Mogadishu, Somalia, January 8, 2007 – Even with the recent military success, reports indicate that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its major backer – Ethiopia — will struggle to resolve the many multidimensional conflicts facing Somalia.

By defeating and running the Islamists out of key towns, Ethiopia has secured its strategic interests. However, the powers that be in Addis Ababa are also apparently aware of their inability to handle the emerging post-war scenario in Somalia and have called for the speedy deployment of a peacekeeping force.  

But now, analysts say the defeat of the Islamists could bake the beginning of a difficult period for Somalia and Somalis, as the defeat of the Islamists has destroyed a “home-grown” peace-building process started in the 1990s.  

Compounding the problem is a conspicuous unwillingness by the international community and most African countries to finance and deploy a peacekeeping force to Somalia.  

Second, the multidimensional conflict in Somalia is rooted deeply within the very structure of the Somali society and has to do with how the population accesses, uses and controls natural resources in different regions there. A further source of complication is that different countries — both within the Arab world and in the Horn of Africa — have been actively supporting different clans in line with their strategic interests.

According to a World Bank-commissioned report titled Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics, since it started in 1991, the civil war in Somalia has been fought along clan lines; over access to and control of resources, and could therefore prove, difficult to resolve especially because better-armed clans have not shown any willingness to let go of the valuable urban and agricultural land they have forcibly captured from smaller and lesser-armed clans.

The report says that since the fall of the Siyad Barre regime, armed clashes in the country “have been fought in the name of the clan.” This was after political leaders manipulated the clans for their own selfish interests.  

According to Wikipaedia, the online encyclopedia, Somalia’s major clans include the Dir who comprise 5 per cent of the population; Hawiye, 21 per cent; Isaaq, 20 per cent; Darod, 30 per cent; Rahanweyn, 17 per cent; and Digil 3 per cent, with the Bantus, Barawas and Bajunis (lumped as “others”) comprising 6 per cent. The military conflict pitted clan-based liberation movements that had sprung up all over the country against each other, including the Hawiye clan-based United Somali Congress, the Somali Patriotic Movement of the Ogaden clan and the Somali Salvation Democratic Movement of the Majerteen clan. This was before what the World Bank report calls the “predatory looting and banditry” that was to come later.

Interestingly, clan identity in Somalia is not static or fixed but is “shaped and manipulated according to changing situations.” This means that clans do not merely engage in conflicts as a matter of course but that conflicts are created by leaders to acquire and control resources and power. “War lords are instrumental in invoking loyalty to raise or lower the level of identity from clan to subclan? and back again depending on what is most convenient.”  

This technique is said to have been perfected by Barre; the clan-based warlords have simply continued to apply it. To ensure political survival and to dominate other clans, political leaders enabled their clans to monopolize state resources besides stealing valuable land and other assets from other clans.  

The World Bank report says the warlords continued this practice from 1991-99, during which “whole clans found themselves in possession of valuable urban and riverrine real estates won by conquest.” Fearing that they stand to lose such possessions in peaceful settlement, clan leaders have ended up frustrating successive peace processes initiated by international community. As a result, there were 12 other national reconciliation conferences — most of which ended up in provoking conflict in the country — before the Igad-led process.

It is now clear that such fears were behind the humiliating experience the UN underwent under UNosom between 1993 and 1994 in which the 19 US peacekeepers were killed in the most inhuman way. Initially, UNosom’s operations had succeeded in putting a halt to armed conflict, especially because the US was not involved in disarming the militias. But when UNosom’s mandate was expanded to incorporate the reconstruction of a government based on local district councils, “this threatened the interests of a number of militia leaders and their clans who controlled valuable real estate through conquest and who viewed UNosom as moving towards disenfranchising them.”  

The report says a confrontation was therefore “inevitable” and was the principal driving force behind the four-month Farah Aideed-led assault on UN forces.

Going hand-in-hand with clannism is the raging competition for, and access to such nature-based resources as land, water points, cash crops, charcoal, fisheries, frankincense and “potential” oil and mineral reserves. Competition over access to these resources has caused recurring clashes among and within clans in nearly all regions of the country.  

