This is the seventh article of a series of articles that Dr. Mohamed-Rashid analyses the military coup and its legacy

Land Reform Strategy

By Dr. Mohamed-Rashiid Sh. Hassan

Land reform was one of the key components of the regime’s socialist programme but before discussing land reform, a glance must first be given to some of the matters surrounding this issue. Most of the fertile cultivatable land in the country lies on the banks of the two rivers Juba and Shebelle, in southern part of the country. This land was taken over by Italian farmers during fascist government rule in Somalia in the 1930s. The Italian government of the day granted loans and other financial incentives to their unemployed workers in Italy to immigrate and settle in Somalia. Libya, Somalia and Eritrea were the most important Italian colonial posts in Africa, during their colonial period.

When the Italians arrived, they turned most of this land into banana plantations for export to Italy. Somali workers were coerced to dig long canals from the river for these plantations, without proper payment, let alone any workers’ rights. Some were given a small plot of land to cultivate for themselves. The situation was similar to the Feudal system that existed in some parts in Europe before the industrial revolution in Russia, for instance. Many lost their families and loved ones as a result of digging these canals.

One canal dug from Shebelle river to these plantations was named the canal of death, “asayle”. The word is derived from the word asey, which is a white cloth women wear as sign of grief when their relatives die. The main Italian companies involved in the banana plantation and exportation were Saka and Sanka. They enjoyed considerable political power during the colonial government, while Somali workers were exploited and had no protection. When you look at the matter from another angle, these companies were the only ones who had the money and machinery to carry out large-scale projects and provide employment.

When the country achieved its independence in 1960, the national government put pressure on the Italians farmers to relax their system and allow the Somali government and the private sector to enter the banana market. The Italian farmers did not want to lose their total domination. Therefore, they thought of a smart idea and told the government and MPs that they were ready to provide a limited share in banana exportation, described as “quota” (about two thousand quintals of banana) to MPs and Ministers. The MPs and the Ministers would be allocated this share without doing anything and they would get the cost of "quota" in cash. This was apparently a direct bribe and as result any bill brought to the parliament to reform the system was never successful.

In the first Somali government, the Minister for Agriculture was Ahmed Haji Dualeh “Ahmed Kaise” a British educated Northerner. Being trained in a system of governance in which accountability and transparency were strictly adhered to, it became too difficult for him to overcome the influence of the Italian farmers over government and parliament, and the corruption surrounding the banana exportation system. He resigned and decided to leave the country; he was only later persuaded to accept an ambassadorial post.

In the early years, following their socialist agenda, the military regime introduced what was described as land reform with far reaching interventionist measures, in the agricultural sector including the banana sector, which was in the hands of Italian farmers since 1930. The Italian farmers had a monopoly of this sector through “Mafia-like connections”. Like the successive Somali governments before them, the military regime at the end of the day did not make any fundamental change to the system. The Italian farmers found new friends in the military establishment, too.

It is important to understand that the banana question in Somalia has been always at the centre of economic and political power. For instance, one of the main reasons why warring factions within the United Somali Congress (USC) ferociously fought around Mogadishu and Merka harbors and prolonged the Somali civil war after the collapse of the military regime in 1991, was linked to who would control the banana exportation from these ports. The solution or lack of solution of this problem has been a major ingredient in the Somali social, economic and political crisis as well as the continuation of civil wars.

Following Stalinist method of coercion, the regime established collective farms in the Soviet style on the previously uncultivated fertile areas around the two main rivers: Juba and Shebelle. Nomadic communities affected by drought were moved from other regions and unemployed young people were rounded up from the capital and other places; and both were given some plots of land in these areas. They were also given agricultural equipment and other basic materials and were forced to settle down in what the military described as “crash programmes projects".

The first Minister for Agriculture appointed by the military was Abdulle Aw Farah who had worked for the United Nations for a long time as an agriculture expert. He left his post in the belief that he could help his country at this time of national excitement and historical change. Immediately he rejected most of the ideas of land reform. He described the idea of collectivization as economically unproductive. He strongly argued that a Stalinist type of collectivization would not work in Somalia, and was a negative policy for development. When the military leadership insisted on this course of action, Farah resigned and went back to his work in the United Nations. Dr. Omar Salah who had studied Agriculture in East Germany and was very keen to carry out the land reform programme as the military and their Soviet advisers wanted replaced him. It received hostile responses from the entire farming communities both Somalis and Italian landowners. The small traders whose business was linked to the farming market also resented it. It was clear that land reform was hurting those it was supposed to help and in the end the policy was a complete failure.

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