The "New Strategy" For Somalia Collapses

Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

On January 9, Somalia's new prime minister, Nur "Adde" Hassan Hussein introduced his second cabinet to the country's transitional parliament. His first cabinet list, which was long, contained many holdovers from his predecessor Ali Mohamed Gedi's administration, and was meant to appease myriad clan factions, had failed to win sufficient support due to complaints about clan representation and the resistance of Western donor powers, which had insisted that Hussein appoint a streamlined cabinet containing "technocrats" from outside parliament who would provide more effective and less corrupt administration, and would be positioned as reconcilers of Somalia's complex web of conflicts.

The disputes over representation gave the donor powers their opening to bring Hussein around to their position, and his second list reflected their desiderata. Opposition in parliament to Hussein's new list was expressed in a motion, which failed, to have a vote on the list by secret ballot, and, on January 10, parliament approved the second cabinet by an open vote of 223-5-2. The overwhelming margin did not reflect enthusiastic support for Hussein, but was motivated by an interest in placating the donor powers, which bankroll the transitional institutions.

When Hussein presented his proposed second cabinet to parliament, he also delivered a speech outlining the challenges that his new administration faced. The most important of those were achieving political reconciliation, providing security and facilitating humanitarian aid, with only the first being to some extent under his control, since the transitional institutions are dependent on external military support from Ethiopian occupation forces and an under-staffed African Union peacekeeping mission, and even their own nominal forces are often controlled by regional and factional leaders who oppose the transitional government when they perceive that it is in their interest to do so. Emphasizing reconciliation, Hussein said that his "new strategy" was to deal directly with the opposition to the transitional government, which "recognizes every citizen, whether they support or oppose the government."

The "new strategy" marked a shift from an earlier position in which Hussein had suggested a bottom-up approach to reconciliation, beginning at the local and regional levels, and then expanding to include the political opposition on a national level - the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (A.R.S.) based in Eritrea and composed of the leadership of the Islamic Courts Council (I.C.C.), which had been ousted from control over most of Somalia by an Ethiopian intervention in December 2006; dissident parliamentarians, and sectors of the Somali diaspora. Hussein's decision to go top down was again a response to pressure from the donor powers, which wanted rapid progress, but was also a recognition of instability on the ground, which made a bottom-up approach unworkable.

Hussein Loses Momentum

In the six weeks following Hussein's speech to parliament, he has failed to make headway in meeting any of the challenges that he had defined. The humanitarian crisis marked by hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons fleeing fighting in Mogadishu has become ever more severe; an insurgency centered on the militant wing of the former Courts movement, forces allied to the A.R.S., and dissident sub-clans has intensified and spread to every region of Somalia; disputes within regional administrations and competing authorities within regions have proliferated; and the A.R.S. and the leadership of the Hawiye sub-clans that have suffered most from the Ethiopian occupation have not responded positively to what some have called Hussein's "charm offensive."

At the bottom of Hussein's failure to gain momentum is the fact that he lacks his own power base. As former director of Somalia's Red Crescent Society, Hussein gained the approval of the donor powers because he was a "politically neutral technocrat" who might win the trust of the A.R.S. and Hawiye leadership, sideline the transitional president, Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmad, who is a divisive and uncompromising figure, and engineer a power-sharing agreement that would isolate the militant wing of the insurgency and drain off local support for it. However, just because Hussein was a "political neutral," he lacked organized support in Somali society and had to start from scratch in building it, which he has been unable to do because of the external constraints that he faces.

Most importantly, the A.R.S. and the Hawiye Tradition and Unity Council (T.U.C.) have insisted that they will not negotiate until the Ethiopian occupation is lifted or - at least - a credible plan for Ethiopian withdrawal is put in place. Yet Hussein cannot accept that condition, because - although Addis Ababa is stretched and strained and probably wants to pull out - the donor powers, on which it also depends, want it to stay pending the unlikely arrival of five thousand more African Union peacekeepers to augment the approximately three thousand currently on the ground. Since the transitional institutions are dependent on Ethiopian military protection and donor funds, Hussein is constrained to satisfy the external actors, whatever his private views might be, giving him nearly no leeway to negotiate.

