By Nikolas Gvosdev

U.S. strategies in two key fronts of the ongoing struggle against terrorism and extremism -- Afghanistan and Somalia -- are predicated on one critical element: the eventual emergence of a central government that can establish its writ throughout the territory nominally under its jurisdiction.

And in both cases, the central governments that exist on paper seem to offer little hope for success. Diplomats may recognize Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, the head of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), as president of Somalia, and Hamid Karzai has held the presidency in Afghanistan for many years now. But oftentimes it seems that both men are, in essence, the mayors of Mogadishu and Kabul, respectively.

Testifying before the Africa subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs last month, professor Ken Menkhaus had this to say (.pdf) about the TFG, which he called the "cornerstone" of U.S. strategy in Somalia:

Six years into its initial five-year transition, the TFG has utterly failed across the entire range of tasks it assumed in late 2004. It has failed to establish itself as a minimally functional government, advance key transitional tasks, broaden itself as a unity government, and extend its authority beyond a few neighborhoods of Mogadishu protected by African Union peacekeepers. It has done nothing to improve the security of its citizens or provide them access to basic services. It has not improved conditions for the private sector. It has not facilitated the flow and planning of international development aid and humanitarian assistance. And it has not proven to be a useful partner for external states seeking to monitor and reduce the security threats emanating from Somalia.

The problems faced by the central government in Afghanistan are perhaps more widely known. Former Deputy National Security Adviser Bob Blackwill summed them up as follows:

Afghan President Hamid Karzai's deeply corrupt government -- as unpopular as the Taliban -- shows no sign of improvement, and Afghanistan has no history of a robust central government. Allied efforts to substitute Western nation-building for Afghan nation-building will continue to fall short.

In both cases, however, the U.S. approach is to focus on strengthening a central government in the hope that it can somehow extend its control, with Washington providing aid and assistance, as well as direct military intervention in the case of Afghanistan.

Less time, of course, has been spent on the fundamental question of whether or not the two countries really have central governments that can fulfill the roles envisioned for them. Moreover, Washington has been reluctant to engage more-promising regional governments for fear of encouraging separatism.

That may change, however, as the Obama administration faces the prospect of diminishing resources, which could spur Washington to rethink its insistence on dealing with central governments.

J. Peter Pham, a longtime Africa observer, argues that just such a course correction is now needed in U.S. policy toward Somalia:

It is high time that the United States and Somalia's other international partners look after their own legitimate interests and refocus their energies on minimizing and containing the harm caused by the interim regime's ineffectiveness and corruption, while strengthening those functional parts of the former Somali state and integrating them into the framework for regional security and stability. 

In particular, he makes the case for dealing directly with Somaliland, even if, for political reasons, the United States and Europe are reluctant to endorse its claims to full independence. 

When it comes to Afghanistan, Blackwill similarly advises the administration to pursue a de facto partition, which "offers the best available U.S. alternative to strategic defeat. . . . We would then focus on defending the northern and western regions -- containing roughly 60 percent of the population. These areas, including Kabul, are not Pashtun-dominated, and locals are largely sympathetic to U.S. efforts."

These are provocative positions, at odds with current U.S. policies in both Somalia and Afghanistan, and Blackwill, in particular, is under no illusions that a de facto partition will offer an automatic guarantee of success. But in the absence of any signs of real progress in terms of creating a viable central government in Somalia, and with real concerns about whether the McChrystal-Petraeus strategy can turn things around in Afghanistan given the timetable imposed by U.S. domestic politics, having "plan Bs" is important.

The State Department is understandably concerned about encouraging anything that might challenge the territorial integrity of a state -- particularly when it comes to Somalia, given the fragility of countries throughout Africa and the damage that encouraging separatism can do in terms of stability. But our experience in balancing Kurdish demands for independence with preserving the overall territorial integrity of the Iraqi state might give us a model for being able to work much more effectively -- and directly -- with regional authorities that have proven track records in both Afghanistan and Somalia. In particular, if local leaders are offered guarantees that they will be able to retain their autonomy in an eventually united Somalia or Afghanistan, they might be willing to forego any separatist claims they are currently advancing.

We already have such entities in place in Somalia -- Somaliland and Puntland. In Afghanistan, more of an effort should be devoted to strengthening provincial institutions. While the Afghan presidential election took up much of the time and effort of the international community in 2009, working from the district level upward -- to create effective provinces and groups of provinces, rather than putting all our hopes in a strengthened and responsive central government -- might be a better use of resources that will grow increasingly scarce over time.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Navy or the U.S. government. His weekly WPR column, The Realist Prism, appears every Friday.

Photo: Afghan President Hamid Karzai (U.S. Department of State photo by Keith Thompson).

Source: World Politics Review, July 16, 2010

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