Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

PINR 23 February 2007

During the first three weeks of February, Somalia continued its slide into political fragmentation as violent attacks against occupying Ethiopian forces and militias loyal to the Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) persisted on a nearly daily basis, inter-clan fighting continued to break out and the level of crime increased.

Although the T.F.G. claimed to be in control of security in the official capital Mogadishu, local media reported that its forces were failing to patrol the streets and that the Ethiopians were remaining in their bases, which came under attack, leading to exchanges of artillery fire that resulted in scores of deaths and injuries, mainly suffered by civilians. With approval of and pressure from the T.F.G., neighborhoods and businesses recruited their own security forces, restoring the situation that existed before the Islamic Courts Council (I.C.C.) had made its unsuccessful bid to unify Somalia in an Islamic state during the last half of 2006.

As the T.F.G. proved unable to establish itself as a legitimate and effective governing authority, external actors -- international and regional organizations, Western donor powers, and regional states -- continued to urge the T.F.G. to initiate reconciliation talks that would include conciliatory elements of the formally disbanded I.C.C. and would be geared to the formation of a national unity government, and to press for the deployment of an African Union (A.U.) "stabilization mission" (AMISOM) that would protect the T.F.G. and train its security forces. Although halting progress was made toward both goals, neither had as yet been realized, due to the reluctance of the T.F.G. to share power and of African states to contribute troops to the mission and donor powers to fund it adequately.

Ethiopia , whose invasion of Somalia in December 2006 had defeated the I.C.C. and whose troops and armor had been propping up the T.F.G. since then, had declared that it would pull out of the country in mid-February, but kept its forces there under Western pressure when AMISOM did not materialize as quickly as hoped. Some Ethiopian withdrawals were reported in local media, but they were only of marginal significance.

The T.F.G. failed to make progress on its top priority of disarming independent clan-based militias, which the United Nations reported were once again falling under the control of warlords who had divided Somalia into fiefdoms before the rise of the I.C.C., and suppressing criminal groups and the militant elements of the I.C.C.

The judgment of PINR's February 2 report on Somalia that the country had entered a devolutionary cycle has been confirmed during the past three weeks. Addis Ababa is satisfied with a fragmented Somalia, Western powers and international organizations have not made stabilizing the country a high priority, African states are either unwilling to contribute troops to a conflict zone or will only sign on to a restricted mission, and the T.F.G. is resistant to "inclusive" reconciliation.

Disorder on the Ground

February began with mortar attacks on an Ethiopian base on the northern edge of Mogadishu and a demonstration in the city attended by several hundred protestors who called for the return of the I.C.C. On February 2, mortar attacks on Mogadishu's seaport, a hotel and an Ethiopian base left nine people dead. Later in the day, an explosion at an Islamic girls school wounded seven faculties, and there was a gun battle between sub-clan militias sparked by a property dispute that had been suppressed by the I.C.C. The T.F.G.'s president, Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed, admitted, from Somalia's transitional capital in the south-central town of Baidoa, that "the security situation is getting out of control" and threatened that the T.F.G. would "use force to restore order."

Establishing a pattern that would hold in the coming weeks, most of the attacks were aimed at Ethiopian bases sited in derelict public facilities that housed or were near camps housing internally displaced persons who were the victims of the fighting and who began to flee their shelters.

On February 3, Somali police force colonel, Ali Qalaf, was ambushed and assassinated, an armed gang threw a bomb at a movie theater and militias were reported to be extorting money from motorists in Mogadishu. In the Lower Shabelle region, local media reported that there was no police force and that militias were robbing civilians in the town of Merka and that a truck doubling as a bus was attacked and its passengers robbed.

After a lull on February 4, attacks resumed in Mogadishu on February 5, with six rockets falling at the seaport. Shabelle Media Network reported that government police had withdrawn from the city's streets after repeated attacks on officers. Yusuf blamed not only I.C.C. "remnants," on which the T.F.G. had been laying responsibility for the violence, but also militias loyal to 40 members of the transitional parliament who support reconciliation with the Courts movement and who have taken refuge in Djibouti. Sources for local media claimed that militias loyal to disaffected warlords were behind some of the attacks. On February 6, a mortar round was fired near Villa Somalia, the Mogadishu residence of Yusuf and the T.F.G.'s base in the city.

