June 5, 2007

Editorial: The solution to the Somali conflict must be political in nature and, as importantly, must be free from foreign meddling.

Countless civilians killed, wounded in battles between Ethiopian troops and Somali fighters

During the months of March and April of 2007, residents in Somalia's volatile   capital, Mogadishu, witnessed some of the most brutal gun battles in more than 16 years of conflict. Upwards of 1,300 people–mostly innocent women and children–were killed, with another 321,000 civilians fleeing the increasing violence in Mogadishu between February 1 and April 26, according to UN and aid agency estimates.

The Somali transitional federal government (TFG), backed by the Ethiopian army, contends that it has defeated rebels and clan fighters opposed to its presence and politics. But opposition to this government is not simply limited to "armed groups"; without a doubt, today's thundering silence in Mogadishu   did not come   by peaceful dialogue and political consensus, but rather by coercive force engineered from abroad. The epicenter of the conflict in Somalia is, and has always remained, Mogadishu, where the power struggle that violently erupted in early 1991 between the Somalis' various armed clans remains without an absolute victor to date.

The US-backed Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia, ostensibly at the behest of the TFG, has not only worsened clan relations in the country, but has also catapulted domestic clan-based power struggles into the international arena, with rival clan groups now openly seeking and forging alliances with foreign powers and interests to advance their own narrow   agendas. Worse still, many in Somalia identify the TFG cast of characters –from President Abdillahi Yusuf to national police boss Abdi Qeybdiid –as nothing short of legitimizing the clan warlords from the 1990s.

Clan feuds

The history of clan feuds in Somalia predates the arrival of European colonialists on Africa's shores. But the bloodiest and lengthiest clan feud exploded in Mogadishu in January 1991, dismantling the national government and igniting a civil war amongst armed clans in virtually every region of Somalia. During the pre-colonial era, the various Somali clans coexisted as self-governing communes who traded and intermarried regularly, and at times engaged in violent dispute. Clan elders, derived from a historical bloodline of successors akin to Middle Eastern kingdoms, upheld the local peace and mediated negotiated settlements in times of war. The rule of traditional law guaranteed that each Somali be known as a member of such-and-such community, and as member, had the right of clan protection.

But the prominence and value of Somali customary law gradually diminished over the decades, due to European colonial legacy, the Gen. Barre regime's Socialist dogma, the onslaught of the civil war and the subsequent exodus to the Diaspora. With the ascendance to power of clan warlords following Gen. Barre's departure, the peaceful arm of clan politics, historically represented by the elders, was quickly curtailed as clan survival interests triumphed over all else.

With time, the clan-based rebel groups who expelled Gen. Barre in 1991 and retook control of their clan homelands revamped their political schemes and names, but the central agenda of each rebel group remained unchanged. The nation-state effectively disintegrated, creating a power vacuum filled by undisciplined rebels commanded by men who lacked national vision and character to lead the Somali nation to the next level. These narrow-minded rebel leaders disagreed over one principal issue when the euphoria of Gen. Barre's collapse dissipated and reality sunk in: who ( read: what clan?) should lead the Somali nation?

The Somaliland-Puntland "border" dispute led to armed clashes in April

No national leader emerged from the ashes of state collapse, and instead the rebel leaders embarked on a violent struggle amongst themselves for power, for land and resources, for economic wealth and infrastructure; even for legacy; but truly disturbing is that this struggle has remained an integral part of Somali national politics to date. In present-day "Somaliland"–a self-declared independent republic in northwestern Somalia since 1991–the SNM rebel group successfully transferred power over to clan elders, who cooperated with local politicians to establish a functioning administration equipped with state apparatuses, such as an elected government, police and armed forces, and a regulated economy.

Likewise in neighboring "Puntland," which administers its own affairs but maintains itself as part of federal Somalia, the SSDF rebels, at the time led by current TFG President Yusuf, created a state administration which has managed to restore order since its inception in 1998. Both sub-states have realized a degree of stability over the years that seemed largely elusive in the south; however, the return of military hostilities between these two northern Somalia sub-states in April is a recent example of the continuing clan-based power struggle between the armed clans. " Somaliland" leaders claim regions historically inhabited by Darod clansmen on the basis of colonial-era borders, while "Puntland" says undeniable clan boundaries supercede borders arbitrarily erected by foreign powers in the 19th century.

Further south, the situation has been complicated by several factors, but most dramatically by the presence of Ethiopian combat troops. Of course, it is no coincidence that the Ethiopian forces in Somalia are concentrated mainly in regions deemed to be hotbeds for Islamist activity, from Mogadishu to Beletwein. These same regions are dominated by the Hawiye clan, a community that disproportionately suffered under the brutal rule of USC (Hawiye-based rebel group) warlords for over a decade, and in mid-2006, placed much economic and people support behind the rise of the Islamic Courts movement that in turn ousted the warlords.

There is the common view among Somali society that, had it not been for Ethiopian firepower, President Yusuf, the "Darod president," would have little-to-zero chance of officially relocating his transitional government to Hawiye-dominated Mogadishu. Hence, it is no wonder that clan relations in the country have become even more polarized when one takes into account that the first "Darod president" since the violent ouster of Gen. Barre in 1991 could only do so by bringing Somalia's historical arch-nemesis –the Ethiopian army –to protect him in Mogadishu. Perhaps even more damning is the fact that the Ethiopian military intervention managed to destroy the only Hawiye-based movement that was able to secure Mogadishu after 15 years of warlord-led chaos and disintegration.

