Alan Jamieson

In the religious wars that plagued Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries, the aim was to achieve states confessing only one religion. In the nationalist conflicts that racked Europe from the late 18th to the mid-20th centuries, the aim was to achieve ethnic homogeneity.

Judged by these parameters, Somalia should be one of the world's most perfect states – 99 per cent of its population is Sunni Muslim and more than 90 per cent is ethnic Somali. Yet Somalia's reputation is as the world's No. 1 failed state. Clearly, religious and ethnic homogeneity are not enough to overcome humanity's perverse capacity to find differences worthy of slaughter.

Despite its apparent unities, Somalia's Sunnis come in a variety of hues, from the laxer pale green of some northern communities to the deep green of the south, which is home to the most extreme Islamists, currently led by al-Shabab. And while Somalis claim a common ethnicity that leads to demands for reunion with Somali populations in neighboring countries such as Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, their primary loyalty is to competing clans. Even within the main clans, there are family groupings that find grounds for dispute.

The same contrast applies to piracy, the activity that accounts for most of Somalia's international attention at the moment. To many outsiders, Somalis seem like a monolithic nation of pirates, but the reality is much more complex, and worthy of examination as a new piracy season approaches.

Somali piracy is not a nationwide phenomenon. The self-declared state of Somaliland in the north has no pirate activity, while the Islamists in the centre and south of Somalia claim to be hostile to all piracy. The bandits are restricted to Puntland, the autonomous region in Somalia's northeast. The main pirate bases are on the Indian Ocean shore, with a few others on the Gulf of Aden.

These pirates have spent the monsoon season, when bad weather discourages them from going to sea, running down their stock of captured vessels by concluding ransom negotiations. Usually, the pirates have around a dozen captured vessels in their ports, but this has dwindled to five large ships – two Greek-owned, two German-owned and one Turkish-owned. The recent escape of two captured Egyptian fishing boats and their crews has been an embarrassment for the pirates, but this loss has been more than compensated by ransoms totaling at least $8-million (U.S.).

The monsoon season is now ending, and the pirates look forward to a new spate of attacks and captures. But will that happen? Are changes taking place on sea and land that might curb their activities?

The number of countries patrolling off Somalia continues to grow. The navies of the United States, Britain, France and Canada have long been active in the area, but they are now being joined by warships from a group that includes Turkey, Iran, India, Malaysia and South Korea. Even Japan has cleared constitutional obstacles to participating. Soon, as many as 40 warships and support vessels may be patrolling together.

The fact remains, however, that the areas to be patrolled remain immense, even with air support. If warships are concentrated on the Gulf of Aden, the pirates will strike north off Oman or south off the Seychelles. The pirates will undoubtedly find more warships hunting them this year, but their small, swift craft may continue slipping through to make captures.

It is usually said that the long-term solution lies not at sea, but on land. Piracy will be halted only when a stable national government is established in Somalia for the first time since 1991. However, this has been an elusive goal. The current Transitional Federal Government (TFG) rules only part of Mogadishu. It may be internationally recognized, but few Somalis pay it much heed.

To boost its power, Washington has obtained a special exemption from the United Nations Security Council to break the embargo against arms shipments to Somalia. Seventy tonnes of arms are to be supplied to the TFG, with training. Sadly, though, two of the trainers, from the French special forces, have already been kidnapped. And skeptics say most of the new arms will be stolen, captured or sold, ending up in the hands of al-Shabab and other armed groups.

The TFG has also appealed to neighboring countries for troops. But since Ethiopia is unlikely to want to repeat its recent military intervention in Somalia, the appeal was largely aimed at Kenya and the Kenyans have declined. The small African Union peacekeeping force in Mogadishu has recently departed from its supposed neutrality by assisting TFG forces in clashes with al-Shabab, but even remandated and reinforced, it would be unlikely to be able to establish TFG authority in Mogadishu, let alone the entire country.

If the establishment of a true national government seems as far away as ever, recent developments in Puntland seem to point toward a further splintering of Somali political authority. Two pirate clans have been fighting each other at Harardhere, and there seems to be growing unrest that is undermining the regional government's already limited authority. Will this chaos undermine pirate activities, or increase it?

In any case, the chance of a land-based authority curbing piracy remains very remote. At sea, there will be more opposition than in the past, but the risk of capture will still be outweighed by the potential rewards. The pirates will not be much deterred in the coming season.

Alan Jamieson is author of Faith and Sword: A Short History of Christian-Muslim Conflict.

Source: The Globe and Mail on Thursday, Sep. 03, 2009

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