. report released on May 10 stated that an unnamed country was giving "clandestine" military support to the A.R.P.C.T., presumed by analysts to be the United States.

Hyper-Complexity

The key to disentangling the web of Somalia's politics analytically and to understanding the present crisis is to acknowledge its hyper-complexity.

After a successful revolution that overthrew dictator Siad Barre in 1991, the insurgent forces were unable to agree among themselves on the formation of a central authority, precipitating a drainage of power to regional and local leaders who over time have entrenched themselves and jealously defended their scraps of power. The longer that statelessness has persisted, the more the interests of the myriad powers have become vested, leading to strong resistance against the consolidation of authority.

At the root of Somali society is a dizzying array of clans and sub-clans that ally with and fall out with one another. The clan structure provides Somalis with protection and traditional means of dispute resolution through elders, but it also reinforces the country's fragmentation and is a cause of conflict.

Overlaid on the clan structure are warlords and their business associates who control regions and localities, and also league with and oppose one another depending on their perceived interests at the moment. Continually jockeying for position, they opportunistically take advantage of support from external powers, which sometimes play several sides at once.

When a single clan or alliance of clans predominates in a region -- as in the breakaway mini-states of Somaliland and Puntland -- relative political integration and stability ensues; elsewhere -- particularly in Mogadishu -- the situation is more fluid and tense, and fragmentation and conflict are the order of the day.

The players in Somalia's politics are so many, their loyalties so uncertain, their interests so cross-cutting, overlapping and entrenched, and their linkages to outside powers so nuanced that 13 attempts to institute a central government have failed and the 14th effort currently in process is in jeopardy. Only the pressure of donor countries, whose aid is needed to alleviate persistent famine caused by drought and the effects of conflict, has forced some of the players to agree to form national institutions.

The latest attempt to overcome Somalia's fragmentation and form a central government came on January 5, 2006 when two major faction leaders -- Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan -- signed the Aden Declaration in which they agreed to implement the plan for a Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) that had been formulated in Kenya in 2004, but had been blocked by a deadlock between the leaders on where to locate the country's capital. Yusuf had insisted that Mogadishu was too unsafe to be the seat of government, whereas Hassan, who was allied with warlords in Mogadishu, had held out for the constitutional capital.

Yusuf, the president of the T.F.G., and Hassan, the speaker of its parliament, agreed to make Baidoa, a neutral town 240 kilometers (150 miles) southeast of Mogadishu, the temporary capital and based the government in an abandoned grain warehouse. With no reliable security forces of its own, scant budgetary resources and an unpaid legislature, the fledgling government was riven by divisions between its components, which had not reconciled with one another. PINR forecasted in a January 10 report that the T.F.G. would not gain the acceptance of the Mogadishu warlords, which has proven to be the case. [See: "Somalia's Uncertain Future"]

As the T.F.G. struggled to organize itself, it was bypassed by two new players -- the I.C.U. and the A.R.P.C.T. -- both of which oppose the T.F.G. and confront each other in a struggle for control over Mogadishu that has drawn into it actors from outside the city.

The most important and complicating recent development in Somalia's political situation is the rise of the I.C.U., which marks the emergence of Islamism as a major force that cuts across traditional social divisions and has polarized them to some extent, disrupted the tenuous and shifting balance of power, and challenged traditional modes of dispute resolution by transcending to some degree the clan structure.

The first Islamic court was formed in 1994, when the U.S. pulled out of a U.N. peacekeeping mission after losing 18 troops in a battle with the warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid in Mogadishu. The disbanding of the mission left Mogadishu in the hands of contending warlords who were unable to bring order to the city. The influence of clan elders was insufficient to restore security and Muslim clerics began to move in to fill the gap.

Over the past 12 years, the number of Islamic courts in Mogadishu has grown to 11. Applying the principles of Shari'a law, the courts provide the basic service of dispute resolution and enforcement of order, and have extended their power by forming militias and establishing schools and clinics. They have found allies in businessmen who have suffered at the hands of competitors associated with the warlords and with some warlords who have been disadvantaged in the struggle for power. The courts have become increasingly popular with Mogadishu's residents, not only because of their services, but also because they are perceived to be relatively honest and dedicated to the country, rather than to their own narrow advantage, and are not beholden to external powers.

