By Ahmed M.I. Egal

Introduction

The present situation in Somalia appears to mark a new nadir in the recent history of this sorry country that has been the very definition of a failed state over the last eighteen years. The so-called government, the Ethiopian sponsored Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Abdillahi Yusuf, established in Embagathi in Kenya in 2004 by the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), has collapsed for all intents and purposes. Yusuf’s recently announced dismissal of Hassan Nur Adde, the Hawiye Prime Minister, has effectively negated any role for Yusuf in the reconciliation process which is supported by Ethiopia, the AU, UN, EU and US. Yusuf seems determined to end the tenure of his TFG by removing himself as a positive figure in the search for peace and reconciliation. He has made it clear that, far from being an asset in the reconciliation process, he is actively engaged in derailing it in the interest of pursuing his deranged vision of personal power and Darod hegemony. Surely, this final act of political irresponsibility must sound the death knell on his continued leadership of the TFG and tenure as President.

The jihadist nihilists of Al-Shabaab under the leadership of Hassan Dahir Aweys, which is the Al-Qaeda franchise in the Horn of Africa, has captured much of the country and is on the rise against government and Ethiopian forces. Ethiopia has finally accepted the bitter truth that many Somalis and others had predicted, i.e. that Abdillahi Yusuf was an extremely poor choice as the leader to effect reconciliation and establish a government accepted by the broad majority of the Somali people. Finally, the international community has run out of ideas to resolve the Somalia tragedy and the impending, threatened withdrawal of Ethiopian troops promises increased anarchy and the possible accession to power of Al-Shabaab.

Notwithstanding this gloomy and dire picture, it is the thesis of this paper that the current situation presents a window of opportunity to establish a credible government in Somalia and decisively defeat both the jihadists of Al-Shabaab and the tribal supremacists of Abdillahi Yusuf. The principal reasons underlying our conviction that such a window exists are:

1. The political and military divisions within Somalia have coalesced into broader, clan-based groupings which are more amenable to indigenous political reconciliation efforts based upon cultural traditions.

2. The fatigue of the international community in cobbling together so-called governments for Somalia from warlords, their political cohorts, apologists and a sprinkling of token civil society representatives leaves it with no alternative but to seriously consider and support indigenous, grass-root initiatives proposed by Somalis themselves.

3. The recent attacks in Somaliland by Al-Shabaab has forced the people and authorities of that as yet unrecognised country to accept that they cannot continue to remain detached from the search for a solution to the crisis in Somalia.

A Somali Perspective on the Current Situation

The conventional wisdom of foreign observers explains the current situation as follows:

• The TFG of Abdillahi Yusuf has effectively collapsed, with President Yusuf and Premier Hassan Nur Adde engaged in a power struggle over the reconciliation talks in Djibouti between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) lead by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed. Yusuf is implacably opposed to these talks and the power-sharing formula arrived therein aimed at bringing the ARS into the government, while Nur Adde has long sought such a compromise and indeed personally negotiated the power sharing formula with Sheikh Sharif.

• Yusuf has lost the support of Ethiopia which is crucial to his maintaining his position as the undisputed leader of the TFG. Recent statements by Meles Zenawi, Premier of Ethiopia, at IGAD meetings and elsewhere, have clearly shown that the Ethiopian government has lost patience with the TFG and Yusuf in particular. In particular, Zenawi’s praise of the ARS and obvious support for the Nur Adde/Sheikh Sharif power-sharing agreement reached in Djibouti seems to sound the death knell for Yusuf’s continued supremacy and indeed tenure.

• Ethiopia has been forced to accept the hard truth that they cannot maintain Yusuf and the TFG in ‘power’ by force any longer, and Zenawi is actively searching for an exit strategy that will not result in the country falling further into anarchy with the concomitant assumption of power by Al-Shabaab.

• Faced with the agreement between Nur Adde (representing the TFG) and Sheikh Sharif, Al-Shabaab split from its erstwhile ally in the ARS, namely Sharif’s UIC, denounced the power-sharing agreement as an Ethiopian plot and stepped up its military campaign against the Mogadishu regime. The Al-Shabaab has scored dramatic successes on the ground as the TFG became increasingly consumed by its internal power struggle and as the Ethiopian forces have hunkered down and focused upon holding the major metropolises of Mogadishu and Baidowa.