In the Galgadud region, clashes were reported between local clan militias and forces from the breakaway sub-state of Puntland that had fought alongside the Ethiopians and were returning home. In the Lower Shabelle region, armed robbers opened fire on a bus, wounding three people. In the Lower Jubba region, clan elders were jailed for failing to provide recruits for government security forces.

Violence continued through the week, with rocket attacks on three hotels, kidnappings, daylight assassinations and mortar attacks in neighborhoods with Ethiopian bases. Bus drivers and conductors in Mogadishu set up roadblocks to protest the use of the main road to the Bakara market by overloaded trucks that overturn and block the artery; the I.C.C. had banned such vehicles from that road. On February 8, attackers ambushed an Ethiopian-T.F.G. convoy with rocket propelled grenades, and rockets were fired in several parts of Mogadishu. The first battle between T.F.G. forces and local militias occurred in the Afgoye district near Mogadishu.

On February 9, 600 people demonstrated in north Mogadishu -- the heart of the Hawiye clan, which feels marginalized by the T.F.G. and was the I.C.C.'s main support base -- against the Ethiopian occupation and AMISOM, and burned the flags of the United States, Ethiopia and Uganda, which is slated to lead AMISOM. On February 10, mortar attacks targeted hotels, Mogadishu's airport and the offices of the United Nations Development Program (U.N.D.P.), leaving five people dead and ten injured. For the first time, the People's Resistance Movement (P.R.M.) -- the reorganized militant wing of the I.C.C. -- claimed responsibility for an attack.

On February 11, the strategic southern port city of Kismayo was the scene of a bombing at a ceremony welcoming T.F.G. army commander Abdi Mahdi; south Somali police chief, General Ahmed Mohamed, and four Somali army colonels were killed, spurring a curfew in the city and scores of arrests.

Violence spiked up in Mogadishu on February 12 and 13, with artillery exchanges between attackers and Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces, attacks on police stations and a hotel housing government officials, rocket fire aimed at the seaport and a grenade attack on the house of T.F.G. trade minister, Abdillahi Ahmed Afrah. The T.F.G. announced plans for a curfew in Mogadishu and the Union of Islamic Religious Leaders in the city called for an end to the fighting, urging the T.F.G. to accept the Islamists as peace partners and advising residents to organize neighborhood security forces pending effective government policing. A previously unknown youth group -- the Muqawama -- took responsibility for some of the attacks.

With the T.F.G. and Ethiopian forces setting up checkpoints and private militias funded by businessmen appearing on the streets, Mogadishu was quiet on February 13 and 14. Somali NetRadio reported that the private security forces that were formed after the T.F.G. warned clan elders that any neighborhood from which a bullet was fired would be leveled. A report to the United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.) on February 14 claimed that warlords had re-established their control and were threatening the delivery of humanitarian aid, and that the chronic violence would undermine efforts to deploy AMISOM.

Violence resumed in Mogadishu on February 15 with mortar attacks on the seaport, Bakara market and the Hodan district, all of which are sites of Ethiopian bases, leaving four people dead. In Middle Shabelle, armed robberies on travelers continued in the absence of an administration to succeed warlord Mohamed Dheere who had relinquished authority to the T.F.G. in January. Shabelle Media Network reported that forces loyal to Dheere had prevented the new administration from taking control. Garowe Online reported that in the western Hiraan region, Islamist militia crossing from the Galgadud region had taken over the Matabaan district, the first such occupation reported since the Ethiopian invasion.

Attacks mounted through the end of the third week of February with mortars fired at an Ethiopian base in south Mogadishu and at the seaport. On February 18, gunmen in a truck opened fire on a car carrying Somali government soldiers, killing one and injuring two others. Another attack on T.F.G. forces the same day left two dead and three wounded. Shabelle Media Network again reported that the police had withdrawn from the streets and interviewed traders at the Bakara market who complained that armed robbery was rampant and that business had plunged. In a move to finance security operations, the regional administration of Banadir region, which includes Mogadishu, set up its own checkpoints to collect taxes from travelers. Despite the preponderance of reports to the contrary, the deputy mayor on Banadir in charge of finance, Hasan Muhammad Nur, said, "It is not true that people are fleeing Mogadishu."

