By Sergei Markedonov

30 April 2008

One of the most important and pointed questions facing Dmitry Medvedev in terms of Russia’s foreign policy is the country’s relations with de-facto states in the post-Soviet space. There are few other foreign policy problems that are as closely tied to security inside Russia, while the ethno-political situations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia directly influence the situation in Russia’s North Caucasus.

The confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh resulted in a significant movement of Armenian immigrants to Russia’s Krasnodar and Stavropol regions. The number of Armenians in Kuban increased by 42.5 percent from 1989 to 2001. As a result, the “Armenian issue” became one of the most important social and political factors in the Krasnodar region, and anti-Armenian rhetoric became a method of political legitimization for the region’s elite. Another example of interrelated ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus is the problem of Ossetia. The Georgian-Ossetian conflict became the first interethnic conflict in post-Soviet Georgia, and developed into a large-scale armed confrontation from January 1991 to July 1992. This struggle exerted significant influence on the course of the first interethnic conflict on Russian territory—the Ossetian-Ingush conflict. The military phase of this conflict occurred in October and November of 1992. As a result of the escalation of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, around 43,000 refugees from South Ossetia and the inner regions of Georgia arrived in North Ossetia in the early 1990s. The refugees facilitated a radicalization of ethno-nationalist sentiments in North Ossetian society; they became mass supporters of North Ossetian radicals, who demanded the preservation of their republic’s territorial integrity in the dispute with Ingushetia over the Prigorodny district.

In much the same way, Georgia’s problems with Abkhazia contributed to the consolidation of Adyg ethno-nationalist movements in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo–Cherkessia, and Adygea, as well as to the activation of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, which played a significant role in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict of 1992-1993. These ethno-nationalist groups remain important participants, although often undeclared and unrecognized, in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

The meltdown

It is important to remember that Medvedev will be acting in much more complicated circumstances than his predecessor. The fragmentation of ethnic groups within the CIS only began during Vladimir Putin’s time in office; moreover, there is now an active thawing of conflicts that were considered frozen during the Putin years.

Before 2008, the attempts to change the status quo in the conflict zones were not part of a systematic strategy, but this changed when the international community began recognizing the independence of Kosovo. And even though the official position of Washington and Brussels is that Kosovo’s self-determination is “unique,” in the capitals of the de-facto states, Kosovo is seen as a legal precedent. For Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, Kosovo is not a legal precedent, but a political one, seen as an important step toward the eventual loss of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and the self-proclaimed Transdnestr republic.

This year has already seen other important developments. The largest armed confrontations in Nagorno-Karabakh since the end of military action in May 1994 occurred in March. Additionally, on March 21, the Russian State Duma approved an appeal to the federal government and the president to examine the possibility of legal recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And a day before that, the outgoing Armenian president Robert Kocharyan declared that it might be possible to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh if Azerbaijan withdraws from the OSCE Minsk group.

The world is watching

Putin’s successor must carefully examine the background of the de-facto states. In the first years of the 21st century, the political role of these states has grown noticeably. Before, they were seen as nothing more than a consequence of ethno-political conflicts in the post-Soviet space. As British researcher Laurence Browers pointed out, “Instead of seeing these formations as an independent political environment, de-facto states are only seen in the context of their relationship with external players and world processes.” This attitude explains the terms “breakaway republics” and “separatist states,” adopted by Western political scientists to refer to these areas. These terms gave rise to the supposition that “breakaway” republics could potentially “return,” and such a return would be considered a “resolution of the ethno-political conflict” and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova was equated with the resolution of these conflicts. As a result of such an approach, the domestic political processes in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnestr and Nagorno-Karabakh were viewed as temporary phenomena that would be eliminated as soon as the existing status quo was broken and their status determined.

In the 1990s, Russian politicians and diplomats shared this approach. As long as levers of influence on the political authorities of Georgia and Moldova were preserved, Moscow was not eager to intensify the dialogue with Tiraspol, Sukhumi, and Tskhinvali. In Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia initially consented to international conflict regulation under the auspices of the OSCE. In the case of Transdnestr, Moscow, along with Kiev, became a guarantor of the peace process. Moscow’s main achievement in the 1990s was not allowing the conflicts to thaw. Moscow’s position regarding the de-facto states that share a common border with Russia — South Ossetia and Abkhazia — was much more active. In 1998, Moscow prevented an escalation of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict in the Gal region of eastern Abkhazia.

The year 2003 became a kind of Rubicon for Russian political attitudes toward the frozen conflict zones. The failure of Dmitry Kozak’s plan to create a united federated Moldovan state that would include Transdnestr, and the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, definitively eliminated Moldova and Georgia from Moscow’s orbit. From this point on, the Kremlin began to consider the de-facto formations as independent entities that have their own significance.