While this characterisation is a reasonable depiction of the current situation in Somalia, it completely misses the local, political and clan dynamic and so fails to illuminate the crucial opportunities and pitfalls inherent at this juncture in Somalia’s descent into hell. It is our view that the current situation is very different from that which prevailed some five years ago when the ill-fated TFG was established in Embagathi. Indeed, the present situation is also markedly different from that which pertained when the Ethiopian invasion ousted the UIC from power and dashed the hopes which the brief period of peace ushered in by the UIC’s stunning success in routing the warlords. The salient opportunities and pitfalls which characterise the current situation in Somalia can be summarised as follows:

         I.      The political divisions in Somali society have broadly coalesced into clan groupings as compared with the atomisation of these divisions into sub-sub-clan and family groupings levels of the previous period. In the previous phase of anarchy which characterised the Somali political situation, before the rise of the UIC, the predominant politico-military unit was the family grouping as individual family units sought to protect themselves and their land/houses or villages and possessions from others. By contrast, the situation now is characterised by allegiance to the sub-clan as political divisions have become coloured both by anti-Ethiopian nationalism and also by Yusuf’s naked tribalism.

This fission/fusion dichotomy is a core feature of Somali clan politics which is central to a comprehensive understanding and analysis of same. The Ethiopian invasion engendered deep feelings of nationalism given the age-old hostility between Muslim, pastoral Somalis and the Christian, agrarian Abyssinians. The nationalism engendered by the Ethiopian invasion is clearly a fusion factor in counterpoint to the fission dynamic which prevailed in the previous, pre-UIC period. Another, more subtle, factor militating for fusion is the naked tribalism of President Yusuf when he put his clansmen exclusively in charge of the security and armed services. With Ethiopian forces protecting his regime, he arrogantly presented himself as a Darod ruler imposing his imprimatur upon the largely Hawiye population of Mogadishu and its environs, in an incomprehensible and incredibly insensitive throwback to the Siyad Barre regime. Yusuf, true to his political past as the tyrant of the Majerteyn-based SSDF of the 1970s/80s and later of the Majerteyn enclave of Puntland, sought to re-establish Darod political hegemony in Somalia under his leadership, which inevitably impelled the fusion dynamic in Hawiye political divisions.

        II.      It is a political fact of life that one of the most important reasons underlying the anarchy that has prevailed in Somalia since 1991, has been that the largest clan, the Hawiye, has fractured politically and militarily into its various sub-clans. By contrast, for example, the peace and stability in Somaliland to the north can be largely explained by the conscious decision of the Isaaq, the largest clan in that country, to re-establish the Somaliland state as a representative democracy with constitutional guarantees for minority rights. The political divisions among the Hawiye now have reverted largely to those that pertained at the time that Siyad Barre was expelled, with one critically important difference, which we shall discuss below. The core Hawiye political division today is between the Habr Gidir and Abgal sub-clans, which are the two largest sub-clans of the Hawiye, with most of the smaller sub-clans, e.g. Murursade, Hawadle etc., lining up with the Abgal. Al-Shabaab is dominated by Dahir Aweys’ Habr Gidir sub-clan, while the UIC is the vehicle of Sheikh Sharif’s Abgal and their allies and the Abgal are also predominant in the TFG since Hassan Nur Adde is from the Abgal sub-clan.

It is important to point out that this coalescence in Hawiye intra-clan politics is not a simple, cut and dried process. In fact some important Habr Gidir figures support the Nur Adde/Sheikh Sharif concordat, e.g. Abdul Salat Qasim – the previous President of the Transitional National Government (TNG), while the Ogaden ONLF, which is of the Darod clan of Abdillahi Yusuf makes common cause with Al-Shabaab in its war against Ethiopia. Despite of these exceptions, the fact remains that the internal intra-Hawiye political divisions have largely reverted back to those that pertained after the expulsion of Siyad Barre, when they were divided between the Habr Gidir lead by Mohammed Aideed and the Abgal lead by Ali Mahdi. The significant and crucial difference now is that the smaller Hawiye sub-clans have lined up with the Abgal, whereas previously each sub-clan had established its own militia to protect its own interests and territory, while forming tactical, ad-hoc alliances with other groups as the need arose. Thus, the crucial difference between the current situation in Somalia and that which prevailed in 1991/93 is that the dynamic in intra-clan politics now is fusion driven while in the earlier period it was fission driven. It is important to note here that the allegiance of the Habr Gidir to Al-Shabaab is neither ideological nor theological, but essentially tactical in response to the Ethiopian invasion and Yusuf’s ignorant reversion to the empty dream of Darod hegemony.

