By G. Kiristos Andargachew

Somalia is a country inhabited by a culturally uniform people; they speak the same language, prefer the same religion, Islam, share a common culture and claim the same history. Somalia came into existence with the idea of "Greater Somalia" inculcated into the minds of the Somali elite. In fact, to "liberate" and unite in a 'Greater Somalia' nation all the Somali lands, i.e., Djibouti, Northern Kenya and Ethiopia's Ogaden had become the most important issue that dominated Somalia's foreign policy since its independence in 1960.

The idea of "Greater Somalia" was first conceived by one of the colonial powers in the Horn region, Britain. After the defeat of Italy by the Allies in 1941, the territories of Somalia and British Somaliland came under British military administration. Also, as a result of an Ethio-British agreement, concluded in 1944, Ethiopia allowed its Ogaden region to be placed under British military rule as part of Ethiopia's contribution to the war effort. This strategically vital region overlooking the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden tempted the British to create the subtle formula of creating "Greater Somalia". Britain proposed this idea to the Allied forces responsible for the expulsion of Italy from its former colonies. Britain's proposal, however, was rejected by the other three members, USA, USSR and France, on the ground that Britain might be trying to obtain a new colony under the guise of unifying the Somalis. The British policymakers reversed their position later and gave up their idea. But the Somali politicians inherited the idea of "Greater Somalia" and made it a very useful political slogan. Because of this, the history of Somalia from the time of its independence consists mainly of its attempt to bring all the territories inhabited by the Somalis under one flag. This had been the reason why Somalia's relations with its neighbors, especially with Ethiopia, have been stormy.

All alliances, diplomatic campaigns and military build-ups were intended for only one purpose: unification of all the Somalis. Ultimately Somalia was plunged into war with Ethiopia in 1964 and 1977-78. All ended unsuccessfully and the quest for "Greater Somalia" ended in failure. The Myth of "Greater Somalia'", on the one hand, served as an instrument to bring together the various clan-families into one nation, and on the other involved the infant Republic in unfortunate disputes with its neighbors. Thus, Somalia was considered a threat to the stability of the region.

Turmoil in Ethiopia, an opportunity for Somalia

Ethiopia's past history that witnessed the fall of the Emperor was followed by years of chaos. On January 1, 1961, in the confused aftermath of an attempted coup against the Emperor, a brutal clash between armed Somali tribesmen and Ethiopian soldiers broke out near the Ethiopian-Somali border. The other most important event that caught Somalia's attention was the fall of the government of Emperor Haile-Selassie in 1974. The Ethiopian revolution that emerged following the Emperor's overthrow was filled with turmoil and uncertainty. Ethiopia's political and military situation was an irresistible temptation to the Somali leaders who had already built up substantial armed forces with the help of the Soviets. Attempting to take advantage of the situation, the Somali government sent its troops to seize the Ogaden by military force. Had Somalia stood as a nation during and after the fall of the Derg regime, its behavior of challenging Ethiopia in times of crisis would have been a problem for the EPRDF government.

The diplomatic offensive

On the diplomatic front the battle to gain influence was fought intensively. For instance, the quest for "Greater Somalia" was aired by its leaders at the conferences of the OAU, the Arab League and Non-Allied Countries. At the OAU conferences Somalia's leaders condemned Ethiopia of being a "colonial power" and at every Islamic conference they used the issue of "Christian Ethiopia" or Israeli-Ethiopian relations to foment Arab animosity against Ethiopia. However, since the fear of balkanization was common to OAU member countries and since Ethiopia's prestige in the OAU was so strong the heads of state turned a deaf ear to Somalia's accusations. The Somalis stood alone.

Somali leaders, as a result of their loss of support at the African forum, shifted their attention towards the Arab World. In every Arab conference that the Somali politicians attended, anti-Ethiopians resolutions were passed. Arab countries became Somalia's hope of moral and material support. It was mainly for this purpose that Somalia, a non-Arab country, became a member of the Arab League. Somalia also turned its attention towards the East and became the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to sign a treaty with the USSR with the intention of gaining diplomatic and military support for its ambition of snatching the Ogaden from Ethiopia by force. As a result of the agreement, Somalia received military assistance to upgrade and expand its armed forces. Somalia, therefore, had built an army that could stand up to any army in sub-Saharan Africa, except South Africa.

