Geopolitical Diary: Playing The Taliban Card ‎In Somalia‎‎

June 27, 2006 – The media were focused Monday on how Somalia had all but fallen into the hands of jihadists -- and the Islamists who have seized control of the capital and other major parts of the country kept feeding this perception. The day began with Siyad Mohamed, a militia leader linked to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), telling Reuters that five men would be stoned to death "in accordance with the Islamic Shariah" in Jowhar for raping four women on June 22. This followed the June 24 announcement that controversial cleric and military commander Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys had been appointed as the head of a new advisory council to the group. Aweys is suspected of links to al Qaeda and is on both the U.S. and U.N. terrorism lists.

All of this raises the question of why the ICU -- which since its takeover of Mogadishu has been trying to project itself as a moderate Islamist group -- is now deliberately working to reinforce international concerns that it is an African version of the Taliban?

The answer has to do with the fact that the ICU is trying to complete its takeover of the country and gain international recognition. It realizes that the latter will come only when the United States recognizes its government. The ICU also knows that there is a major roadblock standing in the way of this recognition: namely, the fact that it is an Islamist group with ties to al Qaeda. But it also sees an opportunity in this.

U.S. interest in Somalia begins and ends with making sure the country does not become a launch pad for al Qaeda. Washington knows that the only force capable of providing that guarantee is the ICU, which has been taking territory by defeating U.S.-backed warlords.

The ICU knows that it has to tread carefully on this path if it is to be successful. Like all Islamist groups, the ICU is all too familiar with the fate of the Taliban government. Moreover, there are a great many similarities between the ICU's push to establish and consolidate its hold over power in Somalia and the Taliban's efforts in Afghanistan in 1996. Like the Taliban, the ICU is an Islamist militia movement with ties to transnational jihadists. Anarchy and warlordism reign in contemporary Somalia just as they did in mid-1990s Afghanistan. And just as the Taliban were able to takeover Afghanistan because the people supported them for their ability to maintain order amid the chaos, the ICU has been able to spread its control because of popular support stemming from the perception that it is establishing security.

That said, there a number of significant differences between the Taliban and the ICU, which underscore that the ICU is not really trying to impose Shariah in Somalia as much as it is trying to play the Islamist card to consolidate its hold over power.

Unlike the Taliban, the ICU lacks a coherent ideology and structure. Where the Taliban were more or less a singular entity with a clear-cut ideology and leadership, the ICU is an amalgam of sundry Islamist elements and warlords. While the militant Deobandi ideology was very close to the extreme Wahhabism of al Qaeda, the ICU is a much more diverse group of Somalis who adhere to the Shafi'i school of law.

What the ICU is really doing with all these moves is posturing. The group knows the United States is willing to deal with it. The Bush administration has been saying as much -- on Monday, after the appointment of Aweys, Washington merely stated that it would not engage with him specifically, but left open the possibility of working with the "collective leadership" of the group. The group's goal is to get the United States to recognize the group's hold over power in the country; it knows that the interim government in Baidoa can still be used by Washington as a counter to the ICU.

The ICU is trying to exploit two perceptions simultaneously: that it is a potentially moderate group with whom the United States can do business, and that it could be overtaken by radicals if a deal is not struck. What remains to be seen is that whether it can maintain this balance.

Source: The STRATFOR

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