      III.      The recent suicide attacks by Al-Shabaab in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, have brought the anarchy of Somalia to Somaliland which had been immune to it until this November. Since the Somali National Movement (SNM) defeated Siyad Barre’s forces and evicted them from the ex-British Protectorate of Somaliland in 1991, Somaliland had studiously remained aloof from the political machinations and manoeuvrings by domestic and foreign actors to establish a government for Somalia. Having declared the union between Somalia and Somaliland null and void, and thereby reasserted its independence from Somalia in 1991, the people of Somaliland were united in their determination to play no part in the disputes and jockeying for power between the various actors in Somalia. As far as they are concerned, Somalia is now a separate country for which significant animosity remains in the collective psyche and they are determined to remain detached from the struggle for dominance between the competing forces there.

The November suicide bombings of the Presidential compound, the Ethiopian embassy and the UNDP compound in Hargeisa has called this policy of aloofness to political events in Somalia into question. While previous so-called governments of Somalia had insisted that Somaliland was an integral part of Somalia, Somaliland had ignored these statements since these regimes had no authority or influence over Somaliland or its people. Now, however, one of the factions vying for control of Somalia has effectively declared war upon Somaliland and the government in Hargeisa with absolutely no provocation. Somaliland has discovered, in a particularly brutal attack that cost over twenty innocent lives, that its neutrality in the struggle for control of Somalia is not reciprocated by at least one of the belligerents. Thus, Somaliland is left with no alternative but to take an active role in the search for a solution to the anarchy resulting from the collapse of the state in Somalia, if it is to protect its own peace and stability.

At this point it is important to point out that the most successful militia in the history of Somalia and Somaliland has been the SNM, which fought and defeated the Somali army and the Zimbabwean and South African mercenaries that Siyad Barre had retained to pilot his war planes and lead his soldiers. It is worth remembering that the Somali army which the SNM defeated was, at that time, the second largest and among the most battle hardened in black Africa. Among the SNM’s innovations in its decade long war against the Somali army was the mounting of artillery and anti-aircraft guns on 4X4 pick-ups, which they used to devastating effect as tank-killing battle wagons. These novel and terrifying weapons came to be known as “technicals”, and they have entered the lexicon of modern guerrilla warfare throughout Africa and the world. Finally, many of today’s principal warlords in Somalia, e.g. Morgan, Qanyare Afrah, Dahir Aweys, were senior officers in the Somali army that the SNM routed. Many of the key commanders of the SNM, not to mention many thousands of the young guerrillas they commanded, form the present Somaliland National Army, while still others are civilian citizens leading ordinary lives after having been demobilised.

The vast majority of ordinary people in Somalia, not to mention their traditional clan elders, admire Somaliland for the tangible and sustained achievement that its people have achieved during the last eighteen years with respect to national reconciliation and the establishment of peace, representative government and the rule of law. This is evidenced by the fact that some 200-250,000 refugees from Somalia live and work in Somaliland, principally in Hargeisa, Burao and Borama. Somaliland and its authorities (particularly the clan elders and religious leaders) command great respect and moral authority with the ordinary people of Somalia, since they are seen as the principal architects of Somaliland’s success at national reconciliation and effective, representative government. These authorities have been compelled to remain resolutely aloof from the internal strife in Somalia due to the strong popular antipathy in Somaliland to any notion of going back into a political union with Somalia in any form, despite several approaches during the last decade by various actors from Somalia for Somaliland authorities to act as ‘honest broker’ mediators among competing factions in Somalia.

