Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

After September 24, when the Islamic Courts Council (I.C.C.) peacefully gained control over the strategic port city of Kismayo in Somalia's deep south and extended its reach over the southern regions of Middle and Lower Jubba, the conflicts in that stateless country sharpened and broadened into a looming armed confrontation between the I.C.C. and Ethiopia. The I.C.C. seeks to unite Somalia in an Islamic state, while Ethiopia is determined to prevent that outcome and supports the Courts' rival, the Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), which is structured by a clan-based constitution.

The I.C.C.'s takeover of Kismayo signaled to every actor interested in Somalia that the Courts had crossed a tipping point and were poised to gain irreversible momentum. With the impotent T.F.G. isolated in the town of Baidoa in the southwestern Bay region and surrounded by the I.C.C. on the north, east and south, Addis Ababa sent troops in from the west to protect the T.F.G. This action militarized the conflict and forced the I.C.C. to devote its primary efforts to recruiting fighters and mobilizing its militias for war.

Fronts opened up not only around Baidoa, but throughout Somalia -- in the south, where Col. Barre Hirale, the ousted warlord of Kismayo, moved to regain control over the Jubba regions; in the central Galgadud and Mudug regions, where the ousted Mogadishu warlord Abdi Qeybdid sent in forces to displace the I.C.C. and was backed by Ethiopian troops and militias from the sub-state of Puntland to the north; and the western Hiraan region, where I.C.C. militias and Ethiopian forces continued a face-off that had begun in June when the Courts initiated their sweep across southern and central Somalia and captured the strategic town of Beledweyne near the Ethiopian border.

As tensions mounted, the breakaway northern sub-states of Puntland and Somaliland came into play, with efforts by sectors of their societies to set up courts linked to the I.C.C. Those initiatives, which were backed by the I.C.C., were met by the governments of the sub-states with efforts to suppress them.

Emboldened by the Courts' successes, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (O.N.L.F.), which has mounted a protracted low-level insurgency in Ethiopia's ethnic Somali Ogaden region, stepped up its activities, reporting attacks on Ethiopian convoys and positions, and defections of Ethiopian troops. According to local media, the I.C.C. and O.N.L.F. were supporting each other's respective campaigns.

Conflict spilled over into Kenya, where the I.C.C. started recruiting fighters in the country's ethnic Somali North Eastern province. The I.C.C.'s control of Lower Jubba, which borders Kenya, spurred Nairobi to put its security forces on high alert and to beef them up along its frontier with Somalia. Although the I.C.C. has made it clear that it does not intend to threaten Kenya, Nairobi does not want fighting in Somalia to spread across the border and has become increasingly averse to the prospect of an Islamic state in Somalia.

With increasing militarization on the ground, other interested external actors were constrained to take positions, most of them following dual-track strategies of backing one of the sides while at the same time calling for the I.C.C. and T.F.G. to engage in dialogue and enter reconciliation talks. An emerging trans-regional polarization pitted Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Sudan and Eritrea, which backed the I.C.C., against Uganda and Tanzania, which backed the T.F.G., Ethiopia and Kenya. The north-south divide reflects a convergent interest of the North African and Near Eastern states in gaining a sphere of influence in the Horn of Africa through a unified Somalia that would check Ethiopia, and the interest of the East African states and Ethiopia in preventing the push south and, consequently, in keeping Somalia relatively weak, if not divided.

U.N. reports confirmed the picture of militarization, estimating that 6,000-8,000 Ethiopian troops were either inside Somalia or massed on the frontier, and that 2,000 Eritrean troops were inside the country supporting the I.C.C. Analysts, journalists, local and regional leaders, and officials in international organizations and Western donor states warned that Addis Ababa and Asmara, which are embroiled in a festering border dispute, were poised to fight a proxy war in Somalia.