The violence continued on February 19 with an attack on a police battlewagon that injured five officers and a shoot out between rival militias collecting tolls on motorists, and spiked to its highest level since the Ethiopian occupation when, on February 20, mortar fire was aimed at three Ethiopian and T.F.G. bases, triggering artillery barrages in response that killed 15 people and wounded 45.

Local media reported that thousands of residents were fleeing Mogadishu for surrounding areas in the Banadir region, their native regions, the breakaway sub-state of Somaliland and Yemen. On the same day, Shabelle Media Network reported that a dispute between the Sade and Harti sub-clans over which one should administer the resources of the Lower Jubba region had prevented the new T.F.G.-appointed administration of the region from functioning.

On February 21, two city officials -- a district commissioner and a deputy district commissioner -- were assassinated in Mogadishu. Garowe Online reported that the killings were linked to attempts to organize neighborhood militias. On February 22, a local militia engaged in a firefight with gunmen preparing to set up a mortar. The same day, rockets were fired at the airport. Warlords were reported to be purchasing large quantities of weapons at Mogadishu's Bakara market, including Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Mohamed Dheere and Abdi Nour Siyad.

The partial tabulation of violent incidents, protests and local conflicts during the first three weeks of February has been chronicled by PINR to give readers a sense of the persistent and deepening instability that characterizes Somalia today, and to temper statements by the T.F.G., Western powers, and regional and international organizations that the country has a "window of opportunity" to form a legitimate and effective government that would reverse the devolutionary cycle.

Taken separately, the events on the ground have not caused the collapse of the T.F.G. or forced the Ethiopians to withdraw from Somalia; taken together, they show the T.F.G. and the Ethiopians to be on the defensive and embattled, probably by multiple forces, and the population to be seeking safety in sub-clans. As PINR has noted before, the longer the devolutionary cycle goes on and deepens, the more difficult it will be for the T.F.G. to become a viable authority, whether or not reconciliation talks are held and/or AMISOM is deployed. Rather than making progress since the end of January, the T.F.G. has lost ground and is more dependent than ever on the support of external actors. As the T.F.G. gropes for a purchase, Somalia reverts to political fragmentation.

The T.F.G. Attempts to Consolidate

The security situation on the ground in Somalia has deteriorated to the point that it now conditions the political responses of all players with stakes in the country's future. Long-term interests are sacrificed for ad hoc adjustments and the players have become desperate and paralyzed, the latter being due either to their weakness or to their relative indifference following from more intense interests and commitments elsewhere.

Within the context of disorder on the ground, the T.F.G. executive -- dominated by Yusuf and its prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi -- tried to consolidate its political power over the transitional institutions and expand its legal authority over Somalia, as it made tentative efforts to start the reconciliation process desired by external actors and elements of dissident clans, civil society organizations and moderate Islamists.

The first move of the T.F.G. executive was to gain control over the transitional parliament, whose speaker, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, had been ousted in January for having conducted unauthorized negotiations with I.C.C. officials, after which his faction of 40 legislators had removed themselves from Somalia to Djibouti. On February 1, the transitional parliament elected Sheikh Aden Mohamed Nour, an ally of Yusuf and Gedi, as its new speaker. Nour, who had lost a race for the post to Adan in 2004, was known to be opposed to negotiations with the I.C.C. Western powers, which had considered Adan a key figure in building a unity government and had urged the T.F.G. to rescind his removal, were displeased, and Adan's faction claimed that Nour had been imposed by Addis Ababa and refused to grant him legitimacy.

On February 3, Yusuf demanded that Djibouti return the dissident legislators to Somalia and was refused. On February 19, Nour said that several sub-clans represented by Adan's faction had asked for replacement of the dissidents and that he would decide on the matter shortly. The dissidents replied that they would not return to Somalia until Ethiopian forces withdrew from the country.