The Way Forward – Towards A Somali Solution

As with any other difficult and intractable problem, an effective approach to crafting a solution to the Somalia crisis must focus upon maximising the positive factors and minimising the negative ones. This means, firstly, seeking to achieve a broad Hawiye reconciliation aimed at achieving a real and tangible Hawiye political consensus. This is absolutely fundamental to establishing a credible government in Somalia that has genuine popular support since, as stated earlier, it will be impossible to establish such a government without the active support of the majority community in the country. The centrality and importance of this requirement cannot be over estimated since its achievement will form the foundation upon which the broader, national reconciliation between the different clans and community groups will rest. The impetus towards fusion in Hawiye intra-clan politics over the last five years in the face of Yusuf’s naked Darod tribalism and the Ethiopian invasion is a clear and distinct political and psychological support factor that must be capitalised upon.

In order to promote Hawiye reconciliation, it will be necessary to convene a caucus of the elders and representatives of all the Hawiye clans, preferably on the sidelines of a national reconciliation conference of all the clans and community groups of Somalia. The fact that the major political divisions within the Hawiye clan have reverted to the Habre Gidir vs. Abgal et al axis is an important factor that will considerably facilitate this process. Habr Gidir leaders, such as Abdul Salat Qasim, which are willing to participate in the reconciliation process, must be incorporated in this conference. It is important to understand that the vast majority of the Habr Gidir sub-clan are not committed jihadists, but have gravitated to support of the Al-Shabaab for two principal reasons.

Firstly, the Al-Shabaab is the most effective anti-Ethiopian militia in the country, and Ethiopia’s brutal occupation of Somalia in support of Yusuf’s naked tribalism has inflamed traditional, anti-Ethiopian nationalism among all Somalis. Secondly, the deposition of Salat Qasim and his replacement by an Abgal axis around Nur Adde and Sheikh Sharif has driven many Habr Gidir militias into the arms of Al-Shabaab for clan solidarity and protection in age-old Somali tradition. Accordingly, it is critical for the success of intra-Hawiye reconciliation that these young fighters of the Habr Gidir militias be weaned away from the toxic lures of Al-Shabaab tribalism and jihadism. This can only be achieved by incorporating genuine Habr Gidir leaders, political as well as traditional and religious, into a genuine reconciliation among all the Hawiye sub-clans. The Somaliland elders and religious leaders are the ideal intermediaries to accomplish this task since they comprise a trusted and traditional interlocutor that is accepted by both parties as a neutral “honest broker”.

The second critical factor in this process relates to the rehabilitation of the Darod clan and its integration into a new Xeer (or social contract as defined by Rousseau) for the re-establishment of Somalia as a nation-state. In order to understand the background and importance of this element of the process, it is necessary to very briefly outline the background of the Darod clan in Somali political history over the last half century. Due to the colonial division of the Somali people and the territories they inhabit, the Darod clan does not constitute a majority in any of the political units which became modern nation-states, i.e. Somaliland, Somalia or Djibouti. However, they form the majority in the Northwest Frontier District (NFD) and they comprise the largest clan (although not the numerical majority) in the Haud & Reserved Area, which were ceded by the British to Kenya and Ethiopia respectively. In Somalia, the Majerteyn sub-clan of the Darod managed to secure a dominant political position during the colonial era through their more willing embrace of the education services provided by the Italians, and the concomitant access to colonial service job opportunities this afforded them. Majerteyn dominance of the colonial service also translated into enhanced patronage in trade and commerce which was a traditional strength in view of their coastal heritage.

Indeed, by the time of independence in 1960 the Majerteyn sub-clan dominated the leadership of the Somali Youth League (SYL) – the independence party of Somalia – as well as the Civil Service, the Police & National Army, the Legislative Assembly and the business community. Through a sustained pattern of migration, particularly during the ten year period (1950-1960) that Somalia was a UN Trust Territory administered by Italy, the Majerteyn emerged as significant numerical constituencies in regions such Kisimayu and Benadir, which are far removed from their traditional home around Cape Guardafui on the Horn. Majerteyn political dominance in Somalia at that time is evidenced by the fact that the two first Prime Ministers of the Somali Republic, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke and Abdirazak Haji Hussein, were both Majerteyn as was the first National Police Chief, Mohammed Abshir. In addition, Abdirashid A. Shermarke went on to become President after the government lead by his clansman, Abdirazak H. Hussein lost the general election in 1967. This Darod domination of Somali politics was taken to its logical and ultimately destructive phase under the dictatorship of Siyad Barre, which did not try to disguise its deliberate and calculated mission of tribal hegemony.