As the threat of war became more intense, the United States (which had been thought to be supporting Ethiopia), the European powers, and the U.N. applied diplomatic pressure for reconciliation talks between the I.C.C. and T.F.G. That pressure failed to bring results when the third round of negotiations in Khartoum, brokered by the Arab League (A.L.), collapsed on November 1 with the I.C.C. and T.F.G. delegations refusing to engage in face-to-face discussions.

Sparring and Waiting

Since PINR published its last report on Somalia in mid-October, the situation there has not changed substantially, except for increased militarization and an intensification of tensions.

The I.C.C. has held its own on the ground, defeating Hirale's militias in Jubba, retaking the town of Bur Haqaba near Baidoa after a T.F.G.-Ethiopian contingent had briefly occupied it, holding Qeybdid's militias and their Ethiopian and Puntland allies at bay in Galgadud and Mudug, and fortifying and consolidating its positions in Hiraan. The I.C.C.'s projections into Puntland and Somaliland through local initiatives to set up Islamic courts have extended its reach and shown that its revolution still has momentum, yet they have also actuated repressive responses, including arrests and raids, from the administrations of the sub-states. The I.C.C. has also penetrated the far southwestern Gedo region -- the only region south of Puntland where it had not yet established a presence and where Hirale's forces are based -- through local initiatives to establish an Islamic court.

The Courts' movement has also gained and consolidated domestic support by appealing to Somali nationalism and anti-Ethiopian sentiment, securing the support of the members of the former Somali national army, the traditional Sufi Muslim clerics and the Somali business class. It has mounted successful recruitment drives and is estimated to have 10,000 fighters. The I.C.C. has continued to encounter only sporadic domestic opposition, although local courts have closed movie theaters, banned the sale of the mild stimulant drug qat, limited unarranged marriages, muzzled some media outlets temporarily and executed exemplary punishments on criminals convicted under Shari'a law.

The rift that many analysts predicted would open between moderate and radical Islamists in the I.C.C. has failed to materialize thus far, nor have often predicted inter-clan conflicts broken out. Following its program of creating an Islamic society transcending clan allegiances, the I.C.C. has banned inter-clan discrimination, especially against weaker, unarmed and lower status clans and sub-clans. The I.C.C. continues to maintain order in the areas under its control and performed its first successful rescue of a commercial vessel seized by pirates in November.

Despite the ability of the I.C.C. to maintain and even extend its reach during the last half of October and the first half of November, its social revolution has been blunted and it has not been able to reverse the pressures on it from the warlord-T.F.G.-Puntland alliance of convenience. Instead of any decisive turn to the advantage of one adversary or another, there has been a condition of deepening stasis, marked by each side testing the other and then drawing back from a major strike.

The impression that Somalia's antagonists are on the brink of war has led to sentiment in Somalia and the region, and among international actors and analysts, that war is imminent. The persistent pattern of sparring and waiting for someone to strike, however, casts doubt upon that sentiment. Although major armed conflict is surely a genuine possibility, close attention to the moves on the ground indicates that none of the actors appears to be ready and willing to strike the first blow or to drive an adversary to the point of doing so.

There are obvious reasons why none of the actors desires a major war. The I.C.C. has strong popular support behind it, but its forces -- armed with battlewagons -- are no match for well-armored Ethiopian troops, which would have to be opposed in a costly guerrilla war. The T.F.G., the ousted warlords and the Puntland militias are in no position to defeat the I.C.C., leaving them dependent on Ethiopia. Addis Ababa, which could presumably win a conventional war against the I.C.C., would face the prospect of maintaining supply lines under the conditions of guerrilla warfare, controlling a bitterly antagonistic population and encountering possible escalation of tensions on its border with Eritrea, stepped up insurgencies in the Ogaden and Oromo regions, defections from its army and domestic political opposition.

