Date: 04 Jun 2009

EVENT: Government fighters launched a counter-offensive on June 2 against hardline Islamist militant groups, Hisbul Islam and al-Shabaab.

SIGNIFICANCE: The government has barely survived a concerted assault on Mogadishu, which threatens to derail the Djibouti peace process.

ANALYSIS: Since it moved to Mogadishu in February, the expanded Transitional Federal Government (TFG-Djibouti) has made only limited progress in increasing coherence among the unwieldy coalition of which it is formed. The arrival of the government was followed by a few weeks of relative calm in the capital, and some revenues started to flow into TFG coffers, allowing payment of some key civil servant salaries, and in particular soldiers and police.

Yet the joint security committee, established under the Djibouti Peace Agreement to oversee the process of integrating former Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) and TFG security forces, has not made much progress. Problems have been compounded by the division of responsibility for internal security between at least three ministerial portfolios -- Sheikh Abdulqadir Ali Omar (Interior), Omar Hashi Aden (Internal Security) and Mohamed Abdi 'Gandi' (Defence).

Hardliner assault. A turning point was reached in late April, when donors within the International Contact Group on Somalia pledged 213 million dollars to support the African Union (AU) peace-keeping mission (AMISOM) and the TFG-Djibouti's security forces. President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed has been asking for funds to bolster his security forces since he came to power in January. Some funding is now flowing, including at least part of the 10 million dollars the United States pledged.

The prospect of international funding for the TFG-Djibouti concentrated minds among hardline Islamist hold-outs:

Representatives of Sheikh Sharif's government met Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the leader of the Eritrea-based hold-out ARS faction, in Sudan in April. However, Aweys returned to Somalia as the aid package was announced, and soon thereafter publicly rebuffed overtures from the TFG-Djibouti for reconciliation (rejecting the advice of his Hebr Gedir Ayr clansmen).

Aweys took a lead role within the Hisbul Islam alliance, and in coordination with al-Shabaab, launched an assault on Mogadishu in early May. Al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam appeared to encircle Mogadishu as fighters took key positions in southern and northern parts of the capital, as well as some strategic towns on the main route north from the city. Hisbul Islam fighters from Kismayo under Sheikh Hassan Abdallahi Turki also moved towards Mogadishu.

Former ARS fighters were in the forefront of TFG-Djibouti response to the initial clashes, but collapsed under the onslaught -- Ethiopian-trained TFG troops provided stiffer resistance. However, it was only the presence of AMISOM -- whose mandate has been extended until the end of 2009 -- that prevented Sheikh Sharif's government from being ousted.

Counter-offensive. Sheikh Sharif launched a largely ineffectual counter-offensive on May 22 -- amid reports of clashes between Hisbul Islam and al-Shabaab fighters, as well as news that Sheikh Yusuf 'Indha Cadde' Mohamed Siad had defected from Hisbul Islam to the TFG-Djibouti (days after he had re-pledged his support to Aweys, a fellow Ayr). On June 2, the TFG-Djibouti launched a more robust effort to assert control over south-western Mogadishu. Reports indicate that Omar Hashi Aden has assembled another government force in Beledweyne with the aim of opening a second counter-offensive. Al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam already face a challenge from the militarised faction of the Sufi group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a in central Somalia.

Humanitarian consequences. The latest violence has displaced tens of thousands from and within Mogadishu, many of whom had returned during the relative calm which followed the TFG-Djibouti's return. Civilians are bearing the brunt of casualties from the violence. Relief operations along the road to Afgooye (just outside the capital) are overstretched and underfunded.

Foreign fighters. Al-Shabaab has called for foreign fighters to join its jihad against the TFG and AU peacekeepers, and an indeterminate number are in the country (reports range from dozens to hundreds). Many of these are probably ethnic Somalis from the region and the wider diaspora (as well as other ethnic Ethiopians and Kenyans). Others may be Arab, South Asian or other jihadist fighters. Evidence is scarce, but the influence of these fighters -- even within al-Shabaab -- is probably very limited.