With the transitional parliament under their control, Yusuf and Gedi presented an anti-terrorism law to the T.F.G. cabinet on February 5 that the cabinet ratified on February 12. The law, which would make permanent features of the "state of emergency" declared by the T.F.G. in January, contained penalties of execution, life imprisonment, confiscation of property and deportation for those convicted of terrorism, which was defined by T.F.G. information minister, Madobe Nunow Mohammed, as any acts that destabilized peace and security. The measure met with opposition from some legislators who said that it would exacerbate conflict and weaken the T.F.G.'s legitimacy.

On February 21, transitional parliament deputy Khadijo Mohamed Dirie told Garowe Online that legislators were being made subject to continuous harassment, searches and questioning by security forces in Baidoa under the state of emergency.

As violence mounted, the T.F.G. announced on February 20 that it had formed an "anti-terrorist unit," which had been trained by Ethiopian forces and had gone into operation. On the same day, the T.F.G.'s national security department renewed its attempts to clamp down on independent media, summoning officials of Radio Shabelle, HornAfrik Radio and Radio Banadir to a meeting at which they were ordered not to report about Somali government and Ethiopian military operations, or about "the civilian population fleeing Mogadishu under any circumstances." The stations were also told that because "there is an emergency state in place in Somalia generally, there is no so-called freedom of expression," and that the T.F.G. would name "editors" for the stations. Shabelle Media Network reported that Gen. Nur Mohamed Mohamud, the deputy chief of the national security department, had told the station officials that as "part of the martial law imposed on the country, government soldiers can shoot and kill everyone they want."

The announcement of the new regulations was greeted by protests from local media outlets, causing the T.F.G. Ministry of Information to claim that they were a "mistake" and that the ministry had jurisdiction over the press. Nunow asserted that "the media has the right to make coverage about any problem on the civilians if it is true, and also to mention who is responsible for the crisis, but the media should avoid anything that might fuel the conflict."

The T.F.G.'s attempts to assert control over Somalia have thus far been symbolic, have not halted the devolutionary slide, have weakened the credibility of the transitional institutions and have alienated Western powers because they run counter to the reconciliation project.

Under pressure from Western powers, international and regional organizations, regional states, African states contributing to AMISOM and marginalized sectors of Somali society, the T.F.G. made halting moves to initiate a reconciliation process.

On February 3, Yusuf announced that the T.F.G. Ministry of Reconciliation would organize a conference within three weeks (which has not yet been scheduled). From February 6-12, a reconciliation seminar funded by the U.N.D.P. to prepare the way for a conference was held in Mogadishu and was attended by 200 representatives, including clan elders, civil society organizations and, according to local media sources, warlords. The seminar ended with the announcement that the national reconciliation commission would consult with communities throughout Somalia that would select delegates to a conference. Gedi made it clear that the conference would be held within Somalia and would not be mediated by external actors, as had been favored by elements marginalized by the T.F.G. and Western powers.

On February 9, the transitional parliament agreed "in principle" to reconciliation talks without specifying the form that they would take, who would participate in them or when they would be held. Nour told skeptical legislators to be "patient," promising that "details would be forthcoming." On the key issue of whether or not conciliatory Islamists would be part of the reconciliation process, Yusuf and Gedi went back and forth, one day saying that the Islamists might be partners and the next day insisting that they would be excluded.

Reluctant to share power and lose positions and perquisites, the T.F.G. is likely to drag out preparations for a reconciliation process as long as it possibly can, moving only enough to placate external actors -- particularly donor powers -- and trying to shape the form that the conference, if it occurs at all, will take to maximize its own advantage. Yusuf has said that the conference will not be the one that has been urged by the international community, which would include conciliatory Islamists and would incorporate external observers and/or mediators.

The conciliatory faction of the I.C.C. was strengthened in February by the release of the former chair of its executive council, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, from custody in Kenya, where he had held talks with U.S. officials, and his reception in Yemen, which hosts other I.C.C. moderates. Washington and Brussels are eager to have Ahmed, who was the most popular figure in the Courts movement, included in reconciliation talks in order to isolate the I.C.C.'s militant wing and give the T.F.G. a modicum of legitimacy. At present, it is likely that the T.F.G. will continue to resist including former I.C.C. officials in the reconciliation process.