A critical, indeed one could say the fundamental, conflict underlying the anarchy in Somalia during the last eighteen years is the struggle for power between the Hawiye and the Darod. Despite being the majority community, the Hawiye have been unable to prevail because of their internal divisions and also because they have failed to articulate and present a new Xeer that the minority communities, e.g. the Rahanwein, the coastal Arab-Somalis, Barjuns etc., feel protects their interests and which they can, therefore, sign up to. The Darod, for their part, have been engaged in an essentially defensive strategy that seeks to prevent the re-establishment of the state on terms that are disadvantageous to them by promoting Hawiye divisions, while maintaining relative peace and stability in their enclave of Puntland. Abdillahi Yusuf’s successful suborning of Ethiopian aid, support and complicity in his bid for the Presidency of the TFG in Embagathi marked the last, and hopefully final, chapter in this tragedy of Darod insecurity and destructiveness in post-Siyad politics in Somalia. The myopic and very ill conceived decision by the US and Ethiopia initially to support the hated and hateful warlords against the UIC, and then to invade Somalia to install Yusuf and his TFG by force played into the domestic political scene in the most negative manner. Under the umbrella provided by the Ethiopian invasion and US international sponsorship, Yusuf embarked upon his immature and equally ill conceived adventure to re-establish Darod hegemony over government, this time under Majerteyn leadership in replacement of Siyad Barre’s Marehan sub-clan. The inevitable result has been to harden Darod antipathy among the other political and clan groupings in Somalia, hence our use of the characterisation ‘rehabilitation’ with regard to Darod participation in the reconciliation process outlined herein.

With respect to the important issue of Darod participation in the reconciliation process, two key elements need to be developed and pursued simultaneously. The first is the achievement of Hawiye reconciliation in order to minimise the attraction of the previous paradigm of promoting, and even fomenting, intra-Hawiye divisions to maintain the current anarchy. The second is to rehabilitate and re-invigorate the traditional clan leadership, religious leaders and business leaders of the Darod clans, which have been delegitimized and shunted aside by warlords like Yusuf, Adde Muse – the Puntland President – and their pirate-baron henchmen. Just as the Habr Gidir are not rabid jihadists, neither are the Darod a clan of tribal supremacists and Machiavellian manipulators. What is crucial is that the Darod understand that the new Xeer underpinning the re-emergence of Somalia as a nation-state will neither punish them nor afford them any special status. There are many Darod political leaders opposed to Yusuf, Adde Muse and the tribal criminality they present as political leadership, which could be enlisted in this endeavour. These leaders have to convince their clansmen that while the era of political dominance is ended for good, the new Xeer to be promulgated at the conference is their best and only chance to secure their legitimate rights and freedoms in a stable and democratic Somalia.

This issue concerning the rehabilitation of the Darod and successfully incorporating them into the reconciliation process is a very complex and intractable one. As with the effort to reconcile the Hawiye, it needs to be addressed thoroughly and comprehensively at a caucus of all the Darod clans on the sidelines of the conference. Among other matters, this caucus should also address the is Darod role in the search for a just solution to ending the Ogaden irredentism in the 5th Province of Ethiopia. Clearly, the dream of Greater Somalia is truly dead, thus the stated aim of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) of secession from Ethiopia in favour of union with Somalia has effectively become a non-sequiteur. Conversely, the new, federal constitution of Ethiopia provides the people of the 5th Province (Ogaden and non-Ogaden alike) with a significant measure of autonomy, or even full independence along the Eritrean model. As they reassess their political position in Somalia, the Darod also need to reassess their position in the context of a Horn of Africa region of multiple, democratic states where power is increasingly diffused and no single socio-political group can monopolise government. Indeed, all the people of Somalia need to develop and articulate a new political ethos for the future, since the Greater Somalia paradigm which underpinned the creation of the erstwhile Republic of Somalia has now been consigned to history.