The final war (1977/78)

As confusion and disorder spread throughout Ethiopia, the Somali government launched full-scale war against Ethiopia. Somali troops had occupied nearly an area of 700 kilometers deep in Ethiopia and threatened to capture the cities of Harar and Dire Dawa. This was the time that the rift between Ethiopia and America widened and the new military regime moved increasingly towards the east, especially towards the Soviet Union. The decision by Washington to refuse the supply of any arms to Ethiopia, including those that had been paid for, pushed Ethiopia to rely only on the Soviet Union for military assistance. Shortly afterwards massive quantities of military weapons worth about 1 billion dollars began to be air- and sea- lifted to Ethiopia as a result of the agreement concluded between Addis Ababa and Moscow. Also, thousands of Cuban troops and hundreds of Soviet military advisors began to arrive in Ethiopia. Despite the fact that the USSR attempted to combine good relations with both Ethiopia and Somalia, the relation on the Somalian side began to deteriorate when the Soviet's military support to Ethiopia began to increase.

Somalia turned its hope of getting arms to the western countries, specially the United States. The United States, however, refrained from arming Somalia because this move would displease the French, who have troops in Djibouti, and Kenya, a friend of the West that also considers Somalia a threat to its security. As a matter of fact, Kenya sent its delegates to Britain and the United States to urge them to refrain from arming Somalia. Although all the efforts were fruitful in persuading the western countries to refrain from arming Somalia, other Islamic counties, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran, including Sudan and Pakistan, provided Somalia with arms. In spite of all the arms that Somalia received from these Islamic countries to keep the war going in the Ogaden, the tide began to turn against the Somali troops when the Ethiopian army began its offensive. Within a few weeks the invading Somalia forces were defeated with three-fourth of the Somalia tank force and one-half of the Somali force destroyed. Somalia's campaign in the ogaden thus ended in disaster.

Implication of the defeat for Somalia

The 1977-78 Ogaden defeat at the hands of Ethiopians had the following implications on Somalia: it ended Somalia's aggression, shattered the idea of "Greater Somalia", removed Somali (north & south) solidarity and exposed clan rivalries. The dissatisfaction surfaced when a group of officers staged an attempted coup d'état in April 1978. The coup was unsuccessful and those who escaped arrest established an opposition group called the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), establishing their headquarters in Ethiopia. Consequently other opposition groups began to emerge and with the assistance they received form Ethiopia and other sources, such as Libya and South Yemen (PDRY), the opposition's military capability was strengthened. By supporting these groups against the Somali government, Ethiopia, for the first time, placed Somalia on the defensive position.

The destabilizing pressure on Somalia forced the government to seek peace with Ethiopia. The peace treaty with Ethiopia, however, didn't bring stability to Somalia. Armed opposition groups emerged everywhere in the country and violent conflict escalated. Meanwhile, the army had broken up into clan-based factions, and the administration and bureaucracy were in total disarray. Thus, the complete collapse of the Somalia state came in January 1991. It must be noted that it was the defeat in the Ogaden that dissolved the Somali unity and shook the Somali government to its foundation.

Although the origin of the conflict was the result of the idea of "Greater Somalia" encouraged by the British, the successive Somali governments can also be blamed for the destruction of Somalia. Instead of working towards solving the problem of fragmentation, the leaders were constantly engaged in tying to unify what they called the "lost territories". In other words, they wanted to expand and become "Great" at the expense of the neighboring states.

Political reconciliation

In an attempt to bring the warring Somali factions together and to ensure stability and peace in Somalia, several peace conference were held in different countries of the region and so many agreements were signed, but all to no avail. None of them were able to bring lasting peace to the Somali people. The most important initiatives which were believed to bring peace to war-torn Somalia were those of Ethiopia and Egypt which were considered as "rival peace initiatives". This was because these two nations were attempting to compete in the peace process. Ethiopia's initiative to bring peace to the broken country, which was mandated by the OAU and also was reaffirmed by IGAD member states, was interrupted by Egypt. This was because Egypt had certain regional ambitions and, therefore, wanted to neutralize Ethiopia's influence in Somalia. Egypt's action was mainly motivated by Ethiopia's contribution of a large part of the Nile waters, which is of vital interest to Egypt. Thus, Egypt, that had lost the hope of seeing a strong and unified Somalia that would be used to destabilize Ethiopia, tried to hijack Somalia's reconciliation process from Ethiopia.

