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Somaliland: The Kurds Of Somalia?
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Issue 283
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Addis Ababa , June 19, 2007 –Something interesting may be happening in Somaliland in the wake of the Ethiopian takeover (let's call it what it is) of southern and central Somalia. For the 16 years since its unilateral declaration of independence, Somaliland has steadfastly refused to have anything to do with the Somali peace process, characterizing it as an internal affair of a foreign country. Now, though, Mohamed Abdi Mareye, a minister in the Somali Transitional Federal Government, is claiming that certain unnamed Somaliland elders and government officials want to participate in the national reconciliation conference scheduled for next month in Mogadishu. And Mareye's claim comes on top of reports that Somaliland is in the midst of secret negotiations concerning possible terms of reunification: According to Al-Khaleej which is based in the United Arab Emirates, the talks are being sponsored by Ethiopian and American diplomats in an attempt to convince Somaliland to accept re-joining Somalia under new favorable terms to be guaranteed by both Addis Ababa and Washington. "Talks involving Somaliland leaders and Ethiopian and American officials are under way to discuss the details of a plan for re-unification of Somaliland with other regions of Somalia," Al-Khaleej said. According to sources close to the discussions, Somaliland has been offered a strong commitment by the two sponsoring nations to guarantee the terms of any deal reached on the re-unification issue, Al-Khaleej added. Somaliland’s Foreign Minister, Abdullahi Mohamed Du’ale, is currently in Addis Ababa. He left Hargeysa about a month ago to an undisclosed destination. The Somaliland government has placed a news blackout on Mr Duale’s whereabouts. The exact terms under discussion aren't detailed, but they'd probably be similar to what has been characterized as "super-autonomy" in the Kosovo context: full internal self-government, partially detached tax structure and security forces, and possibly some degree of foreign relations authority. It would also likely include some guarantee of Somaliland's eastern border with Puntland, which has been a chronic flashpoint in the past. The result would be a largely symbolic reunification, with Somaliland retaining most of the powers of an independent state, but the symbolism itself would be of considerable importance for pan-Somali nationalists. The Somaliland government has, of course, denied the reports and reiterated its desire for recognition as an independent nation. The question is whether the maxim "never believe anything until it's been officially denied" should apply in this instance. Given the current state of domestic and regional politics, I'm not certain who to believe. Under other circumstances, a super-autonomy deal might be good for Somaliland, allowing it to keep its hard-won autonomy while resolving its international status and opening it to more investment. As things are, it's hard to see what Somaliland would gain by buying into Somalia's problems. Somaliland has achieved stability and modest prosperity, and enjoys de facto recognition from a growing number of countries, so resolution of its legal status would be more a bonus than an urgent necessity. Rejoining Somalia would make Hargeisa a potential target for Islamist insurgents, and its border dispute with Puntland (which may be about to flare up again) might not fare well given the Puntland clans' dominant position in the TFG. It would be understandable, given this state of affairs, for Somaliland to keep the cash and let the credit go, especially since it isn't clear how effective Ethiopian and American guarantees will be in the medium term. On the other hand, the United States and Ethiopia might be pushing Somaliland toward a deal. Both countries are heavily invested in the TFG, whose continued survival is key to their regional political objectives, and might want to hand it a diplomatic victory to shore up its shaky legitimacy. Reunification with Somaliland could be precisely such a legitimating event, and given Hargeisa's dependence on Ethiopian patronage, it would have a hard time saying no if Ethiopia and the United States exerted sufficient pressure. If the Somali conflict is a replay of Iraq, then the Somalilanders might end up playing the Kurds' role as a minority that wants independence badly but is blocked by its patrons' wider agenda. Somaliland does, however, have an option not open to Kurdistan: the possibility of switching partners. Its neighbors aren't uniformly hostile and at least one, Eritrea, might conceivably back Hargeisa as a tactical move against its strategic rival Ethiopia. Somaliland's domestic politics, including foreign policy, are in a state of flux due to the ongoing power struggle between the presidency and the opposition-dominated parliament, so its longstanding pro-Ethiopian alignment may be in question. The TFG's statements accusing Eritrea of fomenting trouble in Somaliland may be so much smoke, but they may also reflect a real shift in position by a country forced to choose between its independence and its current patron. Somaliland has thus far been largely successful in staying out of the chaos to the south, but its luck in that regard may be coming to a close. Source: African Path |
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