The increase of the geopolitical role of these regions occurred in large part due to formally external causes—the ethno-political self-determination in the Balkans. As a result, in 2006 the independent Republic of Montenegro appeared on the world map for the first time since 1918. In 2008, 33 states recognized the independence of Kosovo. And even though Montenegro, unlike Kosovo, never existed as an unrecognized state, the possibility of a violation of the principle of territorial integrity and ethno-political self-determination aroused a heightened interest in the country by the leaders of de-facto states.

The response of the leaders of these de-facto states to the events in the Balkans forced Russia’s political leaders to take a more drastic position on the unrecognized post-Soviet republics. Russian representatives, beginning with Vladimir Putin, announced a “universal” approach to the Kosovo problem, saying that if Kosovo can be granted full independence, it should not be denied to Abkhazia or South Ossetia. “I do not want to say that Russia will also immediately recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia as independent and sovereign states,” Putin said, “but such precedents exist in international politics. In order to be fair, in the interest of all the people living in certain territories, we need commonly recognized universal principles for the resolution of such problems.” Yet Putin’s “universal” approach is hardly universal. He does not extend the Kosovo precedent to Nagorno-Karabakh, limiting its precedent-setting to Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdnestr. This attitude can be explained by the fact that Moscow has had a much more constructive relationship with Azerbaijan than with Moldova and Georgia, and is trying once again to not aggravate its relations with Baku.

Putin’s approach also found support among experts in the United States and Europe, who stopped viewing the situation as a case of Russia meddling in the domestic affairs of Georgia and Moldova. For the first time since the 1990s, Western political scientists began mentioning the de-facto states as not simply the consequences of unresolved “frozen” conflicts, but as formations that have their own internal dynamics and are capable of transformations. In the words of British expert Thomas de Vaal, “Many external observers mistakenly consider Abkhazia as simply a Russian puppet state. Of course, Russia uses its undetermined status for its own purposes, but Sergey Bagapsh, the acting president, was elected despite Moscow’s wishes, and many Abkhazians are not happy with creeping annexation by Moscow.” De Vaal also asks: “How long can we go on denying their right to independence? This is not a simple matter. But the alternative—keeping the conflicts frozen and keeping whole territories as the world’s ‘orphans’—is also unacceptable.” Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman have also urged American and European politicians to be realistic, and doubt that the West will risk confrontation with Russia solely for the sake of Georgia preserving its jurisdiction over South Ossetia.

Cooperation goes a long way

The countries that host the frozen conflict zones have also changed their behavior. In 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili started demonstratively violating the Dagomys Treaty that set the rules and format for conflict regulation in 1992. “If the Dagomys Treaty does not permit raising a Georgian flag on the territory of the Tskhinvali district [the official name of South Ossetia in Georgia], I am ready to leave this treaty.” Then, in spring 2006, Moldova and Ukraine decided to use economic instruments to change their customs policies to break the Transdnestr “separatists.” With this action, Kiev changed its role from a guarantor of the peace process into an ally of one of the conflict sides. Late that summer, Georgia seized the Kodor Gorge in a military operation, violating the Moscow Treaty of 1994, which regulated the peacemaking operation in Abkhazia, and attempted to change the status quo in the conflict.

Russia’s policy with regard to the de-facto states has been based, first of all, on maintaining the status quo not as an end in itself, but as a mechanism of counteraction to the “thawing” of the conflicts. But this status quo is changing. Additionally, no official representative of Moscow has ever expressed prejudice against the territorial integrity of Moldova, Georgia or Azerbaijan. However, Moscow’s political patronage allows the de-facto states to work toward final self-determination and in 2006, there was a parade of referendums in these states. These referendums were more legitimate than those held in the conditions of open conflict in the early 1990s and demonstrated that Transdnestr, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh all have their own working legislative systems.

These referendums are another step toward final self-determination, but the success of this project depends in many respects on Russia’s actions. Russia must convince the international community that it wants to continue to play a stabilizing role in Transdnestr, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Additionally, only Russia can shepherd the development of democratization and modernization in these regions, which will benefit them in the long run, whether or not they become independent states. And finally, political recognition of these regions is much more important for Russia than legal recognition. After all, the United States works with Taiwan and finances social projects in Nagorno-Karabakh without any declarations recognizing these states. Israel has an active working relationship with Somaliland without announcing official support for the former British protectorate. Naturally, the UK itself “works” with the subjects of the former empire and the fact of legal recognition is not crucial here either. The most important thing is political cooperation and cooperation in the field of security, and the expectation of a favorable political situation. Russia should not force an acceleration of the process of official recognition for the de-facto states. Right now it is much more important to bring them out of the shadows, to provide them with political support and to appeal to political realism. After all, Russia is the only country that can explain that the disintegration of the Soviet Union will only be complete after the post-Soviet reality is taken into account.

Sergey Markedonov, is the Head of the Interethnic Relations Department at Moscow’s Institute of Political and Military Analysis.

Photo: Kazbek Basaev, STR

Source: Russia Profile.org

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