Analysts say that several dominant clans have aggressively displaced locally populations in Juba and Shabelle river valleys in south and central Somalia. For instance, there are claims that the Marehan, Darod and Hawiye, who operate under the auspices of the Juba Valley Alliance, have wrested the control of lower Juba valley from other clans who have the support of Puntland’s authorities. There are also reports of tensions over the Mudug region and Sool in Eastern Sanaag, which are claimed by both Puntland and Somaliland.  

The World Bank report says, “It is speculated that there are oil and natural gas reserves in pockets across the country which potentially could bring substantial revenues?(and) also be a source of conflict.”  

It remains to be seen how the TFG will address the forcible occupation of land in the country, especially when it is borne in mind that leaders of offending clans are now within its ranks.

Poverty is also likely to prove a against the creation of order. Even before Barre was ousted, Somali’s per capita income was a paltry $170, while life expectancy was 47 years. Most people have been struggling to survive through cash crop farming (mostly bananas and citrus fruits), livestock rearing, the sale of khat (miraa), while remittances from Somalis in the diaspora played a big role in maintaining local households. But aside from the long-running civil war, other forces have stepped in to make the bad situation worse.  

For one, the US moved against the Hawala money-transfer institutions by freezing assets of such outfits as the Al-Barakaat in the aftermath of September 11 terror attacks. The World Bank report says that this “not only damaged” household economy but also put many young people — who now form the base of the militias —- out of work.  

In addition, the outbreak of the Rift Valley Fever led to the ban on livestock exports to Saudi Arabia and seven other Gulf States pushing hundreds of thousands of pastoral Somalis into destitution.

Although the TFG through Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi, has vowed to disarm thousands of militiamen and private citizens, many observers say this will prove a tricky operation.  

A 2004 GTZ study on militarisation in the country showed that there were between 70,000 and 80,000 militia personnel organized in 53 different groups. These people, the GTZ reported, view looting as “employment” though of “last resort.” It is also evident that the TFG does not have the capacity to engage in such an elaborate endeavor, especially in a situation in which ordinary Somalis are said to be highly distrust of political power and the state.  

The other reason is that unlike the Islamists, the TFG has not come up with “homemade” peace-building and order-creating process. The courts had benefited from Somali businessmen who had bankrolled the creation of order in parts of the country. “Emboldened by their growing wealth, and dissatisfied with the lawlessness caused by the militias, the businessmen bought militiamen away from their leaders and handed them over to local Sharia courts to serve as police.”  

The Sharia courts preceded the formation of the Union of Islamic Courts and are reported to have sprung up all over towns and neighborhoods in much of southern Somalia.

Analysts say that the TFG’s operation base might be limited by its limited reach and support from most Somalis. They say the very process out of which the TFG came into existence was not only faulty from the beginning but was also “external” — the outcome of a desire by the international community to create order in the country.  

For instance, the World Bank report says the 2003 Arta Peace Conference in Djibouti, which resulted in the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG), excluded the semi-autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland and a number of militia leaders in Mogadishu. To make matters worse, “the TNG leadership devoted most of its attention to securing foreign aid and external recognition rather than engaging in the arduous process of rebuilding a central government.”  

But even after securing the funds from Gulf States, the World Bank report says TNG officials lost the funds through “corruption,” which not only diminished its image but also made it “largely irrelevant.”

But as the GTZ researchers found out, many militiamen have shown an interest in settling down to normal lives. Further, it is now apparent that most Somalis— both within the country and in the diaspora — have grown weary of the conflict and are willing to give peace a chance. Besides, Igad — with Kenya playing a leading role — has shown commendable seriousness in resolving the conflict.  

What remains to be seen isif there will be willingness by the international community to bankroll a comprehensive peace process and a return to normal life in Somalia. Some of the key players in the recent events — particularly the US and Ethiopia — will have to reorient their thinking away from safeguarding their regional interests towards working for the rebirth of the country. A chaotic Somalia is a threat to the whole world.

Source: The East African

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