Thirdly, the new-found willingness of Somaliland to play an active and constructive role in the search for a solution to the crisis in Somalia must be seized upon and encouraged. The proposed national reconciliation conference can and should be held in Somaliland under the auspices of the Somaliland elders. It is important that the said conference is hosted by the Somaliland elders rather than the Somaliland Government, in order to avoid any perception that the government is meddling in Somalia’s affairs for its own, political ends. It is the practise in Somali culture and tradition for the elders of a neutral, third clan to mediate in a dispute (or war) between two other clans and it is a feature of such traditional mediation for the two disputing clans to agree to accept unconditionally and wholly the arbitration decision of the mediators. This is the model that needs to be adopted and followed and which will be broadly accepted by the vast majority of the Somali public which are clearly fed up with the continued anarchy ushered in by successive so-called governments concocted in foreign capitals.

In order to secure Somaliland’s willing collaboration to host the conference and provide the necessary commitment of political, moral and human resources (e.g. military troops, equipment & materiel), it is essential for Somaliland to obtain clear benefits for its effort. The obvious benefit that Somaliland will seek is international recognition of its statehood. Without a clear and unequivocal commitment from all parties, particularly the Government of Somalia, that Somaliland’s quid pro quo for organising and hosting the conference is international recognition, it will be impossible to secure widespread public support for this conference in Somaliland. To this end, the first step in the arrangement of the conference should be for the governments of Somalia and Somaliland to mutually recognise each other. Another important factor to take into account is the participation of Al-Shabaab in the conference. It is unreasonable to expect Somaliland to agree to Al-Shabaab’s participation in view of the November 2008 attacks in Hargeisa it orchestrated, unless it is willing to surrender all those who were involved in the planning and execution of the said attacks, and pay compensation to the families of the dead and injured. Since it is our view that the only effective way to deal with Al-Shabaab is to deprive it of its main constituency, i.e. the Habr Gidir sub-clan, and then deal with it as a criminal organisation (much as one would deal with the pirate gangs with which it is loosely affiliated), their de facto or de jure exclusion from the conference is not a cause for concern.

For the proposed conference to be credible and in order to secure the willing support of the mass of Somalia’s citizens, it must be open, inclusive and truly representative of all communities and opinions. It must enable the open airing of grievances and the concomitant, but difficult, process of acknowledgement and recognition of past injustice in order to forge genuine reconciliation. The conference envisaged is an amalgam of a ‘Truth & Reconciliation Forum’ along the lines of the South African model and a political convention to select a legislative body and an executive government. The Somaliland elders are uniquely equipped to host and structure such a conference, since they did precisely this in 1993 at Borama to establish the first post-SNM government and legislative assembly for Somaliland. The essentially open, democratic and non-authoritarian nature of the Somali clan structure and political system lends itself very well to such type of conference, as would be expected since this type of conference was designed and structured by clan elders. Thus, its inclusive and open nature works against those who refuse to attend and participate, since their refusal is a repudiation of the traditional, cultural norms of mediation that have characterised Somali society since time immemorial.

Finally, the international community must support this process in tangible ways including, inter alia, the following:

1.       The costs of convening and holding the conference must be pledged by the major foreign players, i.e. US, EU, AU, AL.

2.       The Ethiopians have to announce the withdrawal of their forces from Somalia once the government formed at the proposed conference is sworn in and is installed in Mogadishu.

3.       A peace keeping force comprised of Somaliland forces (which will form the backbone of the said peace keeping force force with a complement of, say 15,000 soldiers), AU and ICO members must be formed and committed to protect aid and relief organisations and supervise the disarming of the militias and the establishment of Somali security services. Western, Arab and Asian countries would provide the equipment, logistical and financial support for this peace keeping force.

4.       An international donor conference should be convened as soon as possible after the establishment of the new government to pledge and commit significant funds for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. This conference should also separately pledge funds for Somaliland to support its reconstruction and development.

It is our firm belief that a golden opportunity exists at this time to finally establish a truly representative, inclusive government in Somalia as the logical conclusion of a genuine national reconciliation conference that will lead to the final end of the anarchy and misery that has bedevilled that country. The people of Somalia cannot afford to miss this opportunity, and we are convinced that they are ready to grasp it with both hands, given a chance to do so. We fervently hope that the international community will avail this chance not only to help the people of Somalia to re-establish the state in their country, but also to help the people of the region secure the Horn of Africa from anarchy, starvation and misery and the terrorism and piracy these evils incubate and breed.

By Ahmed M.I. Egal

December 2008

Email: egality@gmail.com

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