Given the uncertain and severely problematic consequences of a major war between the key antagonists, other regional states, Western powers and international organizations appear to want to avoid the outbreak of serious armed conflict, even though the regional states have taken sides and Washington and the European powers would prefer not to have Somalia become an Islamic state. At present, all the interested regional and international actors call for dialogue, with the African bloc supporting an African Union (A.U.) peacekeeping mission that would prop up the T.F.G. and relieve pressure on Addis Ababa; the Arab bloc opposing the peacekeeping mission and urging the T.F.G. and I.C.C. to resolve their differences without "foreign interference," which would work in favor of the Courts; and the international actors caught between the two sides without a precise policy, but increasingly averse to a war that might spread throughout the Horn and lead to a lasting divide between East African and Near Eastern states.

The longer that the deep stasis and sparring among the major antagonists continues, the greater is the probability that one of them will strike the first blow or goad its adversary into doing so. Were the I.C.C. to attempt to take Baidoa and expel the T.F.G., Addis Ababa would be constrained to respond, but that eventuality is unlikely, at least in the short term. Were Addis Ababa to act preemptively and strike into central Somalia, it would be exposing itself to international isolation unless it had Washington's blessing, which seems more and more unlikely. There is no indication that Nairobi would open a second front in the south to support Addis Ababa; Nairobi is more concerned with border security than it is with mounting an invasion that would cause unrest in its northeast.

Given the balance of power and the perceived interests of the conjuncture of actors, look for the present sparring and waiting to persist, at least in the short term.

Diplomatic Maneuvers

With war an unattractive eventuality for all the actors interested in Somalia's conflicts, attention was focused on diplomatic alternatives to resolving the stand-off and breaking the stasis.

Events in mid-October were dominated by attempts to bring the I.C.C. and T.F.G. to the bargaining table at a third round of reconciliation talks in Khartoum scheduled for October 30. The period of diplomatic activity began with the I.C.C. expressing eagerness to participate in the Khartoum process and the T.F.G. reluctant to do so, reflecting a balance of power on the ground that registered a preponderant advantage for the Courts.

That picture changed when the Washington-inspired Contact Group (C.G.) -- composed of the former European colonial powers in Somalia (Great Britain and Italy), Scandinavian donor states, the United States and Tanzania -- met in Nairobi on October 19, with the A.L. A.U., U.N. and representatives from the I.C.C. and T.F.G. in attendance. Insisting that it would not go to Khartoum if the talks were solely brokered by the A.L., the T.F.G. was able to persuade the external actors to designate Kenya as the co-chair of the third round, driving the I.C.C. to place the conditions of withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia and removal of Kenya as co-chair of the third round for its participation in the reconciliation process. The T.F.G. responded that it would not accept any conditions for negotiations, leaving the prospects for productive discussions bleak.

When the talks opened a day late on October 31, the I.C.C. and T.F.G. were present with low-level delegations led by the I.C.C.'s foreign relations chief and the T.F.G.'s minister for constitutional affairs. Holding fast to their stated positions, the T.F.G. refused to meet the I.C.C.'s conditions and the I.C.C. insisted that they be met, resulting in an impasse. Efforts by regional and international mediators to persuade the adversaries to accept Sudan as sole chair failed and the third round collapsed on November 1 without the I.C.C. and T.F.G. having negotiated face-to-face.

With the major hope for diplomatic resolution dashed, external actors renewed the flurry of bilateral consultations that had begun in the first half of October, the most important of which involved Addis Ababa and Cairo. None of the bilateral discussions has as yet produced a compromise that would allow the northern and southern blocs to achieve a unified position that could be used to pressure the I.C.C. and T.F.G. to break their stalemate.

As regional and international actors remained deadlocked or suspended, the I.C.C. and T.F.G. parliamentary factions led by parliamentary speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan launched an internal initiative that brought a T.F.G. delegation to Somalia's official capital Mogadishu for talks with I.C.C. leaders aimed at finding ways to restart the reconciliation process. The T.F.G. executive tried unsuccessfully to prevent the negotiations, which threatened to split the transitional institutions irretrievably and to strip away any of their remaining legitimacy.

On November 11, the I.C.C. signed a "preliminary peace agreement" with Adan, including a pledge to reject "foreign interference" in Somalia and an appeal to the international community to continue a frequently flouted U.N. arms embargo on Somalia that prevents a peacekeeping mission. The T.F.G. executive immediately rejected the agreement, as would be expected, leaving the diplomatic picture unpromising.