Foreign influences

The injection of thousands of foreign combat troops into Somalia over the past year or so under the pretense of protecting the TFG has created an opportunity for resistance, as demonstrated by the ongoing series of guerrilla attacks   targeting government personnel, Ethiopian soldiers and African Union peacekeepers serving in Mogadishu. The developing resistance to the Ethiopia-TFG alliance is not limited to Islamist rebels; during the months of March and April, battles between Ethiopia-TFG troops and the resistance included Hawiye clan fighters, openly supported by their clan elders (who would later accept defeat).

The U.S. government backed the Ethiopian intervention in December diplomatically and financially, and a month later, American warplanes bombarded Islamist hideouts in the Jubba regions of southern Somalia. The Bush administration, ever alert of Islamic political ideology in and of itself, felt an eminent threat arise from Somalia's Islamic Courts movement, whose leaders unwisely used the "jihad" term too often for Washington's–and Addis Ababa's–taste.

Ethiopian army: U.S. "war on terror" ally in the Horn of Africa

In Washington, the Ethiopians are perceived as a bulwark against the rise of "Islamic extremism" in the Horn of Africa. Instead of U.S. combat boots in Mogadishu, it is the Ethiopian army doing Bush's bidding on the ground, a necessary policy given American public opinion of the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Continuing U.S. support for Ethiopia's leadership, despite political freedom and genuine human rights concerns in that country, contradicts America's "on paper" policy of supporting democracy, in Ethiopia and across the world. The Bush administration continues to pour millions of precious taxpayers' dollars into Ethiopian government vaults in the name of fighting the "war on terror," but in reality, the Ethiopian government is terrorizing its own civilian population, especially those belonging to non-Tigre ethnic groups, such as the Oromos and the Somalis.

In its 2007 annual report, Amnesty International stated: "In Oromia region, there were large-scale arrests in different areas during anti-government demonstrations…” Another line, regarding the Somali-inhabited region of eastern Ethiopia, Amnesty wrote that there were reports of "extrajudicial executions." Naturally, the Ethiopian government denies all charges, claiming that such reports on the human rights condition in the country are exaggerated. Yet, this country, which suffers from a long list of its own social, economic and political problems, is expected to help stabilize Somalia with U.S. aid, notwithstanding centuries of animosity between Christian-led Ethiopia and Muslim Somalia.

The Ethiopia-TFG alliance has attracted TFG opponents to Eritrea, a country which has a border dispute with Ethiopia following the 1998-2000 war. Experts and analysts agree that Eritrea actively supported the Somali Islamists when they ruled Mogadishu and most of south-central Somalia during the second half of 2006. Furthermore, Eritrea is accused of offering military assistance to the anti-TFG armed groups in an effort to destabilize the Ethiopia-backed transitional government in Mogadishu.

These foreign powers and interests are aligned with various Somali clans, many of whom have fought bitter clan wars since 1991. These foreign powers are pouring in millions of dollars into Somalia to pay off parasitical warlords legitimized by the United Nations, or those who oppose them. Under the leadership of clan warlords, Somalia has now entered a period similar to Lebanon under Syrian occupation (1975-2005). As far as anyone can tell, the Ethiopian army, “invited” by the TFG just like the Lebanese government “invited” their Syrian allies, will stay in Somalia for the foreseeable future.

Nation in agony

There is no military solution to the clan-based conflict in Somalia. If such a solution existed, the Gen. Barre regime, which used state military apparatus to crush domestic dissent with excessive ferocity, would have survived, perhaps saving Somalia from the present quagmire. The solution to the Somali conflict must be political in nature and, as importantly, must be free from foreign meddling. The various foreign powers actively engaged in Somalia are not there for the genuine interests of the long-suffering yet resilient Somali populace, but are there to protect and advance their own nation's interests and agendas.

Despite being a very poor country, Somalia has great potential for development if and when stability is realized and a legitimate national government takes office. This is a country   endowed with resources –both natural and human –but crippled by corruption and bad leadership. However, t he vast majority of Somalis simply want a government...any government that is willing to guarantee the safety of citizens, their properties and assets. At the same time, most Somalis realize that, far from protecting citizens, the TFG itself depends on the protection foreign powers to exist.

The open-ended question is: for how long can the status quo exist? Certainly Addis Ababa cannot sustain a long-term military occupation. Except for the brave Ugandan peacekeepers, other African countries have yet to send their boys to Somalia, citing anything from financial burdens to personnel challenges. But the fact of the matter remains that, aware of the present crisis in Somalia, no African leader is willing to engage in a conflict zone with no "pullout date" in sight.

The international community, which has been actively involved in the Somali saga from the onset, must pressure the TFG and ensure that the scheduled "National Reconciliation Conference" is an all-inclusive, independently-run convention that draws in Somali delegates from all clans and regions to Mogadishu to debate the future and destiny of this nation in agony. The NRC is a real chance for the TFG to seek local legitimacy and to welcome everyone, both supporters and opponents, at the negotiating table where Somali clan delegates can freely and openly discuss national issues, and chart out a plan for the peaceful withdrawal of Ethiopian forces.

Let us remember that the essential conflict in Somalia is a clan-based power struggle, and perhaps with various armed clans genuinely discussing serious matters inside Somalia for the first time since 1991, there is some reason for measured hope. But do not expect the "armed groups" to agree.

Garowe Online Editorial

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