Issue 272

Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia on December 28 last year reopened a decade-and-a-half-long war for Somalia in the already volatile Horn of Africa. The result of the invasion has been medium-intensity warfare involving Ethiopian and Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces on one side, and Islamist militant umbrella group the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and allied militias on the other. Ethiopia’s justification for the invasion was that the UIC posed a direct threat to its own borders; hence it had the right to protect its sovereignty and interests. This included the fear that the rise of the UIC would spread radical Islam throughout Ethiopia’s large Muslim community and cut Ethiopia’s access to the sea. That the UIC was being financially and militarily supported by Eritrea, Ethiopia’s archenemy, was another concern. Ethiopia’s entrance into Somalia, however, has led to the emergence of a Somali insurgency and US intervention.

The emergence of the Somali insurgency behind the UIC can be attributed to the movement’s role in bringing a semblance of peace to Somalia between June and December last year. With popular support, the UIC was able to remove weapons from the streets and curb inter- and intra-clan violence. In addition, the UIC’s popularity is strengthened by Ethiopian meddling in Somali affairs, which brought back to power the unpopular but internationally recognized TFG.

Without grassroots support and under pressure from the US and the European Union to negotiate with moderate Islamists within the UIC, the TFG’s President Abdillahi Yusuf needs to start some sort of a national reconciliation process. However, Yusuf is not willing to meet hardline elements within the UIC, many of whom form the UIC leadership, and this makes it extremely difficult for the UIC to engage in any meaningful dialogue with the TFG.

This dialogue might not take place any time soon, especially in view of the latest US involvement in Somalia. This allegedly came about within the framework of the US war on terror, when the Islamist fighters fled Mogadishu after the Ethiopian invasion and entrenched themselves around the town of Ras Kamboni, on the border with Kenya. Between January 5 and 12, the US used AC-130 gunships against suspected al-Qaeda operatives thought to be embedded within the ranks of the UIC forces. Meanwhile, the US is funding the African Union mission in Somalia in support of the unpopular TFG. The US has also been secretly training Ethiopian soldiers for several years in camps near the Ethiopia-Somalia border, many of whom participated in the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia.

Although the US has stated that its involvement in Somalia is part of its fight against terrorism, some other motives can be uncovered. The US seems to be viewing Somalia as a possible launch pad for an invasion of Iran and Sudan. A stable Somalia could form the regional base for Africom (the US Strategic Military Command in Africa) and be a potential base for protecting the Strait of Hormuz — the primary gateway for Middle Eastern oil.

It is also worth noting that Somalia’s oil deposits have not been exploited and many countries would be interested to get control of them in the unpredictable oil market. The US establishing control of the Horn falls in line with its overall strategy of establishing a military presence in areas rich in natural resources and controlling access to them.

In view of this hidden agenda it is necessary that an unconditional and genuine process of reconciliation among Somalis takes place as soon as possible. This should involve the TFG, moderate and radical members of the UIC, clan elders and civil society, leading to the creation of an inclusive government of national unity. The involvement of foreign players such as Ethiopia and the US should be avoided, since the pursuance of their interests only alienates the protagonists further by lending credence to the widespread view within Somalia that the TFG is a puppet of the US.

One way of solving the Somalian nightmare is to resort to traditional Somali structures and processes of conflict resolution, as was done in the case of Somaliland, where all clan elders met and managed to resolve their differences in 1993 at the famous Burao conference, which led to the creation of a government of national unity after years of fighting. Such a reconciliation process would undoubtedly benefit from the support of the international community and the United Nations, to give additional credence to the entire process, and ensure decisions emerging from any such process are binding and implemented.

Dr Othieno is an Africa analyst at the Institute for Global Dialogue, Johannesburg.

Source: Business Day

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