Issue 380
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Front
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News Headlines
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Local
and Regional Affairs |
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Editorial |
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Features
& Commentary |
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International News
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Opinion |
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It
is difficult to talk about Somaliland’s foreign policy since after
almost two decades, the country does not yet have a foreign policy
establishment, institutions, or even a ministry of foreign affairs that
is worth the name. Instead, what we have in Somaliland is a foreign
policy that is managed by President Dahir Rayale Kahin and two of his
closest aides: Abdillahi Mohammed Duale (the foreign minister) and
Hussein Ali Duale a.k.a Awil (the finance minister). It is these three
individuals who decide Somaliland’s relations with the rest of the
world, and the results have been catastrophic.
Let us take for example Somaliland’s response to the piracy issue. The
fact of the matter is that there was no response at all. While the whole
world was, and still is, engaged with the issue, the three people in
charge of Somaliland’s foreign policy stayed quiet and did not even
bother to point out that Somaliland’s part of the Somali coast is free
of piracy, let alone strengthening Somaliland’s position by presenting
ideas on how Somaliland can contribute toward defeating piracy. The
result is that the US and the European Union were able to use the piracy
issue as a fig leaf and diverted the worldwide outrage regarding piracy
into a financial bonanza for financing its proxies in Mogadishu: the
African Union troops, and to a lesser extent, the Sheikh Sharif faction.
The second example is Somaliland’s relations with Djibouti. And here it
is even more clear that the problem with the triumvirate (Rayale,
Abdillahi Duale and Awil) that is running Somaliland’s foreign policy is
not just a matter of their demonstrated incompetence or their
unwillingness to build institutional mechanisms for decision-making, but
rather a matter of deliberate and willful selling out of the country to
Djibouti.
Somalilanders already know how far Djibouti is willing to go to sabotage
Somaliland, how Djibouti is constantly trying to create a pro-Somalia
fifth column in Somaliland, how it lobbies against Somaliland in the
international arena, how it kicked out Somaliland’s representative in
Djibouti, and how it has forced Somaliland’s livestock to pass through
its port. The question is: what did the triumvirate do in return?
Answer: They rewarded Djibouti by siding with it against Eritrea.
If taking Djibouti’s side brought some worthy positive change in
Djibouti’s policies toward Somaliland, at least the triumvirate would
have something tangible to point to, but up to now there is no such
thing. The only thing that happened is that Djibouti’s government toned
down its overt anti-Somaliland rhetoric and instead of confronting
Somaliland head-on, it is following a more devious policy of bringing
Somaliland under its aegis by controlling its economy and diplomacy.
Again, what did the triumvirate do about this? Did they make every
effort to protect the country from Djibouti’s stratagems?
Not at all. Instead, the same foreign minister (Abdillahi Duale) who did
not speak up for Somaliland regarding piracy, the same foreign minister
who is missing in action when the world debates Somali issues, the same
foreign minister who has essentially ceded the international foreign
media to the yahoos in Mogadishu, that same minister was quick to come
to the defense of Djibouti’s dictator Ismail Omar Guelleh when some
Somalilanders questioned that dictator’s policies toward Somaliland. Not
only that, but Somaliland’s government-owned television gave plenty of
air-time to a pro Ismail Omar Guelleh rally in Borama, something which
offended a lot of Somalilanders. As if that were not enough, instead of
insisting that the World Bank officials come to Somaliland for
discussing Somaliland issues, Somaliland’s government consented to
sending a large delegation to Djibouti to meet with the World Bank, thus
continuing a policy of making Somaliland a subset of Djibouti.
Although Djibouti’s government these days refrains from making overt
anti-Somaliland utterances, its policies remain fundamentally hostile to
Somaliland. A recent example is the statement made by Djibouti’s
Information Minister Ali Abdi Farah who said, “Eritrea would not have
dared to attack Djibouti if Somalia were still militarily strong
(Eritrea kumay dhiirateen inay Djibouti soo weerarto haddii ay awoodii
milateri ee Somalia jirto)”. Mr Ali Abdi Farah knows that Djibouti has
no borders with Somalia but shares a border with Somaliland. He knows
that, unlike Somalia which exports piracy and terrorism to its
neighbors, Somaliland has given Djibouti a safe and secure border. But
apparently this is not enough, and the only thing that would satisfy
Djibouti is a return of the bad old days when Somalia was “militarily
strong” and for Somaliland to be wiped off the map. That is Djibouti’s
policy. And that is why, despite all the song and dance by Somaliland’s
government about how great are the Somaliland-Djibouti relations,
Somaliland’s office in Djibouti has not been re-opened. It is the same
policy that was spelled out clearly by Djibouti’s Ambassador to the US,
Mr. Roble Olhaye, in an interview posted in AllAfrica.com:
“[Reporter]: Some voices in the northern, self-declared republic of
Somaliland criticise your government's non-recognition of their country
and say that this undermines its stability and, thus, contributes to
instability throughout Somalia? Would a US-led campaign against
terrorism change that, do you think, and bring you and the Somalilanders
closer together?
[Roble Olhaye]: No. First of all, Somaliland is part of Somalia. It is a
misnomer to use that name. Anyone can float any name in Somalia. You
have Jubalanders and Puntlanders and others but there is no sufficient
ground for that and these people are all part and parcel of Somalia. We
want the Somali people to come to their senses and to lead a decent life
and to be good neighbors and to reconstitute themselves. That's what we
want. We have no axe to grind in a destabilized Somalia.” (AllAfrica.com,
Jan.16, 2002)
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