Only A Spirit Of Give And Take Will Work

By JACKSON MBUVI

Nov 16, 2006

Amid the cacophony and prospects of an all-out war that has characterized Somalia in the last one year, three events have taken place in the past two months that indicate there could be a ray of hope after all.

In late August, Mogadishu port became operational for the first time in 11 years. The main sea gateway to the troubled country had been a no-go zone, with various armed factions battling for its control.  

The second event that indicates that disorder may soon lose ground in Somalia is the rescue of a ship taken hostage by pirates two weeks ago.  

Islamic militias recaptured the vessel, Mv Veesham, from six gunmen who had hijacked the 2285-tonne charcoal-laden cargo-ship and its 14 crew, and demanded a $1 million ransom.

The third and most important event is the sign that the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) are willing to sit down and talk peace

Forget about the fact that each side has, in the past, snubbed peace initiatives by the other. The bottom-line is that each side has demonstrated a willingness to talk peace. Apparently, none of them is too enthusiastic to fire the first shot that will ignite an all-out war.  

Three compelling factors

All this goes to suggest that each party quietly acknowledges that in the present circumstances, a winner-take-all situation would be a difficult short- or long-term proposition for Somalia.

Indeed, three compelling factors dictate that only a give-and-take situation will prevail in the country that has not known peace or statehood in the past 16 years.

First, none of the two combatants can easily vanquish the other now or in the near future. From the look of it, the UIC has a better footing, having captured the capital, Mogadishu. The Islamists also control huge swathes of the central and southern districts.  

But except for the capital, the UIC has no capacity, either in personnel or equipment, to defend such a huge front, extending to about 700 kilometers to the north and south of Mogadishu.  

It has barely 2000 well-trained and committed soldiers known as the Shabab (Arabic word for youth). The rest of the fabled UIC "army" is made up of unreliable, ill-equipped youth-for-hire who previously served the warlord with the deepest pockets.

In the event of an all-out war, it is likely the UIC would lose much of the territory to both TFG and other small factions, and be marooned in Mogadishu. That, effectively, would return Somalia to the gang-land it was three years ago where clan warlords controlled more than a dozen "autonomous" fiefdoms.

On the other hand, the TFG army, though only confined to Baidoa on the western border with Ethiopia and Kenya, is well-trained and disciplined. Also, it has direct material and logistical backing of Ethiopia.  

Ethiopia has deployed heavily armed battalions at the border with Somalia, only 100 kilometers from Baidoa. In the event of war, the TFG and Ethiopians could easily storm the 600-kilometre ill-protected buffer-zone between Baidoa and Mogadishu.  

With the UIC being stopped from reaching the south, a rival group allied to TFG, the Juba Valley Alliance, which was driven underground by the UIC three months ago, would reappear to recapture the strategic port of Kismayo and lower Juba.

Ethiopia 's strategy, once it comes to an all-out war, is also to halt UIC advance to the north. It is, thus, easy to appreciate why there will be no outright winner in the imbroglio any time soon.

That, automatically, leads to the second compelling reason why only give-and-take will prevail in Somalia. Both the UIC and TFG need each other if Somalia is to be restored to the nation status it was before 1991.

The UIC has shown willingness and capacity to restore sanity in the country as demonstrated by the opening up of the port of Mogadishu and the determined onslaught on pirates.

Even the most severe of UIC critics grudgingly acknowledge that it has restored law and order in the territory it controls. That is certainly something TFG cannot just trash.

On the other hand, the TFG has international recognition and acceptability which UIC lacks. However, TFG must appreciate that its mandate is only to effect the creation of a federal state. The biggest mistake it has made is to act as if it were the substantive authority in Somalia, excluding other parties.

The US, too, retreated

It is, thus, clear that only the moderation of respective hard-line stances and accommodation of one another will give birth to a new peaceful and progressive Somalia where UIC and TFG are partners.

The third factor is that no external force – whether the powerful US, the UN or the AU – can bring lasting peace in Somalia.  

Somehow, Ethiopia understands that, hence the hesitation to go at it hammer-and-tongs with the UIC militia. So do Kenya and Uganda which had initially backed intervention by a regional peace-keeping force only to develop cold feet.  

The US, too, which had earlier tried to bankroll the warlords against the Islamists, retreated on realizing that it was pulling an empty bag.

Former US ambassador Smith Hempstone best captured the Somali situation in a November 1992 cable advising his government not to intervene militarily.

"There is no reason to believe that the bitter and long-standing clan rivalry that has turned Somalia into a particularly murderous African Lebanon will yield to outside intervention by the UN or any other group.

"Somalis, as the Italians and British discovered to their discomfiture, are natural-born guerillas. They will not be able to stop convoys from getting through. But they will inflict casualties. Encourage the Somalis who want peace. Leave them alone to work out their destiny, brutal as it may be," he wrote.

Mr. Mbuvi is a consultant on security matters.

Source: The Nation