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Issue 412 --
December 19 - 25, 2009
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1969 Military Coup In Somalia – Part V |
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By Dr. Mohamed-Rashid Sh. Hassan The instability of the state structure in Africa primarily comes from the actions of the leaders of the state itself who are supposed to reinforce its stability. A close look at the political behavior of the military regimes in Africa, strange as it may seem, shows that they undermine their own achievements in the previous years of their rule. They gradually destroy the very tools which they could increase the capabilities of the state. During the first years, the military power base rested on seven major organizations which they set up immediately after seizing power: · The Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC): The SRC consisting of the 25 top military officers who were largely instrumental in staging the coup d'état under Barre’s leadership. The SRC held separate meetings chaired by Siyad Barre before their weekly cabinet ministerial meetings, which included some civilians. This shows how the military saw themselves as the ultimate power. · The National Army Forces, under General Mohamed Ali Samatar: Member of the Somali Revolutionary Council, SRC, and a long-time right hand of Siyad Barre, who later became the Minister of Defense as well as vice-president. · The Ministry of Interior, under General Hussein Kulmiye Afrah: SRC member and vice-president on interior matters. · The Ministry of Information and National Guidance, under Col. Ismail Ali Abokar: SRC member and vice-president on party affairs. · The National Security Service, under General Ahmed Suleiman Abdalla: SRC member. · The Council of Ministries: composed of both military officers and civilians’ bureaucrats who were largely educated in the United States, Western European countries, and the Arab world. Barre was chairman of both councils. · The Security Court, under Col. Mohamoud Geelle · Public Relations Office, (PRO) which eventually came under the direct control of Siyad Barre himself transforming its name into national political office (NPO) (Xafiiska Siyassadda Qaranka). This office later developed into what became the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SSRP) in 1976. As Chairman of the SRC, Siyad Barre had the dominant control. He was the strategist and thinker for regime. He regarded Islam and tribalism "Qabyalad" as the main two factors that his enemies might use to topple his regime, and he was right. Because of the exploitation of these two phenomena he was finally overthrown, and clannishness became the option for the opposition when the regime itself revived it and used as a political weapon to suppress and alienate certain sections of society on the basis of their clan, for instance, the Isaak clans. Consolidation of Power through FearIn 1972, Siyad Barre took a further step to consolidate his position within the SRC, and to send a warning to any possible opposition. He executed three high-ranking officials by firing squad on the grounds that they were involved in a counter coup. They were: General Mohamed Einanshe, Colonel Salad Gabeyre and Captain Abdulqadir Dheel. The three belonged to some of the main clans of the country. Einanshe belonged to Isaq sub-clan Habar Yonis, one of the prominent clans in Somaliland, although he lived most of his time in Mogadishu. Salad Gabeyre belonged to Hawiye sub-clan Abgal, that largely inhabit in the Benadir region, of which Mogadishu is the capital. Gabeyre was also married to the daughter of the former President Aden Abdulle Osman and he was the man Siyad Barre mostly feared. Lastly, Captain Abdulqadir Dheel belonged to Majerteen sub-clan Osman Mohamoud. It is generally believed that the main reason Siyad Barre executed these officers was to teach an immediate lesson to the large clans which he thought might pose one day a threat and challenge his authority. The day these officers were executed a song which became almost a signature tune for other executions afterwards was broadcast on Radio Mogadishu: “Beware you rejectionists of peace, a trap of death was set for you”, “Samadiidow dabin baa kuu dhigan lagugu dili doono”. This song revives a nomadic imagery for revenge. In the past when two Somali clans fought each other the victorious clan often recites a poem for boasting “tiiq-tiiqsi”. For Siyad Barre, the action and the song associated with it was interpreted as a revolutionary government executing counter-revolutionaries. This also reminds us of Mao tse-tung Cultural Revolution’s Red Guards in china who when they executed one of the people whom they regarded as anti revolutionary started to compose songs in condemnation. This degree of state violence was unprecedented in the Somali political history. From that day fear entered in the hearts of the population. People were shocked because these officers were not brought to any court and their execution was swift and cruel. To be continued...
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