Hussein's frustration became apparent in a January 18 interview he gave to the BBC, in which he repeated his call for a reconciliation process "open to everyone" and promised that he would meet with the opposition at "any reasonable location without preconditions." Then he quickly added that the Ethiopian occupation would continue until "the Somali people come together and reach a decision that this is their country, that this is one country and one people, and that it is vital they understand each other." By mid-February, Hussein was telling Newsweek magazine that Ethiopia "has continued to support us in relation to security restoration," and that it had allowed the transitional government to "come back to Somalia." He added that the United States Central Intelligence Agency was coming "in and out" of Somalia and that "we like that." On February 19, Hussein said that "we are ready to talk to those who are fighting in Mogadishu" and concluded: "I need the support of elders, religious leaders, women, youth and the Somali intellectuals." His appeal was an admission that he has not made himself a credible leader and that he has not been able to mobilize the popular support that would give him the equivalent of a sectoral power base.

As Hussein pursued his thus far unsuccessful "new strategy" of reconciliation, he was untroubled at first by formidable opposition from within the transitional institutions. That changed in early February when Yusuf returned to the scene after a round of medical tests and treatments, and quickly took a more hard-line stance than the prime minister. In an interview with Al-Jazeera, Yusuf claimed that there was "almost complete peace" in Mogadishu, that the I.C.C. was affiliated with Al-Qaeda ("We know our people more than the Americans"), that only the most militant jihadists oppose the Ethiopian occupation, and that the Hawiye are "not a big tribe," adding that negotiations would only be possible if insurgent violence ended, thereby undercutting Hussein's "charm offensive" and creating a rift at the top of the transitional institutions.

Since Yusuf's return, Hussein has tilted away from conciliation, a possible indicator that the president is regaining his influence. If that is the case, the "window of opportunity" that the donor powers perceived when Hussein replaced Gedi has closed. Addis Ababa was displeased with Hussein's appointment - Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's regime had desired an ally or a proxy rather than a "political neutral" and has complained that Hussein has not been sufficiently cooperative with the occupation force. With Yusuf active once again, Addis Ababa hopes to gain leverage for its strategic aim of keeping Somalia divided, which is at odds with the policy of the donor powers and further undermines Hussein's efforts to please them. Meanwhile, the A.R.S. has recently scaled up its demands to include the release of prisoners who have been jailed on suspicion of ties to the opposition and the admission by the transitional government that its forces and the Ethiopians have committed war crimes.

Hussein has been further impeded by the lukewarm support of the donor powers, which had inspired his "new strategy." On February 15, the United Nations Security Council turned a deaf ear to pleas by the transitional government and the African Union to turn the current peacekeeping mission into a more robust U.N. mission, and, instead, deferred decision on a U.N. mission and extended the A.U. mission for six months. The transitional government and the A.U. complain that the donors are not living up to their pledges to support peacekeeping adequately, leaving African states that are reluctant to provide troops with an excuse to hold back.

A more serious threat to the transitional institutions is evidenced by the visit of Somaliland's president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, to Washington and an unprecedented return visit of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer to Hargeysa. In December, the Washington Post reported that elements of the U.S. Defense Department were urging that the goal of reconciling Somalia be abandoned in favor of recognizing Somaliland's independence and allowing post-colonial Somalia to be cantonized in order to isolate the militant Islamists and to gain a military foothold in Somalia. At that time, the Post reported that the U.S. State Department was resisting the cantonization strategy, but Frazer's visit casts doubt on its resolve, although the official position remains that Washington will only consider recognizing Hargeysa if the A.U. moves first. It is telling, however that the State Department called Somaliland a "region" when Riyale visited Washington and that Frazer called it a "country" when she visited Hargeysa.

Hussein responded to U.S. contacts with Somaliland by welcoming them and praising Somaliland's political achievements, while insisting on the unity of post-colonial Somalia. Although it is far from certain that Washington is moving towards recognizing Hargeysa, its new initiatives cast doubt on its commitment to the transitional institutions, weakening Hussein's credibility.