The eruption of militant political Islamism outside and opposed to the T.F.G. and the Mogadishu warlords and rising over the clan structure provoked a fierce reaction among the warlords, whose vital interests were threatened. It also caused concern in Washington, which saw the danger that the courts might become the basis for a Taliban-like movement that would provide safe haven and sustenance to international Islamic revolutionaries.

The warlords' reaction to the I.C.U. crystallized on February 18, 2006 when some of them formed the A.R.P.C.T. and moved to roll back their opponents under the banner of the war on terrorism. During February and March, brief violent clashes broke out between the antagonists, resulting in 85 deaths and setting the stage for the current civil conflict.

Regional analysts are convinced that the A.R.P.C.T.'s "counter-terrorism" ideology is an opportunistic attempt to gain support from Washington, a tactic they agree has borne fruit. A flurry of reports place former C.I.A. Director Porter Goss in Kenya in February negotiating with the A.R.P.C.T. for support in hunting down al-Qaeda figures in return for funds to finance the warlords' military build-up. The deal was supposedly consummated with the Ethiopian secret service acting as the conduit for the money.

Faced with questions about its possible support for the A.R.P.C.T., which undermines the T.F.G., violates the U.N. arms embargo and changes the established U.S. policy of refraining from taking sides in Somalia's domestic conflicts, Washington has refused to confirm or deny its involvement, stating that it supports the T.F.G. but is also working with "responsible" figures outside the transitional framework to suppress terrorism.

In reports drafted in 2005, PINR identified the strength of Islamism in Somalia and noted the rising power of the Islamic courts and the weakness of the T.F.G. The inability and unwillingness of the factions within Somalia to reconcile, and of external powers to support reconciliation consistently with incentives and sanctions, finally created a situation in which a movement for an alternative form of order has gained prominence, transforming the conflicts in Somalia from traditional power struggles rooted in economic and political interest to an incipient fight over the character of a future regime.

At present, Somalia is not faced with the immediate prospect of an Islamist takeover; the country's politics are far too fragmented for that -- the web is too segmented, dense, knotted and crisscrossed. Yet, the possibility that Islamism will become a dominant force in Somalia is now genuine and so is the possibility that Washington's efforts to suppress it will subvert the T.F.G., ensuring that the country will continue in its stateless condition and that -- as a consequence -- the Islamists will gain more recruits.

The Battle for Mogadishu

The violent confrontations between the I.C.U. and A.R.P.C.T. that began on May 7 and continued until a fragile cease-fire took hold on May 14 drew all of the actors on Somalia's political landscape into its vortex. Both antagonists saw the struggle as a battle for control over the city, with the I.C.U. widely regarded as the rising force and the A.R.P.C.T. engaged in a desperate defense, despite its presumed backing by Washington.

The hostilities were initiated when A.R.P.C.T. militiamen reportedly opened fire on the bodyguards of Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, the leader of the I.C.U. The A.R.P.C.T. claimed that their shooting was in self defense, whereas the I.C.U. insisted that it had been unprovoked.

The fighting was initially centered in the Sisi neighborhood in the north of Mogadishu and remained concentrated there, but spread in the following days to adjacent districts and sporadically to southern neighborhoods. Breaking with past custom, the contending forces engaged in night fighting, lobbing mortar rounds at each other, destroying houses and killing, wounding and displacing civilians as the militiamen sought to gain control over a key road.

By May 10, the conflict had become so intense and destructive that T.F.G. Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi and U.N. Special Representative for Somalia Francois Lonseny called for a cease-fire. Meanwhile, the U.N. Security Council met to hear the report of its sanctions committee. The committee reported that the U.N. arms embargo was being violated routinely, that the I.C.U. had effective control of 80 percent of Mogadishu, that the A.R.P.C.T. had been "severely degraded," and that a "widening circle of states" was being drawn into the conflict.

