By Jena Baker McNeill and Brett D. Schaefer
April 15, 2009
When Somali pirates seized the U.S.-flagged Maersk Alabama, taking
the ship's captain hostage, resulting news coverage focused U.S.
public attention on piracy and lawlessness in Somalia.
Piracy is a growing problem that benefits from the instability in
Somalia. In the near term, effectively safeguarding maritime traffic
requires a balanced public/private effort with the use of force
limited to protecting commerce and maintaining freedom of the seas.
Also required is an effective strategy to resolve Somalia's troubles
and establish and bolster the rule of law.
Piracy Makes a Comeback
The goal of modern-day pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden is to
make easy money--take over a ship, seize a few hostages or a few
million dollars in cargo, and wait for the shipping company to pay a
ransom. This approach usually translates into $1–2 million in ransom
per ship.
Contributing to the ease of taking over a ship is the low number of
crew members that staff most modern merchant ships. Most are unarmed
and therefore powerless to do anything when seven to 10 pirates
armed with assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers get
on board.
Despite the risks, private companies still see the seas surrounding
the Horn of Africa as a cost-effective means for moving goods--as
many as 20,000 ships travel these waters annually. Only a very small
percentage is subject to documented acts of piracy.
In response to the increasingly brazen acts of piracy over the past
year, the United States and other countries undertook several
actions to protect the shipping lanes. NATO ships, later replaced by
an EU task force, deployed to the region, and in January the U.S.
contributed additional naval forces as part of the multinational
anti-piracy effort dubbed the "Combined Task Force (151)." The
United Nations Security Council has passed several resolutions to
try and address piracy in the region.[1] However, the pirates have
not been deterred. Instead they have expanded their range to escape
more heavily patrolled waters--the Maersk Alabama was hundreds of
miles from what were previously considered pirate waters.
The Challenge
Somalia is a key base of operation for pirates in the Gulf Aden. The
pirates live in Somalia, where they sell the fruits of their piracy,
get resources for more missions, and collect intelligence needed to
target ships from on-shore spies. Cutting pirates off from these
benefits is central to minimizing Somali piracy over the long term.
Somalia has a well-earned reputation as a failed state. Since the
U.N. withdrew in March 1995 without restoring a central government,
little progress has been made. Aside from the autonomous, broadly
self-governed enclaves of Somaliland and Puntland in the northern
parts of the country, over the past 18 years Somalia has suffered
under "governance" by a succession of tribal factions, warlords,
Islamist groups, and foreign interventions.
Since 2004, the U.N. and countries like the U.S. have supported the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia diplomatically and
financially in an attempt to promote a functioning central
government. Although the TFG is internationally recognized as the
government of Somalia, it has proven to be a weak institution
hindered by a lack of legitimacy among the Somali population.
What to Do
Interest in dealing with the lawlessness and instability in Somalia
has been elevated by the recent press attention on piracy. U.S.
policymakers should resist letting headlines drive policy, such as
supporting a new U.N. peacekeeping operation, which would face
enormous--perhaps insurmountable--challenges.
Key among such challenges is that there is no legitimate sovereign
able to assert its authority for the U.N. peacekeeping operation to
support. Instead, the U.S. should be seeking an approach to Somalia
that capitalizes on existing realities.
Recognize the Failure of Imposing a Centralized State Authority.
Somalia is a failed state with various powerful factions possessing
little, if any, national allegiance. A strategy of establishing a
state-centric model (throwing capital, political and financial, at a
succession of worthless central authorities) has been proven
ineffective: The TFG is the 14th such interim government structure
since 1991.
Instead, the U.S. should support a "grassroots model" of identifying
and bolstering existing legitimate authorities, including civil
society and traditional clan authorities--excepting those with links
to terrorism, piracy, or Islamic extremism. Applying this strategy
will take time and face many difficulties. However, such an approach
is more likely to lead to success in the long run.
Encourage Improved Governance in Somalia. To encourage local Somali
authorities and statelets to improve their governance structures and
to mature politically, the international community should reward
them with the benefits other governments receive--provided they meet
clear benchmarks. For instance, to address the situation in
Puntland, the international community should demand that local
authorities clamp down on piracy and cooperate with international
anti-piracy efforts as a key early condition. A similar approach
should be used for other Somali regions, albeit tailored to their
specific circumstances.
Make the Seas Safer. Combating piracy will require security
enhancements on the high seas. The Navy's presence coupled with
effective intelligence sharing and targeted operations can:
Conduct interdiction and blockade missions that will serve as
partial deterrent;
Conduct hostage rescue; and
Perform search and rescue in concert with other concerned naval
powers.
Over time, U.S. maritime presence should shift from naval to U.S.
Coast Guard forces, which are better suited to most of these tasks.
The U.S. should also help regional allies improve their coast guard
and maritime security programs. This shift will require speeding and
expanding the modernization of Coast Guard maritime security assets.
In addition, private sector shippers should take more responsibility
for their own security. This should not include arming the crews of
ships--such a move would be dangerous to the crew (untrained in the
use of weapons) and face many legal obstacles. In addition, little
can be practically done to prevent pirates from overtaking the ship
once they are on board without endangering the vessel and the lives
of the crew.
Rather, private shippers could, at modest cost, hire private
security that operates in separate small vessels. Sensors and
non-lethal technologies could provide a picket line to prevent
pirates from approaching commercial craft.
Enhance International Efforts to Deal with Piracy. The U.S. and
others should apply pressure to Puntland and other Somali
authorities linked to piracy by undermining the profit motive (e.g.,
applying U.S. treasury sanctions on financial institutions linked to
piracy or prohibiting insurance claims on ransoms paid to pirates).
The U.S. should also, in coordination with other nations, implement
a naval interdiction and blockade of Somali and other ports known to
be harboring pirates should these ports prove unwilling to cooperate
with anti-piracy efforts. Such blockades would be lifted only when
the pirates are surrendered.
The U.N. Security Council could assist by blessing interdiction of
ports in Somalia and other nations where pirates have demonstrably
been able to seek refuge; recognizing the historical customary
international law practice of applying universal jurisdiction in
cases of piracy on the high seas and the authority of ships to sink
private vessels, kill individuals that refuse to surrender, detain
pirates and deliver them to legal authorities; and permitting
national authorities to try and punish them as they deem
appropriate, so long as they comply with fundamental due process.
A Unique Situation
Ensuring freedom of the seas is fundamental to global commerce, and
it is the responsibility of nations to ensure that right. The U.S.
should do its part. The anti-piracy strategy should be applied to
the Horn of Africa and surrounding waters, but the uniquely lawless
situation in Somalia requires supplementary strategies.
Specifically, the U.S. must focus attention on recognizing and
bolstering points of stability in Somalia and working with local
authorities toward the long-term goal of expanding governance in the
country.
Jena Baker McNeill is Policy Analyst for Homeland Security in the
Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a
division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, and Brett D. Schaefer is Jay Kingham Fellow
in International Regulatory Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center
for Freedom, a division of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage
Foundation.
[1]For instance, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 1816 in June 2008 permitting states to use "all necessary
means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery" in Somali waters.
Resolution 1838 in October 2008 called for nations to intensify
their efforts to combat piracy in Somalia, and Resolution 1851 in
December 2008 expanded Security Council approval of anti-piracy
efforts to include operations on land.
Source: The Heritage