Conclusion

For the past six weeks, Somalia has been edging toward the brink of war, as the various adversaries have taken up military positions around the country and tested one another's resolve, and diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis have failed.

The major factor increasing the probability of near-term armed conflict is the polarization of external powers along a north-south axis, with the northern states supporting the I.C.C. and the southern states backing the T.F.G. That polarization will be confirmed in a report, advance information on which was obtained by Reuters, of the U.N. commission monitoring the arms embargo on Somalia that notes how the northern states and militant Islamist movements are arming and supplying the Courts, and how the southern states are doing the same for the T.F.G.

The most significant change in the power configuration surrounding Somalia that has occurred since mid-October has been the moves of two of Somalia's immediate neighbors -- Djibouti and Kenya -- that had previously attempted to maintain equidistant stances toward the conflict into the northern and southern camps respectively, eliminating the possibility of a regional honest broker to mediate the reconciliation process. The root cause of the failure of the T.F.G. and I.C.C. to negotiate in Khartoum was the lack of an honest broker trusted by both sides, leaving the military option dominant.

The fact remains, however, that none of the major actors appears to feel that it is ready for war. The most likely actor to strike the first blow would be Addis Ababa, which sees the window of opportunity to check the Courts closing rapidly. Addis Ababa has the most to fear and lose from a united Islamic Somali state, which would carry with it the threat of irredentism and encirclement by hostile and competitive powers. Yet Ethiopia is restrained by recent moves by Washington indicating a shift away from the military option. In a press briefing in Nairobi on November 10, a senior officer in the U.S. Central Command that is based in Djibouti made it clear that Washington does not want Ethiopia in Somalia and that U.S. forces would not participate in a war if it breaks out. The officer, who did not believe that war was imminent, told reporters that its most probable cause would be an I.C.C. attack on Baidoa that would force Addis Ababa's hand.

At present, despite the tense stand-off around Baidoa, it does not appear that the I.C.C. is ready to mount an attack on the provisional capital. Local skirmishes are likely to continue to break out, any of which could get out of hand. The I.C.C. is determined to make inroads into Puntland, Somaliland and the Gedo region, and its advances are likely to trigger firm responses from its opponents.

On November 12, the I.C.C. claimed to have taken the town of Bandiradley in the Mudug region after a firefight with militias loyal to Qeybdid backed by Puntland and Ethiopian forces. The capture of Bandiradley would bring the Courts closer to the Puntland border than they had previously been and would open a path for them to Galkayo, the capital of the central Mudug region, which is divided between Puntland and the new regional authority of Galmudug, which has disavowed affiliation with the I.C.C. but has distanced itself from Puntland. I.C.C. fighters announced that they would advance on Galkayo and the Puntland administration responded by mobilizing its security forces in the town, where an Islamic court has recently been formed. It remains to be seen whether the I.C.C. will cross a red line in Mudug.

PINR's judgment in mid-October that general war was not imminent, but that local armed conflicts were likely to break out, has been confirmed through mid-November and still holds, although an I.C.C. takeover of Galkayo would be a major advance, similar in its significance to the Courts' move into Kismayo, and would be likely to draw I.C.C. forces into armed conflict with Puntland militias and their Ethiopian allies.

Much of the future shape of the conflict depends on how aggressively the I.C.C. presses to complete its revolution and on whether or not the U.N. Security Council lifts its arms embargo (if it does, and A.U. peacekeepers enter Somalia, the I.C.C.'s hand would probably be forced).

With every actor averse to a war, yet unwilling to make the compromises necessary to back away from the brink on account of interfering interests, expect the current period of high tension and deep stasis to continue, perhaps for months ahead.

Please update your address books:

New: seth@sethkaplan.org

Backups: seth.kaplan.wg94@wharton.upenn.edu

skaplan@bdumail.com