Conclusion

Lacking his own power base and failing to mobilize popular support, Hussein is too weak a figure to generate the reconciliation that is necessary to meet the humanitarian and security challenges. That weakness has been evident throughout his tenure as prime minister, first when he attempted to appease the clan-based political factions in parliament and now as he continues to try to appease the donor powers in the face of their slackening resolve and new pressures from Yusuf and Addis Ababa. The beginnings of a possible devolution in Kenya have turned the external powers to concentrate on that country and to neglect Somalia, lowering even further the probability that they will assist the transitional institutions adequately.

It would be unfair to blame Hussein for his failure to jump-start reconciliation; from the outset, he has been the captive of greater forces beyond his control. Daily monitoring of reports on all of Somalia's conflicts reveals a starkly different picture than Yusuf drew. For the first time since the Ethiopian intervention, opposition forces from both the militant Youth Mujahideen Movement and the A.R.S. are reported to have taken control of territory and villages in the Galgadud, Hiraan, Bakool, Bay, Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba regions, and to be active in the Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle and Mudug regions, and even in the sub-state of Puntland. As the opposition makes gains on the ground, it becomes less willing to bargain. Meanwhile, local disputes between rival officials - often over distribution of tax revenues - have proliferated in Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and Hiraan, making Hussein's hopes, which he recently renewed, for a bottom-up process a mere dream. The better reported situation in Mogadishu shows a steady flow of violent incidents day by day, with insurgents making ever-bolder attacks with heavy weapons on Ethiopian and government forces, which then retaliate with devastating artillery barrages and punitive search operations that drive more people out of the city, which now has lost 60 percent of the population it had before the Ethiopian intervention.

Rather than cataloging the myriad violent incidents that have occurred over the past six weeks, a single recent example will serve to highlight the deteriorating situation. On February 18, insurgents seized control of government checkpoints at the Hawlwadag and Aadan Cade junctions near the Bakara market, routing government forces, who abandoned their equipment, and killing at least four of them. Local residents then proceeded to loot and ransack the abandoned equipment. With Ethiopian support, government forces returned, sealed off Bakara, and went on a looting spree in an "act of revenge," killing at least three civilians in their rampage before they withdrew. After the incident, an anonymous official in a local civil society organization told the U.N. news agency IRIN that "we cannot work with this government." The next day, fresh clashes were reported in the same area, after an attack on a government convoy. Monitoring did not reveal any response by Hussein to these incidents, which along with many others of a similar nature cast doubt on his ability to control the actions of the transitional security forces.

A hard look at the facts on the ground and in the diplomatic chambers shows that Hussein, who had been greeted with hope by many Somalis, faces nearly insurmountable obstacles in accomplishing his primary task of reconciliation. Pushed and pulled in different directions by donor powers, the political and military oppositions, regional strongmen, dissident sub-clans, Ethiopian occupiers, and President Yusuf, the prime minister is the weak and increasingly ineffectual center of an overwhelming force field. His early success in arranging the release of jailed T.U.C. leaders did not assuage the Hawiye. His attempt to ease repression of independent news media appeared promising, but has been resisted by the transitional security agency. Hussein has very little to show for his efforts, which - again - is not a criticism, but a judgment based on his untenable position.

At the root of Hussein's plight is a lack of will on the parts of external and domestic actors to overcome their differences and to transcend their narrow interests in pursuit of a durable political reconciliation. When Hussein pleads for support, he is a voice crying in a wilderness of contending powers, most of which are acting defensively, which makes their initiatives all the more desperate. Hussein does not have guns, money or organized popular support of his own to bring to the table, which accounts for his failure to gain momentum.

With Hussein's ascent to the prime minister's post, the Western powers got what they claimed to want, but - as has so often been the case recently - what they wanted was ill-conceived. One cannot throw an amateur into the ring with hardened veterans and expect him to prevail. As Hussein danced to the donors' tune, the veterans continued to slug it out knowing that he could do nothing to stop them as he watched Somalia descend even more deeply into devolution. Hussein's tragedy is that he was never his own man and that his promoters have not even had the grace to provide him with a safety net.

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