Regional response. Some of Somalia's neighbours have taken fairly forceful positions against the latest violence:

- IGAD. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Horn of Africa's regional body, met on May 20 to discuss the rapidly deteriorating security situation. The group called for tough sanctions on Eritrea, which it accused of supporting forces opposed to the TFG. Days later, this call was echoed by the African Union, which similarly condemned Eritrean influence.

- Eritrea. Eritrea -- which suspended its membership in IGAD in 2007 as a result of long-standing tensions with Ethiopia, and in protest against Ethiopian military intervention -- has rejected these calls, and denies supporting Islamist militants. Nevertheless, Asmara had hosted Aweys since 2007, and multiple UN reports say that it has provided monetary support and arms to his fighters. Evidence of Eritrean support for al-Shabaab is weaker, but cannot be dismissed.

- Ethiopia. Reports of Ethiopian troop movements just inside the Somali border have become more persistent and credible since mid-May. Ethiopia has probably also provided support -- including arms -- for anti-al-Shabaab forces, particularly Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (and possibly assorted warlords who have also become 'Sufis' recently). The internal security minister -- a leader in the 2007-09 anti-Ethiopian insurgency -- has since repaired relations with Addis Ababa, and may allow Ethiopian strategic support for his counter-offensive. Robust intervention can be expected if Aweys or al-Shabaab topple the TFG-Djibouti.

- Kenya. In recent weeks, Nairobi has stepped up its rhetoric against the militant resistance to the TFG, particularly against al-Shabaab. The government has pledged to help the Somali government defeat al-Shabaab, although in principle it is unlikely that Kenya will deploy troops inside Somalia. Nevertheless, Kenya has been the location of two terrorist attacks organised by al-Qaida's East Africa cell -- the 1998 US embassy bombing in Nairobi and the 2002 attacks on Israeli interests in Mombassa -- and the government is keen to avoid becoming the victim of another, amid reports of a growing al-Shabaab presence inside the country. Kenyan intervention will probably be limited to bolstering its border presence.

Two important trends may come out of this regional posturing:

Eritrea's continued isolation ultimately stems from and feeds into its lingering tensions with Ethiopia. In the run-up to Ethiopia's May 2010 general election, Eritrea will play on these tensions by increasing its support for Ethiopian opposition groups, armed or otherwise -- raising the risk of a return of hostilities (see ETHIOPIA: EPRDF tightens control as polls loom - May 14, 2009).

The regional (and international) focus on al-Shabaab has further internationalised the group's agenda. Having carried out coordinated attacks in Somaliland and Puntland in November last year, including on UN and Ethiopian offices, the Kenyan and Ethiopian mainland are increasingly at risk of being targeted by al-Shabaab.

Outlook. In late May, Aweys took over the formal leadership of Hisbul Islam. He appears to be growing more antagonistic towards the leadership of al-Shabaab. He and al-Shabaab parted ways ideologically during the run-up to Ethiopia's December 2006 invasion. Aweys rejected attempts by al-Shabaab's leadership to assume full command of the current offensive. With their assault stalled, their coordination is already fraying. The next question is whether the two organisations -- neither of which is monolithic -- can maintain their own cohesion.

CONCLUSION: The recent hardline Islamist offensive against the TFG-Djibouti may have demonstrated the limits of those groups' cohesion. However, the government remains under military pressure, and is no less susceptible to internal divisions. Moreover, overt Western support risks undermining the TFG-Djibouti's domestic credibility. The future of the Djibouti process is in serious doubt. Republished on ReliefWeb with the permission of research and consulting firm Oxford Analytica Ltd. Copyright 2007 Oxford Analytica Ltd. All rights reserved. For additional information, please visit Oxford Analytica or write to enoel@oxford-analytica.com

Source: Oxford Analytica

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