Issue 260

THE Ethiopian-led and US-backed overthrow of the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia has been swift, but the question of Somalia’s future is still wide open. The answer is important to the peace and security of much of east Africa, Washington’s war on terror and the millions of Somalis in need of humanitarian assistance. In the absence of a political deal between the transitional government, the more moderate elements in the Union of Islamic Courts and clans, the country stands to return to warlordism. And even if there is a deal, the government could suffer a radical Islamic insurgency. Al- Qaeda has called for an Iraq type insurgency to dislodge the Ethiopian “crusaders” from Somalia.

With all the foreign meddling, are the more upbeat scenarios — such as the type of agreement that emerged in Somaliland, which seceded from Somalia — possible?

The US is attaching increasing strategic importance to Somalia. It already has a military base in Djibouti and last week it dispatched an aircraft carrier to join naval vessels offshore. The US has long been concerned that al-Qaeda fighters fleeing Iraq and Afghanistan would go to Somalia, and it now wants to cut off a sea escape for Islamist fighters.

It is highly likely that it was to forestall the possibility of an insurgency that the US launched air attacks this week on what it says were al-Qaeda members, who along with Islamist fighters had fled pursuing Ethiopian troops.

As much as it may have done the US a degree of political damage to demonstrate a substantial show of force in Africa, it was an opportune moment for the US to claim some success in the war on terror.

With the request for US support having come from the internationally recognized interim government in Somalia, the US had legal ground for action. And while the new secretary-general of the United Nations, Ban ki-Moon, as well as the European Union, Norway and Italy, have criticized the US over the attack, the silence from Africa, including SA, has been overwhelming.

What the US, the Ethiopians and the Kenyans fear most is another Afghanistan. Both Afghanistan and Somalia have suffered from a weak central government and warlordism at various stages. And in both cases, a short campaign pushed out Islamist governments. In Afghanistan the Taliban have resurfaced with a vengeance over the past year.

If an Islamic insurgency is prevented, or at least restricted, in Somalia and the wider region, the campaign to overthrow the Islamists is likely to be claimed as a successful model for Washington’s war on terror.

The campaign in Somalia was not US-led. It was led by Ethiopia, a regional power, allowing the US to avoid casualties and the need for a substantial troop presence. Politically, the US may well have preferred that the Ethiopians — and ideally the transitional government — do the entire job, but circumstances probably made that hard.

The US has clearly learnt — from Iraq and Afghanistan — that the end of a campaign can be illusory, and can be used by its enemy to regroup. The Taliban were overthrown in Afghanistan nearly five years ago and after relative quiet for four years, they have regrouped.

Somalia allows the US to point to a success in its war on terror at a time that it is facing severe problems on its other fronts — notably Iraq and Afghanistan. However, Washington will keep a watchful eye from its base in Djibouti. The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan have not been lost on the US military and a recent US defense department report on counter- insurgency underscored the long-term nature of such campaigns.

But the foreign interest from the US, al-Qaeda, Ethiopia and Kenya in Somali clan politics is a risk to any future settlement. Somalia is a theatre for proxy wars and will continue to be so for some time, given its strategic location so close to the Bab al Mandeb choke point into the Red Sea, which leads into the Suez Canal. Further, clan politics makes it susceptible to foreign powers who want avenues to challenge their rivals. The danger would become incendiary should, say, Iran decide to use Somalia as an arena in which to challenge the US.

The real problem Somalia faces now is: what next? That’s the very question the US failed to answer in Iraq and it is bound to be the most challenging problem with any regime change situation.

The Islamic Courts raised international fears of a new terror base in Africa but Somali analysts agree that their six-month rule provided law and order and some other state functions. With a sense of order, open clan rivalry was reduced.

Richard Cornwell, an analyst at the Institute for Security Studies, says that while a Taliban-type state was never a prospect, the Taliban provoked Ethiopia with calls for jihad and its support for rebel groups. Jihadist rhetoric and recruitment of foreign fighters was a further provocation.

It will be difficult for the transitional government to establish legitimacy, due to Ethiopia’s involvement in the overthrow. In Mogadishu, warlords and clans are rearming and preparing to defend their turf and seize opportunities that have come from the end of the Union of Islamic Courts’ control.

The UN’s preferred solution appears to be a peacekeeping force, preferably dominated by Muslim countries. SA is among those considering the request but is insisting that the clans reach a deal before a mission is sent. But if the clans do reach a deal, would there really be the need for such a force to be sent at all? It could merely emerge as a target for extremists.

Somalia’s clan politics have always been complicated, but they are getting a lot more dangerous.

Katzenellenbogen is international affairs editor.

Source: Business Day

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