AMISOM Comes Up Short

As conditions on the ground deteriorated and the T.F.G. dragged its feet on reconciliation, progress toward deployment of the AMISOM stabilization mission that would replace the Ethiopian occupation as a prop for the T.F.G. was also halting. Through the third week of February, only 4,000 of the 8,000 troops deemed necessary for the mission had been pledged by African states and none had as yet been deployed. Even among the committed contributors to the mission -- Uganda, Burundi, Nigeria and Ghana -- there was little enthusiasm for involvement, due to the mission's domestic unpopularity, the hazards of deploying in a conflict zone and inadequate funding from Western powers.

After a series of delays caused by a boycott of the opposition on an unrelated issue and resistance in the majority party, Uganda's parliament approved a six-month deployment of 1,400 troops on February 13, with the opposition still absent but concurring. In return for supporting AMISOM, Kampala was given leadership of the mission and responsibility for Mogadishu. Uganda's president, Yoweri Museveni, made it plain to parliament and a skeptical public that the country's participation would be confined to protecting T.F.G. installations and training T.F.G. security forces, saying that "what Somalis need is someone to train them, that is all." Although Museveni's words did not allay fears that AMISOM would be subject to the same insurgent attacks that Ethiopian forces presently face, the Ugandan newspaper The Monitor reported on February 14 that the opposition acquiesced because it did not "want to antagonize" Washington. A date for deployment of the Ugandan contingent has yet to be set.

Burundi , which hosts a U.N. peacekeeping mission, was pressed to reciprocate and did so on February 18, pledging 1,700 troops and promising rapid deployment. On February 20, Nigeria promised to deploy 850 troops, but only in the spring. On February 1, following its selection as current chair of the A.U. in January, Ghana had pledged 300 troops, with no date of deployment set. No other states are in line to contribute and none, except possibly Malawi, are likely to respond to continued calls to participate from Western powers and international organizations.

On February 20, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved a resolution authorizing AMISOM for six months with a mandate confined to securing T.F.G. installations, training T.F.G. forces, protecting the reconciliation process and providing security for humanitarian aid deliveries. The resolution also charged a U.N. technical assessment mission to visit Somalia to evaluate the possibility for a U.N. stabilization mission to take over from AMISOM after its six-month mandate expires.

Both the narrow mandate for AMISOM and its replacement by a U.N. mission were requirements of contributing states before they were willing to deploy. The T.F.G. had insisted that AMISOM engage in disarming militias, but that is no longer a possibility. Western powers were reluctant to back a U.N. mission, but now they will probably be constrained to support one down the line.

With only half of the necessary forces pledged, delays in deployment, a funding gap, threats by the P.R.M. to attack all foreign troops and escalating violence, AMISOM -- even if it does get on the ground -- is unlikely to stabilize Somalia. As it stands now -- notwithstanding the unpopularity of the Ethiopian occupation -- the introduction of AMISOM will further weaken the T.F.G.'s position.

As AMISOM became the centerpiece of international and regional concern, diplomatic efforts to encourage reconciliation appeared to grind to a halt. On February 9, the Washington-inspired Contact Group for Somalia, composed of the United States, European powers and Tanzania, met in Dar es Salaam and called for strengthening the T.F.G., urging it to initiate "all-inclusive talks" in which "prominent warlords," leaders from Somaliland and former I.C.C. officials would participate. Since then, there has been no international meeting on Somalia and no new external initiatives to broker reconciliation.

Conclusion

PINR's February 2 judgment that Somalia had entered a devolutionary cycle has been confirmed by events in the first three weeks of the month. That judgment is also shared by three leading academic specialists on Somalia -- Ken Menkhaus, Abdi Ismail Samatar and David Shinn -- all of whom add to their analyses different preferences for a desired pattern of conflict resolution.