On May 11, the Security Council passed a resolution extending for six months the mission of the U.N. Monitoring Group that investigates compliance with the arms embargo, reaffirming its support of the T.F.G. and I.G.A.D., and "insisting" that member states honor the embargo. The Council did not follow the sanctions committee's recommendations for targeted measures, such as travel bans and asset freezes, and for an embargo on goods including charcoal and fish that are sources of funds for the warlords. The Council also did not heed the request of the T.F.G. for a partial lifting of the arms embargo, which would allow it to equip its fledgling security forces.

As the death toll rose above 120, Gedi warned that fighting was spilling over beyond Mogadishu and said that the T.F.G. was no longer attempting to mediate the conflict.

As the street warfare continued, Washington, joined by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, weighed in on May 12 with calls for an end to the fighting. Reflecting the multiple dimensions of Somalia's political web, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (I.P.U.) gave a boost to the T.F.G. by admitting the country into membership. Hassan hailed the development as proof of the T.F.G.'s advance toward a functioning central government.

With the struggle in the streets continuing unabated and the death toll rising to 150, the conflict widened on May 13 as two regional warlords joined the A.R.P.C.T. and unaffiliated militias in Mogadishu dug into defensive positions to protect their neighborhoods. In the T.F.G.'s first direct intervention into the conflict, Yusuf threatened to sack four warlord members of Somalia's cabinet who are affiliated with the A.R.P.C.T. The most important of them, National Security Minister Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, has played a key role in defending the Mogadishu warlords within the T.F.G.

May 14 marked the first break in the fighting, as the opposing forces regrouped. Clan leaders in Mogadishu who are unaffiliated with the opponents moved in to impose a cease-fire by threatening to unleash their militias against any side that resumed violent struggle.

Relative calm returned to Mogadishu on May 15, as militias from both sides continued to patrol the streets. A.R.P.C.T. spokesman Hussein Gutale Rage denied that the group had signed the cease-fire, but said that it would not resume hostilities unless it was attacked. He charged that the I.C.U. was using foreign fighters and had been infiltrated by terrorists. Yusuf made a plea for foreign intervention into Somalia, specifically a peacekeeping force that would preside over disarming militias and building a security force for the T.F.G. Given the opposition in the U.N. Security Council to loosening the arms embargo and the opposition of Hassan's faction in the T.F.G. to foreign intervention, there was little chance that Yusuf's call would be heeded. Gedi repeated the threat to remove Qanyare and Commerce Minister Musa Sudi Yalahow from the cabinet. Again, the prospects for success were doubtful since the parliament would have to approve the dismissals and Hassan opposed the move.

The cease-fire was still holding on May 16 in the neighborhoods that had borne the brunt of the fighting, but a major incident occurred when I.C.U. forces attacked and overran the compound of A.R.P.C.T. leader Mohamed Dheere to end a road blockade that was cutting off supplies to the I.C.U. The U.S. Embassy in Nairobi denied any knowledge of a February visit by Goss and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer repeated Washington's indeterminate response to charges that it was aiding the A.R.P.C.T.: "We will work with those elements that will help us to root out al-Qaeda and prevent Somalia from becoming a safe haven for terrorists." The U.N. Security Council issued a call for an "unconditional and immediate" cease-fire, reaffirmed its support for the T.F.G. and promised to "urgently consider how to strengthen the effectiveness of the arms embargo."

On May 17, with the backing of Hassan, Gedi presented an "ultimatum" to the A.R.P.C.T.-affiliated cabinet members, threatening that if they did not return to Baidoa from Mogadishu within seven days, they would face unspecified "disciplinary action." I.G.A.D. entered the fray by calling for international support of the T.F.G. and -- in a veiled reference to Washington -- urged the cessation of "uncoordinated intervention." On the streets, the I.C.U. organized a demonstration attended by 2,000 people at which the A.R.P.C.T. was denounced as a tool of Washington. The A.R.P.C.T. announced that it was holding the bodies of "foreign fighters" from Pakistan, Sudan and Ethiopia.