In 1997, Egypt hosted what was known as the "Cairo Conference." Ethiopia, on the other hand, rejected Egypt's attempt with the pretext that Cairo was just trying to win publicity by hijacking Somali reconciliation process that would only worsen the condition in Somalia. IGAD members supported Ethiopia's accusations and gave Egypt, a non-IGAD state, a veiled warming not to interfere in Somalia. Egyptian politicians, however, argued that Ethiopia's rejection of the Cairo accord was a result of Ethiopia's desire to see a divided and weak Somalia. Nevertheless, all efforts by any side that signed agreements at different venues failed to bring reconciliation to war-ravaged Somalia. Its territory remained carved out and controlled by various warlords.

Somalis were the most affected by the instability created by themselves. Somalis, who have been craving for more territories, not only lost these but they also lost their country itself. The Egyptian Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN secretary General at the time, warned the Somalis by saying that ". . . the world could forget Somalia in a few minutes." The world, indeed, has forgotten Somalia, though not in a few minutes, but in a few years after his speech.

The present situation

The problem of Somalia that was left to the Somalis came to the attention of the world only a few years ago, that is, when Somalia began to be a safe haven to Islamic Extremists and lately a breeding ground for sea pirates. IGAD member states, supported by OAU and UN, brokered peace deal in Djibouti, which led to the establishment of the Transitional Government of Somalia (TGS). The TGS led by Sheik Sherif, however, could not establish a government that embraces all the different factions in the country. Thus, the prospect for national reconciliation is still dim. This is mainly because there are countries in the region that still want to dominate the politics in Somalia in their favour.

The role which Egypt used to play for a long time is now taken up by Eritrea that had become bitter enemy of the EPRDF regime. The Eritrean government, which is not in a position to make another war owing to internal economic and political crisis, is attempting to engage Ethiopia in a proxy war in Somalia. Therefore, Eritrea is engaged in training and arming the insurgents in Somalia in an attempt to destabilize Ethiopia. The government of Ethiopia in the past has sent its troops into Somali territory to oust the insurgents that have declared Jihad against Ethiopia. After accomplishing its military campaign successfully and staying in Somalia for two years, Ethiopian forces have withdrawn from Somalia. The problem, however, is not solved. The insurgents, receiving support from the Eritrean regime, have regrouped and are now fighting to topple the Transitional Government.

There is no doubt that there are the invisible hands of Egypt and other Arab countries behind Eritrea. This is because Egypt does not want to see an economically, politically and militarily strong Ethiopia. That was the reason why, in the 1977-78 Ogaden war, when the Somali forces were short of ammunition because of Soviet's shift of alliance, Egypt was providing arms to the Somali government to continue the war.

Conclusion and recommendation

Ethiopia is surrounded by countries such as Somalia, Sudan and Djibouti that are members of the Arab League, and Eritrea, that is an associate member. At present, however, Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea are crippled by their own internal and external problems. That is, Somalia is still a failed state, Sudan has its own headache in Darfur and its leaders are in dispute with International Criminal Court (ICC) and Eritrea has sunk into an economic and political crisis. Having pro-Ethiopian government in Somalia, creating good relation with Sudan and even normalizing relations with Eritrea would only bring short-lived advantage to Ethiopia because the relationship with these countries could suddenly change due to internal and external political factors. Furthermore, these countries, Egypt, Sudan Somalia, Eritrea and even Djibouti, that are members of the Arab league and that also share other common values, could, one day, be part of Egypt's unceasing plan of destabilizing Ethiopia.

What helps Ethiopia permanently is, first, to use the present situation that its neighbors are in for its advantage and work hard to solve its economic and political problems and to strengthen its unity in order to stand strong and become the dominant power in the region. Second, the Ethiopian government must handle the matter in Somali cautiously. This is because the Somalis have never publicly renounced their territorial claims and the insurgents have, is so many ways, demonstrated their animosity towards Ethiopia. Therefore, any kind of government which claims control over Somalia could, in the future, raise the issue of "Greater Somalia" as a unifying force. Furthermore, countries such as Egypt and Eritrea could use the situation in Somalia to recreate a Somali government that could be used as an instrument for destabilizing Ethiopia.

Unless the Somalis renounce their irredentist policy, the Government of Ethiopia must campaign for a strong tie with the governments of Somaliland, Puntland, and any kind of government that will emerge in Mogadishu. Somalia, which has been always a thorn in Ethiopia's flesh, is better divided than unified.

Source: The Ethiopian Reporter, Saturday, 08 August 2009

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