In a scholarly study written in 2006 before the Ethiopian invasion and published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Menkhaus, who emphasizes the clan structure of Somali society, argued cogently for the possibility of a "mediated state" in Somalia that would combine a minimal central government performing only essential functions with most political authority decentralized according to clan or region and locality. According to Menkhaus, such a solution would not eliminate conflict, but would limit it and encourage the kind of regional integration that has occurred in southern Somalia in the past and that characterizes the sub-states of Somaliland and Puntland to the north.

In a February 15 interview with Voice of America, Menkhaus expressed his doubts about the success of a reconciliation process, commenting that neither the T.F.G. nor the dissident clans in Mogadishu perceive reconciliation to be in their interests; the members of the T.F.G. do not want to sacrifice their positions and marginalized clans do not grant legitimacy to the T.F.G. Menkhaus expects the dissidents to "make Mogadishu ungovernable and run the clock out" since "the T.F.G. has only two and a half years left on its mandate." Menkhaus continued, "I suspect we're going to end up with a return more or less to a Somalia of 2005, where you have a weak T.F.G. that will retreat back to Baidoa, facing a loose coalition of opposition in Mogadishu." That would not, as Menkhaus recognizes, be the "mediated state" that he envisions, but a default position that leaves the T.F.G. ineffective and maximalist in its pretensions.

In testimony before the subcommittee on Africa of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 6, Shinn backed the solution of a broadened T.F.G., but similarly affirmed the diminishing prospects for political integration in Somalia, arguing that "the T.F.G. probably envisages AMISOM as tantamount to a praetorian guard to keep it in power," and warning that if the T.F.G. does not win "the respect and support of the Somali people," it will fail "to create a national government that has long-term prospects for survival. Its ability to govern will be sharply limited and its longevity highly doubtful."

The deepest analysis of Somalia's predicament is presented by Samatar who believes that the clan-based structure of the T.F.G. itself "balkanizes citizenship and community," and creates a "compartmentalized political order" that is "driven by rent-seeking (corruption) rather than providing an efficient service to citizens, and has no chance of leading to political stability and economic development."

In his article, "Somalia: Warlordism, Ethiopian Invasion, Dictatorship and U.S.'s Role," published in the Sudan Tribune on February 14, Samatar argues that the U.S.-supported Ethiopian military intervention knocked Somalia off a trajectory toward a national political formula based on "common citizenship unmarred by sectarian and clannistic identity, and Islamic values of justice and inclusion." Unlike Menkhaus, Samatar believes in the viability of Somali nationalism and attributes fragmentation primarily to external interference. He anticipates that participants in any reconciliation conference will be "handpicked by the Ethiopian occupiers and their clients and therefore will be charade." His alternative, "a civic centered program" founded on a national formula and individual citizenship, is "not on the cards for now." What the cards show to Samatar is an ineffective "sectarian dictatorship."

In light of their divergent understandings of the structure of Somalia's societal community and their different perspectives on the country's best possible political future, it is noteworthy that Menkhaus, Shinn and Samatar share a consensus on Somalia's present circumstances and likely political future, which is coincident with PINR's judgment.

Each of the experts uses his own methodology and special expertise to reach his conclusions and all of them support their analyses with historical depth. PINR's methodology is distinct and complementary, involving monitoring local, regional and international media, and official documents on a daily basis to get a sense of the concrete flow of events, and to determine the direction and velocity of the flow whenever either or both appear to have changed.

Through monitoring Somalia, PINR has reached the conclusion that the country's societal community is torn between national aspirations and clan identification -- a tension that exists within individual Somalis who transcend clan when an attractive political formula is championed by a popular movement and who revert to clan when the impulsion toward unity is blunted by external interference and/or domestic opposition. Menkhaus provides one half of the story and Samatar the other; the whole story is the interplay between the forces of integration and fragmentation, and their articulation in cycles.

PINR poses no preferred outcomes in its conflict analyses, but simply looks for patterns in ongoing events. On that basis, Somalia's reversion to its pre-Courts past is becoming ever more deeply entrenched.

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of enquiries@pinr.com. PINR reprints do not qualify under Fair-Use Statute Section 107 of the Copyright Act. All comments should be directed to comments@pinr.com.

Source: PINR