The Liberty Of Blackmailing The UN

By Medhane Tadesse

The UN has encountered serious political problems as well as logistical difficulties in seeing operations through to successful conclusions in the Horn of Africa. Indeed, there is a tremendous backlog of unfulfilled commitments, which only serve to discredit multilateralism within Africa. This aside, there is no denying the fact that the world organization has been involved in peacekeeping operations in several African countries.

Two of the UN’s most notable peacekeeping successes occurred in southern Africa, while two of the most important disasters occurred in the greater Horn region. Unfortunately, there is a new addition to the disasters. However, the UN alone could not be blamed for the failures. The diversity and complexity of the tasks of UN operations will depend among others on the mandates of missions, and the prevailing political and military circumstances. In the Horn of Africa, however, the UN has been dealing with highly nationalist, ideologically-driven state actors with militarized political cultures and conceptions of security, and most importantly isolated and rogue state actors. This could go some way to explain the fact that fighting UN peacekeepers to the death and expelling UN staff, including UN Special Representatives, has become a feature unique to the region. Generally speaking, running a peacekeeping operation in the Horn of Africa will face several impregnable difficulties. This being the case, the behavior of Eritrea towards UNMEE is simply unfathomable.

Indeed, Eritrea’s challenge to the UN force’s movement and operations was “unprecedented” in UN peacekeeping history. There have been cases in which some governments were skeptical towards a UN force, and as a consequence were less cooperative. But for a government representing a state recognized by the UN to take a UN force hostage and blackmail the global organization is just inexplicable.

Often, non-state actors, militias or vigilantes have taken UN personnel hostage for various reasons, but never has a government done so. When NATO bombed targets in Bosnia in the mid-1990s, disgruntled Serbs seized 370 UN “peacekeepers,” along with their equipment, including armored vehicles. The Serbs demanded, as ransom, an end to the air strikes. The Western powers vowed never to surrender to blackmail, but quietly suspended the strikes.

Almost a year later, a similar incident happened in Sierra Leone. In May 2006, Foday Sankoh’s RUF rebels held more than 250 UN peacekeepers hostage. But President Taylor, who had close contacts with the RUF rebels, intervened and they were subsequently released. More recently, around seven peacekeepers were captured after a patrol of Nepalese soldiers was ambushed by militiamen of the Revolutionary Movement of Congo, northeast of Bunia, the capital of the Ituri district.

Eritrea is holding UN peacekeepers in Eritrea hostage until its demands (if there are any) for the UNSC to enforce the boundary decision are met. This may be the widely accepted reason for the way Eritrea is behaving. Nevertheless, there may be other motives as well. As a result, there was talk of pulling the UN personnel out, or “reconfiguring” them to vacate the most vulnerable positions. Some of the peacekeepers have managed to move to Ethiopia by truck in recent days. But low fuel supplies and hostile acts by the Eritrean government have made this task more difficult than it should be. Recent actions by the government of Eritrea show that it is just as frustrated with everybody, including itself and the people it controls at gunpoint.

We have a situation where a government seizes the military equipment and other vehicles of a UN force. It may appear cynical, but I believe some of the motives border on acts of robbery and banditry. A government that behaves like a rag tag militia has been there for everyone to see. Confiscating modern armaments, communication systems and military vehicles could be an end in itself. Unbelievable. Some of the troops were forced to stay after they were threatened at gunpoint. Eritrea’s behavior was predicted, but the international community was not prepared to listen and act.

The official position of the Eritrean government is that since it has accepted the approved border demarcation, the peacekeepers are no longer needed along the border. But it is not ready to allow the safe departure of the force. It claims they are not needed anymore, which is ridiculous to say the least. For one thing, both parties do not approve of the line of demarcation. For another, any talk of virtual demarcation is illegal and useless.

It is equally unbelievable that the UN and western powers collectively decided to continue their self-defeating policy that perpetuates their humiliation. In an emergency session of the UN Security Council, the President of the Council stated that Eritrea would be held responsible for the safety of the peacekeepers. But the safety of peacekeepers has been repeatedly jeopardized. After severing necessary fuel supplies and even attempting to starve them by restricting food provisions, the Eritrean regime is completely immobilizing the peacekeepers. It is time that the world body abandons outdated concepts of neutral peacekeeping and replaces them with a more muscular form of peace enforcement.

That could be a long-term solution, which is a matter of debate. But before rethinking long-term implications, the UN should come with a mechanism to tame irresponsible regimes before it gets the necessary respect and credibility in front of the world. The UN should not wait for the worst-case scenario - when the UN peacekeepers actually suffer casualties at the hands of this “callous” action.

There is in fact urgency on what the member states should do to assist the peacekeepers. In order to protect the safety of the UN in Eritrea and elsewhere and save the world organization from total humiliation, a series of non-military measures are available on the menu. In some respects, soft power could achieve the desired objectives. For the sake of world peace and positively influencing state behavior, a military option that includes air strikes against select sites should not be ruled out either. Whatever the course of action, the UN should do something to bring Asmara into line.

Medhane Tadesse of CPRD is a long time specialist on issues of peace and security in the Horn of Africa. He can be reached at mt3002et@yahoo.com

February 22, 2008