May 18 and 19 brought a further charge from the A.R.P.C.T. that 70 members of the transitional parliament are al-Qaeda sympathizers or spies for foreign governments. The majority of the parliament responded that the A.R.P.C.T.-affiliated ministers should be dismissed and a substantial number was ready to declare them "war criminals." Fighting resumed in a core neighborhood in Mogadishu, but was diffused by clan elders. The European Union announced that it would give US$89 million to the T.F.G. for social services and rural development.

The intensely mixed situation was further complicated on May 20 and 21, as reports that the I.C.U. and A.R.P.C.T. were massing their militias north of Mogadishu caused residents of the core neighborhoods to flee their homes. Yusuf announced to the transitional parliament that his negotiations with donor countries had yielded $310 million in commitments and that Washington had agreed to participate in efforts to settle the conflict in Mogadishu peacefully. The African Union (A.U.) added its voice to the calls for reconciliation and pledged its "full support" for the T.F.G.

The momentum of the T.F.G. was reversed when clan elders in Baidoa threatened to expel the T.F.G. from the town after complaining that their region was not adequately represented in the transitional institutions. Puntland suspended its participation in the transitional institutions over Gedi's refusal to approve an oil-exploration deal with an Australian company that the mini-state had made independently.

Throughout the conflict, Ethiopia had pursued active diplomacy with the breakaway mini-states of Somaliland and Puntland on trade and military security, despite its formal support of the T.F.G. In a telling comment, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin said that Somalis and Ethiopians are the "same people" and that "we probably need to abolish the artificial borders in the future." On May 21, Sudan inserted itself into the mix, announcing that it was sending an envoy to Mogadishu to mediate the conflict between the I.C.U. and A.R.P.C.T., hoping to bring the two sides into face-to-face negotiations.

May 22 brought the first sign that the current wave of conflict in Mogadishu was subsiding since the committee of clan elders that had imposed the cease-fire announced that the two sides had agreed to dismantle their blockades, although the militias had not yet stood down from their forward positions. In a 54-6 vote, the T.F.G.'s cabinet approved for the first time the proposal for a peacekeeping mission to protect the government as it built its own security forces. The cabinet insisted that the states that would contribute to the mission be confined to Sudan and Uganda, reflecting fears of intervention by Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, which are accused of taking sides in Somalia's conflicts. The A.U. promptly endorsed the decision and authorized I.G.A.D. to prepare for the mission, pending ratification by the T.F.G.'s parliament, which remains uncertain.

Conclusion

A brief narrative of selected events within and surrounding the abortive battle for Mogadishu gives only a glimpse of the myriad contradictory forces shaping Somalia's tangled and knotted political web. Overall, the picture is one of a frenzied paralysis in which some of the actors confront one another and check one another with relatively clear purpose, and others are divided and ambivalent, blunting the open struggle and thereby working against any decisive resolution.

As the U.N. Monitoring Commission noted, the I.C.U. has become a major independent force with "organizational strength, leadership and, most importantly, will." The A.R.P.C.T. is similarly determined in its efforts to roll back the I.C.U. and is counting on its "anti-terrorism" rhetoric to place the United States securely on its side. Washington expresses public support for the T.F.G., but will not deny that it is backing the A.R.P.C.T. The T.F.G. remains divided and ineffective, but it is showing signs of consolidation as other actors compete with it for legitimacy, and it is receiving international support. International and regional organizations are behind the T.F.G., but they are hobbled by the fact that some of their members are also supporting factions committed to derailing the transitional institutions. Unaffiliated clans, warlords and businessmen can step in temporarily to diffuse conflicts, but they are unable to swing the balance of power decisively. The breakaway mini-states pursue their independent policies with the blessing of Ethiopia, the region's major power center.

Expect Somalia's frenzied paralysis to continue. At present, there is no political force capable of prevailing on its own and no external power that is willing or has the capacity to impose a solution. The new and complicating thread in the web is the I.C.U. and Islamism.

Look in the near term for persisting waves of tension between the I.C.U. and the A.R.P.C.T., as all the other foreign and domestic forces struggle to position themselves around the central confrontation. The complexity and uncertainty of the political situation ensures that most actors will try to hedge their bets, lowering the chances for conflict resolution. The political configuration of the web has changed and become more fraught, but the familiar tangles and knots remain.

Report Drafted By:

Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.

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